Mathematics of Enlightenment

First published in 1949, Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind is one of the classics of twentieth-century philosophy. Described by Ryle as a 'sustained piece of analytical hatchet-work' on Cartesian dualism, The Concept of Mind is a radical and controversial attempt to jettison once and for all what Ryle called 'the ghost in the machine': Descartes' argument that mind and body are two separate entities. As well as rejecting dualism about the mind, Ryle goes much further, arguing that more recent materialist or functionalist theories of mind do not solve the Cartesian puzzle either and even accept some of its fundamental, mistaken, propositions. It is because of these mistaken propositions that associated problems, such as mental causation and 'other minds', arise in the first place. Ryle builds his case via an erudite and beautifully written account of the will, emotion, self-knowledge, sensation and observation, imagination and the intellect. Some of the problems he tackles, such as the distinction between 'knowing how and knowing that', challenged some of the bedrock assumptions of philosophy and continue to exert important influence on contemporary philosophy. A classic work of philosophy, The Concept of Mind is essential reading for anyone interested in the nature of the mind and human behaviour. This sixtieth anniversary edition includes a substantial commentary by Julia Tanney. Together with the reissue of both volumes of Ryle's Collected Papers, it provides essential reading for new readers interested not only in the history of analytic philosophy but in its power to challenge major currents in philosophy of mind and language today.

NUTA Journal

The mind (nāma) and matter (rūpa) are the two great constituents of the beings. Nāma refers to the mental phenomena of the four aggregates vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra and vijññān. The mind is a formless, shapeless, non-physical field that functions to store, perceive, and analyze information. It originates when the six senses; eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin and the mind get contact with their corresponding objects; form, sound, smell, taste, touch and mental constituents respectively. The mind and the brain are completely different entities. The mind is an agent that carries the seed to have the next life. The rūpa is a physical phenomenon. It is the material form of the body and of the eternal world. Earth (prithivi dhātu), water (apo dhātu), fire (tejo dhātu) and wind (vayo dhātu) element are the four fundamental elements in our body and the outer world. Mental phenomenon and physical phenomenon are different but dependents on each other. The objective of this article is to examine t...

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, 2020

I first attempt a taxonomy of meditation in traditional Indian Buddhism. Based on the main psychological or somatic function at which the meditative effort is directed, the following classes can be distinguished: (1) emotion-centered meditation (coinciding with the traditional samatha approach); (2) consciousness-centered meditation (with two subclasses: consciousness reduction/elimina-tion and ideation obliteration); (3) reflection-centered meditation (with two subtypes: morality-directed reflection and reality-directed observation, the latter corresponding to the vipassana-method); (4) visualization-centered meditation; and (5) physiology-centered meditation. In the second part of the essay I tackle the problem of the epistemic validity and happiness-engendering value of Buddhist meditation. In my highly conjectural view, the claim that meditation represents an infallible tool for realizing the (Supreme) Truth as well as a universally valid method for attaining the highest forms of happiness is largely based on the credo effect , that is, a placebolike process. I do not deny that meditation may have some positive effects on mental and physical health or that its practice may bring changes to the mind. Meditation may be a valuable alternative approach in life and clinical treatment, but it is far from being a must or a panacea.

Dogma: Revue de Philosophie et de Sciences Humaines, 2022

This article is the FIRST of several excerpts from my book The Nondual Mind: Vedānta, Kashmiri Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and Spinoza (the full book is posted on this site). “I liked James H. Cumming’s The Nondual Mind a lot. It is beautifully written, thoughtful, and very clear.” (Prof. Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Charlotte Bloomberg Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University) “James H. Cumming’s scholarly interpretation of Spinoza’s works, persuasively showing how 17th century European ideas that ushered in the Enlightenment find a precursor in 10th century Kashmir, is a masterpiece of reason and philosophy that will leave the reader with profound thoughts on the meaning of history, God, and life itself. As a senior staff attorney in my chambers for many years at the California Supreme Court and a top scholar of ethics and philosophy of law, Mr. Cumming never ceased to amaze me with his outstanding research and intellect. This scholarly book is a must read for all who want to know why Spinoza continues to influence contemporary philosophy and how his work is still relevant in today’s challenging, interconnected world.” (Hon. Ming W. Chin, Associate Justice (Retired), Supreme Court of California, 1996–2020)

This article is an introduction to the philosophy of mind that developed within the syncretistic rDzogs chen (Great Perfection) tradition of Tibetan Buddhism between the 8th and 14th centuries CE. Despite the growing interest in this tradition in recent decades, there has so far been no systematic appraisal of its views on mind that traces their evolution and complex relationships with antecedent Buddhist philosophies of mind. These views merit attention not only because of their intrinsic interest and relevance to contemporary consciousness studies but also because they provide an essential key to understanding the tradition's leading ideas and practices. From a traditional standpoint, discerning the nature and structure of human consciousness in accordance with the crucial distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes) is deemed indispensable to understanding rDzogs chen view and meditation. To this end, the present article focuses on how this distinction allowed rDzogs chen adepts to precisely describe, on the basis of careful first-personal observation, what occurs when a human being becomes a buddha, and to articulate a disclosive model of goal-realization commensurate with their findings. It traces the development of the distinction within its historical and doctrinal contexts and then examines its subsequent clarifications and refinements as a soteriological model. It finally summarizes the tradi-tion's distinctive (re)intepretations of 'mind' and 'primordial knowing', and concludes with a brief assessment of the contemporary relevance of the distinction.

The goal of Buddhist teachings is liberation of suffering. It is a process of cumulative path leading to the attainment of wisdom, that is, to see things as they really are. In order to facilitate the understanding of experienced reality, an elaborate analysis of the mind is necessary. This paper is an attempt to review the analysis of mind as taught in Abhidhamma.

Additional required and recommended readings are posted on Blackboard.

Erkenntnis, 2003

If we understand something's having intentional content as its being about something, then conceptualism, broadly construed, is the view that, "no intentional content, however portentous or mundane, is a content unless it is structured by concepts that the bearer possess." 1 Put more precisely, conceptualism is the view that, "For any perceptual experience φ, (i) φ has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of φ must possess a concept for each item represented by φ." 2 Thus, conceptualism is the view that experience has intentional content only to the extent that it is structured by concepts that the person possesses. If we understand the experience of a person who has achieved Buddhist enlightenment to be ineffable; 3 and if we attribute that ineffability to the experience of ultimate reality's being non-conceptual, then we appear to have a direct conflict between conceptualism and enlightenment so understood. Since I find compelling both conceptualism and the idea that enlightenment experience is ineffable, the aim of this paper is to offer a way of reconciling the two. 4 Hilary Putnam writes, "…it is a part of almost all religious forms of life to say that God, or whatever may be of ultimate concern in the particular religious form of life, is not properly conceptualizable by us." 5 He goes on to write that in the context of religion what lies behind this problem of language is the nearly universal, "..sense that whatever one say [sic] about God falls 1 Gunther 2003, 1. 2 Bengson, Grube, and Korman 2011, 168. I take it that the notion of a "Fregean proposition" here is to emphasize the idea of a proposition whose sense is a product of it conceptual parts-a sense that is to be distinguished from its possible referent. This needn't commit us to an ontology of mind-independent propositions along the lines of abstract objects. 3 Here "experience of a person who is enlightened" is not the experience at the moment of enlightenment, but that enlightened aspect of the ongoing, lived experience of the enlightened individual, and as such it is presumably shot through with intentional content. 4 As such, I am bracketing the question of conceptualism's truth. 5 Putnam 1997, 410.