A proposed solution to the voters preference aggregation problem
Dennis Packard1977, Theory and Decision
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Abstract
DEFINITION 1 : ~> is a difference relation on S iff for every x, y, z, w, r, s in S, (1) (x, y) >~ (z, w) or (z,w) >~ (x,y). (2) If (x, y) >~ (z, w), then (w, z) >1 (y, x). 1> is a transitive difference relation on S if also (3) If (x,y.) >/(z, w) and (z, w) i> (r, s), then (x,y) >I (r, s).
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