Wittgenstein’: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy

This paper discusses the traditional philosophical problem of other minds and the notion of consciousness. Through an elucidation of Wittgenstein's works, focusing primarily on the later publishing of Philosophical Investigations (1953), it will be shown that rather than aligning with positions of either Cartesians of behaviorists, Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind strongly resembles that of early twentieth century phenomenologists in its insistence on the redefining of subjectivity. Further, consideration will be given to the method of enquiry Wittgenstein employs, and how the consistency of its usage results in his identifying of similar issues of intuition in the propositions of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics.

2021

The aim of this paper is to investigate the nature of mental phenomena with special reference to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein's main concern is not with the construction of any philosophical theory about these mental phenomena. He is concerned with the dissolution of puzzles that arise because of the linguistic misunderstandings about the nature of mental phenomena. Mental phenomena are generally very complex. The words that try to capture mental phenomena do not have clear grammar. Hence, statements describing mental phenomena mislead us. Therefore, linguistic misconceptions or misunderstandings are the main sources of any philosophical problem on the human mind.

2017

This thesis explores central themes in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and engages with exegetical discussions of Wittgenstein's early philosophy. Metaphysical, therapeutic, and elucidatory interpretations are presented and discussed. The division between showing and saying, which is a key distinction in the Tractatus, is found to be more complicated than the exegetical discourse sometimes suggests. This is argued to count in favour of an elucidatory reading of the Tractatus' seemingly paradoxical closing remarks. Moreover, Wittgenstein's account of picturing is shown to have a fundamental role, around which the distinctions between showing and saying and internal and external relations revolve. Even the doctrine of simple objects and atomic facts is rooted in the pictorial view of language. The thesis furthermore defends a dynamic interpretation of internal relations, upon which internal relations are shown through the application of operations, a view that is linked to Wittgenstein's philosophy of the subject. The result is a view on which, although the limits of language mean the limits of the world, the limits are not drawn once and for all. VI Acknowledgements Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Bjørn Ramberg, for his illuminating comments and proactive engagement. His feedback has given me the motivation to keep writing and thinking through the difficult material at hand. I would also like to thank everyone who has joined me in discussions of philosophy in general, and Wittgenstein's thought in particular, over the years. These discussions initially sparked my interest in the relationship between language, thought, and action, and they have since given me the inspiration to study the subject at greater depth. Last, but not least, I would like to thank my family for their constant and invaluable support, without which this thesis could not have been written.

En Investigaciones filosóficas y otros escritos postractarianos Wittgenstein rechazó la concepción de lo mental que incorpora la Tesis de Brentano. Ese rechazo, dirigido específicamente contra la idea de que los pensamientos representan la realidad conteniendo representaciones que concuerdan con ella, denuncia una confusión gramatical: los objetos a los que se dirigirían los pensamientos son sombras proyectadas por la gramática del lenguaje. Autores como Hacker y Glock consideran que esa confusión se produce al asimilar las oraciones mediante las cuales se adscriben estados mentales a oraciones transitivas sin verbos psicológicos. El presente trabajo argumenta a favor de una imagen mucho más compleja de los medios utilizados por Wittgenstein para rechazar la Tesis de Brentano. Se defiende también que en la visión corregida de la intencionalidad de lo mental desempeñan un papel decisivo los requisitos de inocencia semántica, expresivismo, sistematicidad del significado y del lenguaje como vehículo del pensamiento, ignorados hasta el momento.

Wittgenstein Reads Weininger, 2004

I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else & I have done no more than passionately take it up for my work of clarification. That is how Boltzmann Hertz Schopenhauer Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos Weininger Spengler, Sraffa have influenced me. 1

European Journal of Philosophy, 2019

Can we perceive others’ mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomenologists, that we can. The view thus attributed to Wittgenstein is a view about the correct explanation of mindreading: he is taken to be answering a question about the kind of process mindreading involves. But although Wittgenstein claims we see others’ emotions, he denies that he is thereby making any claim about that underlying process and, moreover, denies that any underlying process could have the significance it is claimed to have for this debate. For Wittgenstein, the question is not ‘Is this perception?’ but ‘What do we mean by “perception” here?’ and that question is answered by investigating the grammar of the relevant concepts. That investigation, however, reveals similarities and differences between what we call ‘perception’ here and elsewhere. Hence, Wittgenstein’s answer to the question ‘Can we perceive others’ mental states?’ is yes and no: both responses can be justified by appeal to different concepts of perception. Wittgenstein, then, has much to contribute to our understanding of mindreading, but what he has to contribute is nothing like the view typically attributed to him here.

Nordic Wittgenstein Review, 2019

The second part of Philosophical Investigations and other contemporary writings contain abundant material dedicated to the examination of visual perception, along the lines of similarities and differences manifested in the use of concepts such as "seeing as", "seeing aspects", "noticing the aspect", "aspect blindness", among other related ones. However, their application to phenomena such as face perception and word perception, and similarities between the latter two, has not received proper attention in the literature. My first aim is identifying the features pertaining perceptual (and more widely, experiential) relationships we have with written language, showing in what ways they are strongly linked with some proper features of facial perception. In other words, I will try to show how the "phenomenology of reading" is akin to the "phenomenology of facial perception" or "physiognomy". Based on all this, my interpretative hypothesis is that, in Wittgenstein's view, the features shared by face and word perception are more deeply related than via a mere analogy; hence they might contribute to explain, in the case of words, a variety of specific semantic, perhaps semantic-pragmatic, phenomena, that should be included in an appropriate clarification of the varieties of use in natural languages.

2019

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 1990

In the first and shorter part of this essay I comment on Wittgenstein's general influence on the practice of philosophy since his time. In the second and much longer part I discuss aspects of his work which have had a more particular influence, chiefly on debates about meaning and mind. The aspects in question are Wittgenstein's views about rule-following and private language. This second part is more technical than the first.

Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is the first collection to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing. These essays show that aspect-seeing was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein’s later writings, but, rather, that it was a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy’s attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. Arranged in sections that highlight the pertinence of the aspect-seeing remarks to aesthetic and moral perception, self-knowledge, mind and consciousness, linguistic agreement, philosophical therapy, and “seeing connections,” the sixteen essays, which were specially commissioned for this volume, demonstrate the unity of not only Philosophical Investigations but also Wittgenstein’s later thought as a whole. They open up novel paths across familiar fields of thought: the objectivity of interpretation, the fixity of the past, the acquisition of language, and the nature of human consciousness. Significantly, they exemplify how continuing consideration of the interrelated phenomena and concepts surrounding aspect-seeing might produce a fruitful way of doing philosophy. The volume includes a concordance for the unnumbered remarks in the various editions of Philosophical Investigations, including the latest (4th) edition. (The front matter is posted here. The introduction - "Seeing Aspects in Wittgenstein" - appears below under "Papers.")