Kazakhstan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests

2006

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support to counter Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Uzbekistan endorsed coalition military action in Iraq and Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding. After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking. Other strategic interests include internal reforms (democratization, free markets, and human rights) and energy development. Administration policy also aims to integrate these states into the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and to discourage the growth of xenophobic, fundamentalist, and anti-Western orientations that threaten peace and stability. The Administration's policy goals in Central Asia reflect the differing characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan include the security and elimination of Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. In Tajikistan, U.S. aid focuses on economic reconstruction. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. IB93108 03-29-06 CRS-1 MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS On March 27, Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev opened the first session of the State Commission for Democratic Reform, composed of various citizen's groups and pro-government political parties. He proclaimed that the goal of the Commission is to enhance local self-rule and the links between the citizenry and the rulers, including through the mechanism of the ruling OTAN party. Critics have termed the Commission a means of controlling and coopting local human rights and pro-democracy non-governmental organizations. A seemingly positive development was the long-denied registration of the opposition Nagyz Ak Zhol (True Bright Path) party, whose former leader allegedly had been assassinated by high government officials in February 2006. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan; it borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language); and most are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are closely related historically and culturally. By the late 19th century, Russian tsars had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of Central Asia. By the early 1920s, Soviet power had been imposed; by 1936, five "Soviet Socialist Republics" had been created. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, they gained independence.

, 2014

Notwithstanding Kazakhstan’s entrance into the Eurasian Economic Union and a growing perception of American disengagement from Central Asia (both dis-cussed below) the major finding of this report is that the strategic objectives of the Republic of Kazakhstan and of the United States today are mutually compat-ible and even mutually reinforcing. Indeed, each country needs the other in ful-filling its goals.

Volume 11 Issue 1 2010 35 F Meanwhile, the majority of the population is acting under momentum, which was graphically shown by the latest presidential election: the voters were asked to choose between the bad and very bad, either Bakiev or blatant populists and entirely unpredictable so-called politicians.

Kazakhstan's regional position, its “neighborhood factor,” is more than just a historical and geographical fact (“we didn't choose our neighbors”), but a situation in which both opportunities and limitations are present. Kazakhstan's immediate neighborhood becomes more than important in over-coming its continental landlockedness, turning geographical limitations into opportunities for successful economical development. This has far-reaching economic and social effects for the entire Eurasian region given recent interstate conflicts between neighboring post-Soviet states. The paper reviews the specifics of Kazakhstan's relations with each of its neighbors in terms of both the opportunities and the constraints (economic, political and social) they present. The significance of each of the five neighbors (China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan) to Kazakhstan, as well as their economic and political well-being, are analyzed. Finally, some potential strategies Kazakhstan may pursue to foster mutually beneficial relations with these countries are suggested.

Russia’s foreign policy concept of the Central Asian countries is sophisticated; but nevertheless, is essentially predicated on two main approaches: - Russian policies aim both to reconstruct the relationship between the post-Soviet countries and to re-form a new union that gathers all of these countries under the leadership of Russia. Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s “Near abroad doctrine” toward post-Soviet countries served as a basis for the Russian Federation’s Central Asian policy. Furthermore, the importance of Central Asian countries for Kremlin has been described in “Medvedev’s Doctrine” and “National Security Strategy” documents of Kremlin. Along with Moscow’s hegemony ambitions, Russia desires to fight against fundamental religious movements and radical nationalism in the region, which Russia considers as a threat against its national security. - Secondly, the geopolitical position of the Central Asia is of global importance in the energy arena. Recent demand growth for natural resources, for example, oil and natural gas, from the developed economies of industrialized countries, of which China is the most notable, has amplified this importance; this is not without its implications in Russian energy policy at all. From the Russian Foreign Policy perspective, the most crucial country in the region is Kazakhstan. First, there are 4 million ethnically Russian people living in Kazakhstan. Second, Kazakhstan is the locomotive state of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Especially, after Russia’s failed attempt to include Ukraine into the Eurasian Union, Kazakhstan’s position has strengthened in the union. Furthermore, Kazakhstan tries to act as a mediator between Russia and such states as Turkey and Ukraine, which are having political tensions with Russia.

2016

series of the Joint Center, and addresses topical and timely subjects. The Joint Center is a transatlantic independent and non-profit research and policy center. It has offices in Washington and Stockholm and is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and Development Policy. It is the first institution of its kind in Europe and North America, and is firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders, and journalists. The Joint Center is at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security, and development in the region. Through its applied research, publications, research cooperation, public lectures, and seminars, it functions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion regarding the region. Research for this publication was made possible through the core funding of the Joint Center's institutional sponsors, as well as project support from the Embassy of Kazakhstan in Sweden. The opinions and conclusions expressed in this study are those of the authors only, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Joint Center or its sponsors.

2010

The Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) face common security challenges from crime, corruption, terrorism, and faltering commitments to economic and democratic reforms. However, cooperation among them remains halting, so security in the region is likely in the near term to vary by country. Kyrgyzstan's and Tajikistan's futures are most clouded by ethnic and territorial tensions, and corruption in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan could spoil benefits from the development of their ample energy resources. Authoritarianism and poverty in Uzbekistan could contribute to a succession crisis. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan's beleaguered civil society might eventually help the relatively small nation safeguard its independence. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan might become regional powers able to champion policy solutions to common Central Asian problems and to resist undue influence from more powerful outside powers, because of their large territories and populations and energy and other resources. Internal political developments in several bordering or close-by states may have a large impact on Central Asian security. These developments include a more authoritarian and globalist Russia, an economically growing China, instability in Iran and the South Caucasus region, and re-surging drug production and Islamic extremism in Afghanistan. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the former Bush Administration established bases and other military access in the region to support U.S.-led coalition operations in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration has highlighted U.S. interests in such continued access as well as the long-term security and stability of the region. U.S. interests in Central Asia include combating terrorism, drug production, and trafficking; assisting the development of oil and other resources; and fostering democratization, human rights, free markets, and trade. The United States also seeks to thwart dangers posed to its security by the illicit transfer of strategic missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technologies, materials, and expertise to terrorist states or groups, and to address threats posed to regional independence by Iran. Some critics counter that the United States has historically had few interests in this region, and advocate only limited U.S. contacts undertaken with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure U.S. goals. They also urge these friends and allies to enhance their energy security by taking the lead in the development of diverse export routes for Central Asia's energy resources. Most in Congress have supported U.S. assistance to bolster independence and reforms in Central Asia. The 106 th Congress authorized a "Silk Road" initiative for greater policy attention and aid for democratization, market reforms, humanitarian needs, conflict resolution, transport infrastructure (including energy pipelines), and border controls. The 108 th and subsequent Congresses have imposed conditions on foreign assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, based on their human rights records. Congress has continued to debate the balance between U.S. security interests in the region and interests in democratization and the protection of human rights.

2005

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support in countering Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Uzbekistan endorsed coalition military action in Iraq and Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding. After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking. Other strategic interests include internal reforms (democratization, free markets, and human rights) and energy development. Administration policy also aims to integrate these states into the international community so that they follow responsible security and other policies, and to discourage the growth of xenophobic, fundamentalist, and anti-Western orientations that threaten peace and stability. The Administration is concerned about human rights and civil liberties problems in all the states. The Administration's policy goals in Central Asia reflect the differing characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan include the security and elimination of Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. In Tajikistan, U.S. aid focuses on economic reconstruction. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Some observers call for different emphases or levels of U.S. involvement in Central Asia. Some have called for strengthening conditions linking aid to progress in improving human rights or in making adequate progress in democratization and the creation of free markets. Some have disputed the importance of energy resources to U.S. national security. Others point to civil and ethnic tensions in the region as possibly endangering U.S. lives and investments. Heightened congressional interest in Central Asia was reflected in passage of "Silk Road" language in late 1999 (P.L. 106-113) authorizing enhanced U.S. policy attention and aid to support conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport (including energy pipelines) and communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasian and Central Asian states. Consolidated Appropriations for FY2005, including Foreign Operations (P.L. 108-447, signed into law on December 8, 2004) provides $126 million in FREEDOM Support Act assistance to the Central Asian states (as directed by the conferees; H. Rept.108-792), a reduction of $2 million to the budget request. Prior-year provisions are maintained that condition aid to Uzbekistan on its progress in democratization and respecting human rights, and to Kazakhstan on its progress in respecting human rights. For Kazakhstan, a presidential waiver is permitted on national security grounds.

Kazakhstan’s role in assisting international stabilization efforts in Afghanistan is often underestimated in western commentaries. The precise nature of that assistance, cooperation with key actors, and level of partnership with NATO can be prone to underestimation, not least due to the tendency to prioritize the role of Russia in the international cooperative matrix. These issues convey subtle changes in foreign and defense policy in Astana which may have deeper implications for future peace support or counter insurgency operations. Astana actively seeks – on its own terms – ways and mechanisms in which the country might cooperate at a practical level with its western partners on issues of mutual though not identical interests, as part of a process allowing it to develop a greater international role for itself. Twenty years after gaining its independence, Kazakhstan like other states in Central Asia, is becoming a more clearly identifiable independent actor both in the region and globally. During its first twenty years as an independent state, Kazakhstan’s achievements have mirrored the level of ambition and vision for its future development widely shared by its ruling elite. These include the abandonment of the nuclear weapons arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union, its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, development of its natural resources and in 2010 Kazakhstan became the first Eurasian state to chair the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The country has experienced significant change during this period, and continues to do so, marked not least by its strategic partnership signed with China in June 2011 and setting the target for Sino-Kazakh bilateral trade at $40 billion by 2015. While the country’s cooperation with NATO and assistance to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in no sense implies any belief in a military solution to the problem of Afghan security, the drivers behind such cooperative strategies offer potentially invaluable insight into Astana’s political will to more readily participate in international peace support or other operations or initiatives.