Hufendiek, James & van Riel 2020 - Introduction Social Functions

Hufendiek, R., James, D., and van Riel, R. (eds.) Social Functions in Philosophy: Metaphysical, Normative, and Methodological Perspectives (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy), p. 18-28., 2020

Analyse and Kritik, 2002

This paper presents a model of functional explanations as a species of ordinary causal explanation and argues that they are widespread for understandable reasons in the social sciences. The remainder of the paper then looks at specific functional explanations in the social research and examines the prospects and problems for those accounts.

Philosophy of Biological Functions

Functional explanations in the social sciences come in two kinds. First, evolutionary or ‘reproduction explanations’, which concern the proliferation of cultural traits. Second, non-evolutionary or ‘persistence explanations’, which account for the stability of institutions. To clarify the distinction, I discuss the causal structure involved in both kinds of explanation. Furthermore, I give it more content by arguing that reproduction explanations are historical, while persistence explanations are ahistorical, at least if they stand on their own. Finally, I argue that an ahistorical account of functions can account for how institutions can malfunction. They generate fewer beneficial consequences, if any at all. This raises the question whether well-functioning institutions are all valuable, as is in fact suggested by the attribution of functions such as cohesion, solidarity and wellbeing. Just as most other forms of social functionalism, rational choice functionalism suffers from this problem. Yet, it can be solved by rejecting welfarism, the theory of value with which rational choice theory is commonly combined.

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Philosophy of Science, 1999

This paper defends a social functionalist interpretation, modeled on psychological functionalism, of the meanings of social facts. Social functionalism provides a better explanation of the possibility of interpreting other cultures than approaches that identify the meanings of social facts with either mental states or behavior. I support this claim through a functionalist reinterpretation of sociological accounts of the categories that identify them with their collective representations. Taking the category of causality as my example, I show that if we define it instead in terms of its functional relations to moral rules, it becomes easier to recognize in other cultures.

Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms (edited by P. Demeulenaere), 2011

In this paper I will discuss mechanistic explanation in the social sciences from the point of view of the philosophical theory of explanation. My aim is to show that the current accounts of mechanistic explanation do not serve the agenda of analytical social science as well as they should. I will not challenge the idea that causal explanations in the social sciences involves mechanisms or that social scientists should seek causal explanations and a mechanistic understanding of social phenomena, but will argue that to improve explanatory practices in the social sciences analytical social scientists should employ tools more substantial than the metaphor of a mechanism.

European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2021

Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like economics, psychology, and biology. Generally construed, functionalism is the view that states or processes can be individuated based on what role they play rather than what they are constituted of or realized by. Recently, Weiskopf (2011a, 2011b) has posited a reformulation of functionalism on the model-based approach to explanation. We refer to this reformulation as ‘new functionalism’. In this paper, we seek to defend new functionalism and to recast it in light of the concrete explanatory aims of the special sciences. In particular, we argue that the assessment of the explanatory legitimacy of a functional kind needs to take into account the explanatory purpose of the model in which the functional kind is employed. We aim at demonstrating this by appealing to model-based explanations from the social and behavioral sciences. Specifically, we focus on preferences and signals as functional...

Philosophia, 1973

2012

Abstract In this paper, I provide a critical examination of Warren Schmaus's recently systematized “functionalist” approach to the study of collective representations. I examine both the logical and the conceptual viability of Schmaus's brand of “functionalism” and the relation between his rational reconstruction and philosophical critique of Durkheim and the latter's original set of proposals.

Noûs, 2023

Social scientists appeal to various "structures" in their explanations including public policies, economic systems, and social hierarchies. Significant debate surrounds the explanatory relevance of these factors for various outcomes such as health, behavioral, and economic patterns. This paper provides a causal account of social structural explanation that is motivated by Haslanger (2016). This account suggests that one way that social structure is explanatory is in virtue of operating as a causal constraint, which is a causal factor with unique characteristics. A novel causal framework is provided for understanding these explanations-this addresses puzzles regarding the mysterious causal influence of social structure, how to understand its relation to individual choice, and what makes it more explanatory (and causally responsible) for various outcomes.