‘Russia and the West want the same thing’

In 2018, the dynamics of International Relations highlights on the U.S and Russia relations which are now at the low point of the second cycle of great expectations and profound disappointment since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. In both countries there is a widespread belief that things have gone terribly wrong, and that the other side is largely at fault. But an objective look at the United States and Russia, and the world more generally, would have laid bare the formidable obstacles to building far ranging positive relations, no matter what experts were writing and political leaders were saying about the end of history, the lure of free markets and democracy, and the democratic peace.

2017

Unsuccessful attempts by Russia to push Ukraine to join the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union and successful Russian pressure on the country to drop its Association Agreement with the EU led to political protests in Kiev in fall 2013. In spring 2014, while revolution brought pro-European regime change in Ukraine, Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and started a war in Donbas, violating international law, various bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as undermining the foundations of the post-Cold War order in Europe. It led to the most serious crisis in Russian–Western relations since the end of the Cold War, involving mutual sanctions by the United States, the EU and some other Western allies on one side and Russia on the other. However grave the crisis is, these events are yet another in a whole series of crises between Russia and the West over the 25 years since the breakup of the Soviet Union. On the other hand we also witnessed periods of quite positive, pragmatic cooperation between the two during that time. Unfortunately, none of these lasted long, nor was able to create a critical mass allowing for a positive breakthrough in mutual relations. This chapter is a modest attempt to offer some interpretations that may be helpful in answering questions: why it has happened and where we should go from here? In the first part it assesses differences between Russia and the West related to perceptions, political cultures, values and interests. In the second part it provides several conclusions based on analysis of past periods of both cooperation and conflict between the two sides. In the third part it gives recommendations on Western policies toward Russia: what approaches should be avoided and why, as well as what policies should be pursued.

Washington Quarterly, 2007

New Perspectives, 2016

Vladimir Putin's conservative turn, coupled with imposition of Western sanctions on Russia during Crimean crisis, has aggravated country's international isolation that resulted in diminished enthusiasm on both sides to go back to "business as usual." Seemingly, the current turmoil is the consequence of prevalent misperceptions and abiding unsettled issues in the West-Russia relations. In an effort to undercut its isolation, Russia turned to the East with an aim to forge its ties with China. This article examines the major limitations and opportunities of Russia's cooperation with the West and China from the perspective of its national interests. By doing so, the main text outlines the three fundamental national interests of Russia and seeks to elucidate, how these interests are incompatible with the West's vision and why it can impede healing relations between Russia and the West in a near future. Along with identifying Russia's national interests, first part of article sets out to discuss the deep-seated discrepancies between Russia's expectations and the West's actual response to them. The second part of article highlights the main tenets of Russia-China "win-win" relations and explains why businesslike cooperation with China seems more compatible with Russia's national interests in a short-term perspective.

Social Science Research Network, 2018

In April 2018, the dynamics of International Relations highlights on the U.S and Russia contesting major power relations which are now at the low point of the second cycle of great expectations and profound disappointment since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. In both countries there is a widespread belief that things have gone terribly wrong, and that the other side is largely at fault. It presents how conflicting mutual interests exist in Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Iran, and the Democratic People's of Republic of Korea. Even though an objective look at the United States and Russia, and the world more generally, would have lain bare the formidable obstacles to building far ranging positive relations. In fact, in global politics, at international level, there is no matter what decision-makers quarrelling and scholars were writing and political leaders were saying about the end of human civilization, the lure of globalized free markets and democracy, and the democratic peace.

2018

In a nutshell, these essays—written from wide and often contradictory points of view—tell us that Russia and the West are stuck. Experts and officials from each side are talking past each other, their views rooted in different perceptions and oriented to different interests and goals. An initial conclusion we can draw is that for today, and for the foreseeable future, the key question is not how both sides might develop a cooperative relationship or strike a new modus vivendi, but whether, and to what degree, they can peacefully coexist.

2011

International Politics

Europe's security environment is critically dependent on nature of the relationship between Russia and the broader west. What are the obstacles in the way of a stable partnership? Against the conventional wisdom that foregrounds domestic politics, we establish the importance of an abiding clash of definitions of national interest on both sides. The US and Russian strategic perspectives draw on the modern historical experience of both sides, are consistent with well-established international relations theories and are independent of particular personalities such as Putin's. We demonstrate that though personalities, ideas, and contingency played their roles, these basic clashing perspectives existed even during the euphoric days of the Cold War's end. Success in negotiating an improvement of US-Russian relations will require a pragmatic compromise between deeply divergent interests. Stable economic and political relations may be possible, but the first step in attaining it is recognizing the scale of the challenge. A stable partnership with Russia would do wonders for Europe's security. How to attain it? Much of the action centres on domestic politics. Policymakers and commentators in Europe highlight Russia's illiberal and corrupt domestic politics as the root challenge. Russian analysts look to the Trump Presidency as an opening for change. Throughout Europe, different political parties promise new approaches, suggesting that all it takes is governmental change to transform the West-Russia relationship. Without challenging the crucial role domestic politics can play, this paper establishes the importance of an underappreciated barrier to partnership: the clash of deeply embedded definitions of national interest on both sides. The way the west and Russia each seek security in an anarchic world is consistent over time and rooted in each side's historical experience, but the two approaches are hard to reconcile. These approaches are broadly 'rational', moreover, when viewed from the perspective of major theories of international relations. The fact that major theories can easily account for these policies undermines arguments that each side's (and particularly Russia's) approach is patently "irrational," "malevolent," or wholly the product of idiosyncratic domestic political incentives. We proceed in three stages. We begin with the seemingly familiar US-led (and