Technology and Epistemic Possibility

Rationalists assign primacy to rational thought, not to action; irrationalists dispute this. This discrepancy should be recast in view of recent modifications of rationalism.

Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy, 2020

In the process of scientific discovery, knowledge ampliation is pursued by means of non-deductive inferences. When ampliative reasoning is performed, probabilities cannot be assigned objectively. One of the reasons is that we face the problem of the unconceived alternatives: we are unable to explore the space of all the possible alternatives to a given hypothesis, because we do not know how this space is shaped. So, if we want to adequately account for the process of knowledge ampliation, we need to develop an account of the process of scientific discovery which is not exclusively based on probability calculus. We argue that the analytic view of the method of science advocated by Cellucci is interestingly suited to this goal, since it rests on the concept of plausibility. In this perspective, in order to account for how probabilities are in fact assigned in uncertain contexts and knowledge ampliation is really pursued, we have to take into account plausibility-based considerations.

This paper gives an overview of various attempts to spell out how technological knowledge is 'of a different nature' than scientific knowledge. I argue that all such attempts to place technological knowledge into an epistemic category of its own run into problems, and conclude with offering an agenda for more productive philosophical research on technological knowledge.

2020

Echoing the long-held JTB account of knowledge, according to which knowledge can be conceptually analyzed as justified true belief, Backes (2019) argues that our epistemic aim is to believe truly or accurately and emphasizes on that “a belief is justified iff it is highly probable”. We maintain that this line of reasoning is deficient, in terms of epistemic concerns and non-epistemic concerns of interest for both philosophy and legal theory. Specifically, in this short paper, we argue for the ineffectiveness of the aforementioned Backes’ view to meet the challenges posed by the ongoing rapid techno-scientific transformation of our contemporary societies and ways-of life.

Sebastian Neges, 2018

The central idea of this dissertation is that employing epistemic instruments to acquire beliefs and knowledge – artifacts such as thermometers, clocks, telescopes or GPS systems – centrally involves trust in other agents. Put differently, the epistemic work of the instrument-makers is relevant for the epistemic quality of the beliefs that a user can acquire with the instrument. I argue that there is a genuine social epistemic source that I call “instrumentation”. This source of belief, warrant and knowledge is involved if the user relies on an instrument and accepts its outputs because she trusts the instrument-makers for the instrument’s reliability. In short: without a reliable instrument-maker, instrumentational knowledge for the user is impossible. But, there is a received view in analytic epistemology that says otherwise. According to this view, no trust in other agents is involved when we use instruments, there is no such thing as a genuine social epistemic source called “instrumentation”. This received view is fueled by two usually implicitly-accepted intuitions. First, the “Natural Mechanism Intuition”, which says that when it comes to epistemology instruments function like any other mechanism in nature, which provides information about the environment, like – for example – koplik spots indicate the presence of measles. Second, the “Irrelevance of Etiology Intuition”, which says that as long as such a mechanism works reliably, it is irrelevant how it came about. Against this, I argue that instruments are not like natural mechanisms since with instruments humans have a say concerning what shall be represented by the instrument and how. Natural mechanisms happen to be there in nature and can be discovered by us, but with “designed mechanisms”, such as instruments, we actively establish the mechanism and its relation to its environment. This difference between natural and designed mechanisms is also important when it comes to their etiology, the topicf of the second intuition mentioned above. With instruments (as with designed mechanisms in general), it is not irrelevant how they come about. This can be seen when we consider that instruments come with a seal of warranty. Instrument-makers in fact assume responsibility for the reliability of the instrument that they designed, manufactured and calibrated, and users are entitled to call for such reliability. If the etiology of the instrument is irrelevant, this de facto assumption of responsibility would be irrational. I therefore conclude that the Natural Mechanism Intuition is wrong and that the Irrelevance of Etiology intuition cannot be applied to designed mechanisms such as instruments. This clears the way for showing how with instrumentation central bits of the user’s warrant are outsourced to the instrument-maker. This generates an extended body of warrant for the user that comprises not only the user’s proprietary warrant but also the proprietary warrant of the instrument-maker. This uniquely-structured warrant turns instrumentation into a genuine and social epistemic source of beliefs, warrant and knowledge. I close by discussing some objections against my proposal that could be (and have been) brought forward by proponents of the received view. In the light of historical episodes and our actual practices of making and using instruments, I find these objections to be wanting.

39-49, in: Challenges Facing Philosophy In United Europe, Ed.: S. Kaneva, IPhR – BAS, Sofia, 2004

Based on recent trends in philosophy of science, in philosophy of technology, and in technosience studies it can be concluded that the following formula expresses a significant relationship of the relevant disciplines: science is equal to technology plus philosophy. In order to disclose the meaning of this relationship first of all we have to characterize a kind of philosophy of technology. In this view, the human rule over technological situations and the creation/use of tools play a fundamental role. The tools are created by interpretation, and any technological praxis is situation-bound. The characteristics of sciences are very different – or even the opposite – ones: in sciences we want to reach a situation-free knowledge. Scientific knowledge is not situation-bound, it is universally valid. The question is: how can we use the situation-bound technological praxis for building up of situation-free scientific knowledge? It can be shown that a specific application of philosophical principles and ideas makes this possible. Philosophy can create worlds from situations. Consequently, following certain prescriptions of both technology and philosophy, we can perform a scientific praxis. In this paper, some historical and philosophical arguments will be presented to show this interrelatedness, the most fundamental relationships between science, technology, and philosophy

2015

2000

This paper considers new technologies and their role in the production of knowledge. The main objective is to show that there is not a single angle from which to examine the issue. There must also be, as a starting point, the assumption that to deal with the new configuration of the world and the relations established by and under its mainstreams is to deal with the existence of human beings from an ontological point of view. In this sense, the paper argues for the imperative necessity of a philosophical approach in discussing the ways the contemporary world has brought knowledge to bear. (Author/MES) Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document.

Technology and Society studies, 2006

Technology is frequently considered in terms of its impact on entities outside its essential nature: as the impact of technology on the environment and society, but also the impact of human values and needs on technology. By taking particular social implications of technology into account, the Science-Technology relationship can be extended to the field of Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies. STS studies are grounded in socio-technological understanding, that is, systematic knowledge of the mutual relationship between technical objects, the natural environment and social practice. Because technology is a key element of STS, it is expected that the philosophy of technology will have implications for STS studies. The dynamic nature of technology as such leaves its own philosophy in a tentative or flexible state. However, the implications of the philosophy of technology, being in a development phase at the moment with changes in emphasis occuring, for STS studies ought to be determined continuously. The aim of the article is to identify and discuss possible implications of the the philosophy of technology for STS. In order to deduce these implications, the relevant theoretical framework underpinning the article will be discussed in broad outlines. Seeing that the philosophy of technology is such a wide field a delineation of the field needs to be done. Mitcham's proposed preliminary framework is taken as point of departure for the article. Technology as knowledge (epistemology/theory of knowledge) and technology as activity (design methodology) will be discussed as two key aspects of the modern philosophy of technology which could provide implications for STS. A theory of knowledge usually includes methodology, but seeing that Mitcham classified methodology as one of the modes in which technology is manifested, it is dealt with separately. The epistemology and methodology of technology will each be discussed from a philosophical, historical and practicebased methodological perspective. Some implications of the philosophy for STS are identified and discussed.

Knowledge, in pre-modern times was not detached from an ethical content, namely virtue. Conversely, modernity imagined a realm of knowledge and science characterized by instrumental reasoning and power. However, human experience clearly demonstrates that as human activities (economics, politics, social affairs), within the spheres of knowledge and science can not exist in a non-ethical realm. In this sense, the substantial contradiction intrinsic to the modern understanding of scientific knowledge is that despite its ethical content, its persistence of being value-free. It claims to be objective (namely, the principle of objectivity). In the late modern times, the emergence of technological determinism brings about reducing science to technology, as coined by technologism. Knowledge has always been utilized in a technologically oriented way.