Skeptical arguments and deep disagreement

Cambridge University Press eBooks, 2000

2000

Philosophical Studies, 2009

The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 373-375, 1994

In "The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism" I argue that traditional global epistemological skepticism is incoherent because it mistakenly assumes that we can question our knowledge of the external world without undermining our self-knowledge. The rationale behind my argument is the idea that, since we are substantial agents who exist and act "in the world" among other material beings, the view that our knowledge of our own existence and nature is or can be exclusively subjective is misguided. In a critical response to my essay, Anthony Brueckner claims that my reasoning fails to discredit the idea that one can adopt both "the Cartesian conception of self-knowledge as involving an inference to the existence of a mental substance" and "the Cartesian skeptical view concerning knowledge of the external world. Brueckner believes that my argument is of the "transcendental" variety, and I suspect he also believes that any reasoning of that kind is fatally flawed. In this discussion I explain why my argument escapes Brueckner's objection.

The Philosophical Review, 2012

Epistemologists and philosophers of mind both ask questions about belief. Epistemologists ask normative questions about belief—which beliefs ought we have? Philosophers of mind ask metaphysical questions about belief—what are beliefs, and what does it take to have them? While these issues might seem independent of one another, there is potential for an interesting sort of conflict-the epistemologist might think we ought to have beliefs that, according to the philosopher of mind, it is impossible to have. In this paper, I argue that this conflict does arise, and that it creates problems for traditional skeptical views in epistemology. In particular, I will argue that on certain popular views about the nature of belief, it is impossible to adopt the near-global agnosticism recommended by the skeptical epistemologist. On other plausible views, it is only possible in special circumstances, and this limitation undermines skeptical epistemological claims. The only views about the nature of belief on which there are no metaphysical hurdles to adopting the agnosticism recommended by the skeptic are views that face powerful objections—objections that are completely independent of anti-skeptical epistemological considerations.

Journal of Philosophy, 2007

Virtually every epistemological theory that is currently a live option is committed to two theses: fallibilism and attributabilism. A new argument for skepticism is advanced, which is grounded in the incompatibility of these two theses. It is then argued that the main responses to traditional skepticism—epistemic externalism, contextualism, and Moorean common sense—are ineffective with respect to this new type of skepticism.

Synthese, 2009

External world skeptics are typically opposed to admitting as evidence anything that goes beyond the purely phenomenal, and equally typically, they disown the use of rules of inference that might enable one to move from premises about the phenomenal alone to a conclusion about the external world. This seems to bar any a posteriori resolution of the skepticism debate. This paper argues that the situation is not quite so hopeless, and that an a posteriori resolution of the debate becomes possible once it is recognized that the skeptic holds overly defensive and ill-motivated positions vis-à-vis both evidence and inference, and that more reasonable ones are available. In stating these more reasonable positions, as well as in showing how they make possible an a posteriori resolution of the skepticism debate, the paper draws on the machinery of Bayesian epistemology.

2015

ABSTRACT Nowadays, when one doubts or questions extraordinarily, he is branded a skeptic and consequently resisted. The reason for this anachronistic approach towards the skeptic as an individual, and skepticism as a method or an attitude is not far-fetched. For example, people usually think that skeptics are men whose basic mood is that of doubt. Also they argue that skeptics are those who deny absolutely that true knowledge is possible. In this work, our attempt generally is to show how wrong this position is, and specifically, it is to restate that rather than denying the possibility of certain knowledge, skepticism is a philosophical method of inquiry or epistemological attitude towards knowledge whose goal is indeed certainty, but which selects a serious universal doubt concerning all knowledge as the starting point of a theory of knowledge. In this context therefore, the paradox of skepticism in epistemological enterprise would demand that whoever wants certain knowledge should proceed through doubt. Ordinarily, one would have thought that the best way to certainty is by accepting entirely all that one is told especially when it comes from a sage, or a tradition. Unfortunately, the position of this paper suggests otherwise.

1992

An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an objective world beyond our subjective experiences. I argue that there is there is a fatal flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "external world." Therefore, no such justification is necessary. The feature of skepticism which I believe renders it vulnerable is the assumption that each of us has a right to be certain of his own existence as a subject of conscious experience even in the face of comprehensive doubt about our empirical beliefs.

Synthese 143 (2005), pp.273-290

Some philosophers understand epistemological skepticism as merely presenting a paradox to be solved, a paradox given rise to by some apparently forceful arguments. I argue that such a view needs to be justified, and that the best way to do so is to show that we cannot help seeing skepticism as obviously false. The obviousness (to us) of the falsity of skepticism is, I suggest, explained by the fact that we cannot live without knowledge-beliefs (a knowledge-belief about the world is a belief that a person or a group of people know that p, where p is an empirical proposition about the world). I then go on to argue for the indispensability of knowledge-beliefs. The first line of argument appeals to the practical aspects of our employment of the concept of knowledge, and the second line of argument draws on some Davidsonian ideas concerning understanding and massive agreement.