Cambridge Companion to Seneca: The Senecan Self
Shadi Bartsch
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Abstract
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This paper explores the concept of selfhood in Seneca's Stoic philosophy, contrasting the 'proficient self' and 'ideal self.' It argues that the Senecan self is dynamic and engaged in continual self-improvement through various practices such as meditatio, self-review, and rational discourse. The analysis reaffirms the Stoic unity of self against dualistic interpretations, highlighting the philosophical implications of self-correction, the pursuit of virtue, and the often unachievable ideal of the Stoic sage.
Key takeaways
- Not in a single letter does Seneca stand on the past heap of his personal history to announce, "Mission re.
- Seneca uses the anecdotes and lessons of the Epistles to show us proficient self (including his own) falling prey to bad judgments about the world around it.
- Indeed, Seneca is consistently negative on the issue of human flesh.
- In this use of artisanal metaphors, Seneca is innovating, even within the Stoic tradition.
- It is instead the other self that Seneca staged: the one at court.
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“Constructing Oneself in Horace and Seneca.” In: Stöckinger, M. – Winter, K. – Zanker, T. (eds.) Horace and Seneca: Interactions, Intertexts, Interpretations.
A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.
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