Document Analysis AH and Wilhelm

2016

A Summary of the Causes and Consequences of the First World War from an Orthodox Christian Point of View

In any broad survey of the European landscape over the last thee hundred years, it is evident that nearly all paths go through Germany. It becomes impossible to study German politics and diplomacy without quickly realizing that all roads in Germany lead to the military. Militarism and strict obedience shaped every form of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German life and culture. In the weeks prior the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914, the French journalist Georges Bourdon made an observation that embodies the core of this thesis. He wrote, “such and such country may possess an army, but Germany is an army that possesses a country.” This research project focuses on “the cult of the offensive” that developed within German militarism, its crucial role in her rise to prominence in Europe, and the consequences for Germany, and for Europe, when a military culture dictates domestic and foreign policy. Extensive research examines the German how as a roadmap to understanding and explaining the Germany why. In analyzing the how, it becomes possible to reroute traditional conversations on the pure mechanics of German militarism by historians such as Gerhard Ritter and Gordon Craig; into a conversation that focuses on how the ideologies of military theorists such as Clausewitz and the Elder Moltke shaped the cultural mindset. Two of the most influential German thinkers -- Nietzsche and Treitschke – built and expanded on this “cult of the offensive,” and translated it into the egoism of Germany’s pre-determination for “greatness.” Wilhemine Germany was unique in embracing offensive rather than the defensively minded strategies adopted by the other great Powers of the era: England, France and Russia. Polices which had kept the European peace for almost one hundred years. The crowning achievement of the German “cult of the offensive” was the development of the most famous war plan in history – the Schlieffen Plan - named for its creator and architect, Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff between 1891 and 1905. With her geography at heart of Central Europe, and with no natural defensive barriers such as mountains or waterways, the German states had a long-developed fear of encirclement; and by 1900, her enemies included France in the West, and Russia in the East. Schlieffen Plan’s was an aggressive first-strike should Imperial Germany be forced to fight a war on two fronts. The driving force of Schlieffen’s Plan was speed; Germany must quickly and decisively defeat the French, so she could turn the full force of her attention towards Russia, within six weeks. A key element of the Plan called for the invasion neutral Belgium in order to facilitate an attack on France that would sandwich the French armies between a strong left German flank and even stronger right one. Schlieffen was a brilliant strategist and meticulously planned and choreographed every detail down to the hour. The German government and High Command believed that with the Schlieffen Plan in their back pocket, when - not if- war came, German victories would be swift and crushing. With “cult of the offensive” tactics, Germany could not loose. Reliance was so heavy on Schlieffen’s war planning that no contingencies were considered. The Plan was exhaustive but left no flexibility for an enemy who might behave differently than expected; or battles which might take longer than anticipated. In prizing speed and an aggressive first-strike above all else, any disruptions or delays in the prescribed timetable became deadly. This research reaffirms that it is inaccurate to say that the Schlieffen Plan lost the Great War for Germany however; it did contribute considerably. Moreover, it was the unshakable confidence in the infallibility of the Schlieffen Plan that prompted Germany’s aggressive policies in the summer of 1914 and led her down a path of such deadly destruction that the Paris peacemakers found it necessary to include the punitive Article 231 – the German War Guilt Clause – in the Versailles Treaty. It is the harshness of Article 231 that laid the foundations for the Third Reich and a second world war a mere 21 years later.

The present study investigates the changes in Austro-Hungarian concepts related to Serbia after the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. These two extremist ideologies mentioned in the title clearly mark the range of diverse opinions in Austria-Hungary regarding the Serbian problem. After 1903 Serbia was considered not only as a barrier to the Austro-Hungarian economic penetration into the peninsula, but as a growing threat to the existence of the Hungarian statehood – at least according to Hungarian politicians. The attitude towards Serbia varied from conquering the state to temporary occupation, mutilation or total division of the country between her neighbours (including or excluding Austria-Hungary) and to the economic subjection as the least aggressive plan. The emergence of these plans was always a question of strength of different pressure groups and the changes in the situation on the battlefields in 1912–1915.

2017

Previous years must be known before the topic begins. King Frederick Wilhelm IV suffered a stroke and became mentally disabled, in 1857 Wilhelm I became the Royal Regent for his brother. Then, after King Frederick Wilhelm IV died childless, Wilhelm I became the King of Prussia in 1861. In the following years, he waged campaigns against Denmark, Austria, and, ultimately, France. In 1871, during the Franco-Prussian War, Wilhelm I was proclaimed Emperor (Kaiser) of a now united German state. When Bismarck tells him that he will support the reorganization, Wilhelm I decided to appoint Bismarck.He took Otto von Bismarck, the well-known "blood and iron chancellery", as prime minister.With the help of Bismarck, King Wilhelm rapidly modernized Germany, making it into one of the most dominant military and economic powers in Europe. However,after these great years King Wilhelm I died on March 9th, 1888 in Berlin.He always supported his chancellor, Bismarck, in efforts to transform Germany into a modern state, and a hegemonic power in Europe. His son became Frederick III, German Emperor, but regrettably died a few months therefore became Kaiser Wilhelm II. Central to the unification of Germany and the success of the new German Empire was the relationship between the Old Kaiser (Wilhelm I), and his Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. While building the new German Empire, another less dramatic struggle unfolded was the struggle over the loyalty of the Crown Prince.

Serbian-Italian Relations: History and Modern Times, The Institute of History, Belgrade, 2015

The article describes the Austro-Serbian crisis of July 1914 through Italian documents. Franz Ferdinand was not popular in the Habsburg Empire and his death did not cause much grief. However the Italian diplomacy noticed that the Austro-Hungarian government was eager to use the Sarajevo assassination and the alleged responsibility of the Serbian government as a pretext to wage war against Serbia. Rome and Vienna were tied by their mutual belonging to the Triple Alliance, but Italy's Foreign Minister, Sangiuliano, opposed the Austro-Hungarian aggressive attitude. He feared any territorial enlargement of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan region, for such an enlargement would have altered the balance of power in a highly sensitive region to the detriment of Italy.