Academia.eduAcademia.edu

Guest Editorial Game Theory for Networks, Part I

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Abstract

N EXT-GENERATION networks will be characterized by three key features: heterogeneity, in terms of technologies and services, dynamics, in terms of rapidly varying environments and uncertainty, and size, in terms of the numbers of users, nodes, and services. The emergence of such large-scale and decentralized heterogeneous networks operating under dynamic and uncertain environments imposes new challenges in the design, analysis, and optimization of networks. The past decade has witnessed a confluence among the disciplines of networks, games, and economics, which has necessitated novel mathematical tools and designs that can truly remove the boundaries between these disciplines. In this context, advancing game-theoretic models and tailoring them towards the optimization and operation of future networked systems become pressing needs for our research community. The main goal of this IEEE JSAC Special Issue on "Game Theory for Networks" is to collect cutting-edge contributions that address and show the latest developments in game-theoretic models for emerging networking applications. The response of the community to the call has been overwhelming. We received a total of 120 submissions. We want to thank all the authors who submitted their works to this Special Issue. After a strict and selective review process, we accepted 40 papers and decided to publish two issues. Papers were selected based on their appropriateness for and relevance to the Special Issue as well as their technical merits. Unfortunately, a number of interesting papers did not make the cut because of the criteria set forth above and also due to the constraints on the total page count in a JSAC Special Issue. We hope that such interesting papers will find other venues for publication.

Key takeaways

  • The ninth paper "Pay or Perish: the economics of premium peering" considers the two-sided market structure of the Internet, where access providers charge content providers for premium services beyond best-effort connectivity.
  • At the center of the debate, service providers and content providers argue whether service and price differentiation should be allowed for Internet transport services, e.g., content delivery and IP transit services.
  • Real data are used to numerically evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms, and to draw useful engineering insights for the operation of wireless providers.
  • The design of crowdsourcing incentive mechanisms has drawn numerous interests from the research community, and auctions are one of the commonly adopted types of mechanisms.
  • He has over 800 publications in systems, control, communications, networks, and dynamic games, including books on noncooperative dynamic game theory, robust control, network security, wireless and communication networks, and stochastic networked control.