Russia's "Lessons Learned" from Ukraine and Syria

POLITICAL AND MILITARY LESSONS OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR, 2023

The aim of the article is to draw conclusions on the future course of the war and the future of NATO-Russia relations, analyzing the aims, causes, political and military lessons of the Russian-Ukrainian war that started on 24 February 2022, from a year and a half's perspective. The Russian President has stated that the aim of the "special military operation" is to demilitarize Ukraine, denazify it and liberate the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. As Ukraine did not pose a military threat to Russia at the beginning of the Russian aggression, demilitarization cannot be considered a valid objective. Denazification (ending the cult of Bandera, removing extremist nationalists from political life of Ukraine and the Ukrainian army, investigating atrocities committed by extremist nationalists against the ethnic Russian population, bringing the perpetrators to justice) was an unrealistic objective given the official Ukrainian domestic policy of creating a new Ukrainian identity and the double standards of the EU and OSCE on national minority issues and the use of banned symbols. The most complex problem, the status of the Russian minority and the separatist territories, could have been resolved by implementing the Minsk agreements, but the Russian military presence in the separatist territories after 2014 calls into question whether Moscow was serious about the Minsk agreements. In the meantime, it has also emerged that Ukraine, France and Germany did not intend to implement the Minsk agreements, they did not prefer a peaceful settlement, and they actively supported the preparation of the Ukrainian army for the liberation of Luhansk, Donetsk and Crimea, which would have led to Russian military intervention in any case. This fact does not justify the legitimacy of the Russian special military operation, but merely puts it in a different light. It seems that the real aim was to overthrow the anti-Russian Ukrainian regime, to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, to eliminate the Western military presence in Ukraine and to drastically resolve the situation of the Russian minority in Ukraine. In the Russian view, the series of reasons for the war began with the failure to keep the US-German promise to Gorbachev that if the united Germany could remain a member of NATO, the organization would not expand eastwards. Despite the official position, the West sees NATO expansion as its own unilateral and forced expansion, because it believes that the inevitable disintegration of Eastern Europe makes NATO expansion inevitable in order to contain instability. NATO's defensive nature and the extension of the defense zone are a guarantee for dealing with the instability that is likely to arise. According to another Western approach, European security depends on effective cooperation between the five great powers, which has been undermined by US foreign policy driven by US domestic policy, essentially aimed at the unconditional expansion of NATO. The expansion would have been more acceptable by not integrating the new members into NATO's military structure, by not insisting that NATO membership be accessible to everyone, and by maintaining the de facto nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe. Ukraine's hasty invitation to join NATO was a disregard for the organization's membership requirements, a subordination of those requirements to US political will, a disregard for Russia's security needs, and a rejection of the OSCE's basic principle of "one and indivisible security" (no country can improve its own security situation at the expense of others). Ukraine is not expected to meet these requirements in the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, the same applies to Ukraine's accession to the EU. The lessons of the war so far can be summarized as follows:-NATO enlargement and the export of Western democracy will continue, the collective Western policy towards Russia and Ukraine will not change, the confrontation between the United States and Russia will escalate to the extreme, the chances of a negotiated settlement of the war will diminish day by day, and the chances of a NATO-Russian military confrontation will increase day by day.-The collective West helps and supports Ukraine militarily, economically and financially until the significant all-round weakening of Russia, but does not define the criteria for all-round weakening, which makes the strategy incomprehensible.-We can assume, on the basis of concrete historical examples and an analysis of Russia's internal situation that the collapse of Russia is unlikely, despite tens of thousands of sanctions and Western military support for Ukraine.-It is pointless to hope for a change in Russian policy, as Western sanctions are already directed against the Russian language, culture, sport and existence of Russia, which further strengthens the internal support for the Russian leadership.-The crisis in Ukraine has highlighted a central problem in contemporary political theory and practice: politicians steadfastly deny that something as seemingly moral as democracy can be destructive. Yet a number of countries have already demonstrated that democracy cannot be practiced where there are no stable, accountable institutions and where there is no political culture that values the rule of law.

Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 61-85., 2018

The current state of coexistence in international arena is contested. Russian Federation (RF) cannot come to terms with the fact that following the dissolution of the USSR, it sustained substantial losses, especially with regards to its role globally. The team of Putin is striving to rebuild the power of their country. The Russian society, used to sacrifices for the homelands, offers its invaluable support. A lot of effort is put in the development of the armaments sector. As a result, the structure, command and mobilization the Armed Forces have substantially improved. The RF Armed Forces prepare for a possible armed conflict. Various types of exercise are conducted; frequently maneuvers take place in proximity to the borders of NATO member-states. This paper examines these developments and suggest possible ways of bypassing the emerging challenges.

Land Forces Academy Review

In this paper we will throw a close look on the recent and contemporary military and hybrid phenomenons that curently shape both European and world security structure. In terms of security, seeing through the lens of intellingence and, at the same time, having a deep empirical and epistemological knowledge about the military events that occured near the European border, the world has had serious concerns regarding the russian foreign policy and its geostrategic plans. We will analyze the premises of the Russian military intervention, the hybrid methods used and most importantly what conclusions and valuble lessons Europe, NATO and the West had learned for the future. Moreover, we will see what policies led to these consequences and which strategies will be intended to support decisions and governance regarding the current threats. Systematically, we will try to reveal an efficient physiognomy of the risks, dangers, and threats and what could have been done to stop the current Russia...

The present article intends to study the practical manifestation of Russia's new generation war (novoe pokolenie voyni) concept in the recent armed conflicts Russia has been involved in. The analysis intends to find answers to the question to what extent the concept of a new generation war can be applied to describe the Russian involvement in the wars in Ukraine and Syria, by focusing on the use of military power.

Expeditions with MCUP

This article deals with the tactical lessons of the first six months of the Russian war in Ukraine. The war, which has sent seismic shocks throughout the world, was conceived by many to be a new kind of conflict, with innovative, high-technology weapons and equipment bringing a sea change to the history of warfare. However, a closer look shows a more nuanced picture. While there are many lessons to be learned from this war, it is not as much a break with the past as it is a continuation of it. For all the technology being introduced, not only do tactics remain important, but the war itself is closer in many aspects to the “classic” wars of the twentieth century than to any futuristic concept of warfare.

Various models of explanation have been utilized to elaborate greater understanding of how Russia’s Armed Forces were used in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These models often fail to reflect Russian military culture, operational strategy, doctrine, tactics and military art. The following paper analyses in detail, drawing upon the author’s extensive expertise on the Russian Armed Forces and his assessment of open source reporting on the conflict in Ukraine, Russia’s use of military power in two very different operational environments: in Crimea and southeastern Ukraine. This study seeks to address the following: how did Moscow mastermind its military operation to size Crimea in February-March 2014 and why did this go so smoothly? Why did Ukrainian forces refuse to fight? What were the differences in Russia’s use of military power in southeastern Ukraine? How did these operational environments differ? What was the primary mission of regular Russian military forces in Donbas? The author assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Russian and Ukrainian forces locally in Crimea on the eve of conflict; describes why the operation was so successful; sets out the case that the operational environment and Russia’s conventional force weaknesses were key drivers in how operations were conducted in these different theaters; concludes that the Ukrainian Armed Forces with less combat training and combined-arms exercise experience than their Russian counterparts were stymied in southeastern Ukraine using relatively low numbers of Russian inserted forces alongside rebel forces; while most focus has been on Russian combat roles in Donbas their primary mission has been to train and equip local rebel forces—modeled on the organizational structure of the Russian Armed Forces (brigade-based with battalion tactical groups deployed to conduct manoeuvre warfare against Ukrainian battalions). This study also concludes that while Moscow has retained control over conflict escalation during the conflict, its relatively low-scale use of regular forces and Special Forces reflects Russia’s limited conventional military power and its leadership’s anxiety to avoid being drawn into a larger-scale commitment to an open ended conflict. Finally, in terms of the covert use of the Black Sea Fleet base in Crimea from which Russian Special Forces and marine infantry initially began to spread out across Crimea and surround and blockade key strategic targets, the author argues that Russia would struggle to replicate such an operation on a territory in which it lacks a large military base.

2016

La reforma militar rusa de 2008: ¿una respuesta adecuada a las amenazas y retos del siglo veintiuno? La réforme militaire russe de 2008: une réponse adéquate aux menaces et aux défis du XXIe siècle? A reforma militar russa de 2008: uma resposta adequada às ameaças e desafios do século XXI? Andres Eduardo Fernandez-Osorio a 2008 Russian military reform: An adequate response to global threats and challenges of the twenty-first century? *

The Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies, 2025

This book chapter examines the early phases of Russia's ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine. Initial Russian operations saw numerous attempts to ‘rush’ objectives before the defence could respond effectively. While Russia forces initially gained considerable ground in the east, they failed to seize Kyiv and were subsequently pushed back near Kherson and Kharkiv. These setbacks were undoubtedly a ‘wake-up call’ for the Russian leadership and society, which would result in a partial mobilisation of reserves. Having pulled back from the western bank of the Dnepr near Kherson and been pushed back below Kharkiv, Russian forces consolidated and sought to gain ground through a more methodical and attritional strategy. Certainly, by the end of the year, not only had the front lines stabilised, but Russian forces were again in a position to undertake limited and focussed offensive operations.

This broad overview of Russia’s military capability is not a catalogue of equipment but rather an indicator of trends. Individual sections discuss a range of current factors affecting overall capability that are still in flux, including issues of affordability, manning, organizational development, and the implementation of lessons learned from Ukraine and Syria. This white paper also considers short-term timelines of opportunities versus threats—perceived or actual—for the Russian military, before concluding with a number of broad recommendations.

The entire concept of the Western world to install a “moderate” opposition government in Syria has hopelessly failed. The strategic analysis of the Russian intervention takes into account the assessments of the so called “Arab Spring”, the situation in Syria, the policies of the allies of the Assad regime as well as its opponents or enemies. All these aspects are focused on the realities and the prospects of the Russian military intervention. Key words: Arab Spring, Assad regime, civil war, ISIS1, Kurds, military intervention, Russia, Syria, US, West