Burning the straw man: What exactly is psychological science?

Academic discussions of psychology's scientific status are often artificial and divorced from the more complex picture that practitioners, researchers , and laypersons alike have of the field. Similar to how overuse in academia has lead to the notion of a "moot point" shifting from meaning "that which is deserving of debate" to "that which is not worth debating," many of the ostensive clashing dichotomies within the science of psychology have become more of an intellectual sparring ground than actual battlefield. In this article it will be argued that these debates are helpful for better understanding human psychology, but that we should rise above them. These debates are important, but only in as far as they shed light on the true object of our concern, human psychological functioning. To this end, we should be cautious so as to not overvalue the methodological and theoretical tools at our disposal. When we do so, we can unintentionally give credence to the pejorative meaning of the adjective "academic" – as in "divorced from practical reality" or "having no practical importance". By rising above the fray, we can learn from all sides, and in the process, we can keep academic debates on psychological science both relevant for our lives and from following the historic path of the "moot point."

Theory & Psychology, 1992

There is, unfortunately, a large vestigial heritage of positivist errors, and distortions of positivist errors, concerning the nature of science that still permeate psychology. This article contributes to contemporary debates concerning the metascience of psychology not by proposing a positive program of scientific norms and values, but by addressing and countering a number of these errors, these residual myths, concerning the nature of science.

The possibility of uniting science and practice in psychology is considered. The main aim is to explore the ability of a realist approach to address the various dichotomies prevalent in psychology. The multileveled demands of the society, government, and tertiary training are briefly discussed. The multitude of mental health needs in South African society is addressed by government with a number of policies and legislative processes. In addition, training of psychologists is under pressure because of the changing demands within higher education institutions. The pressure to function as research institutions necessitates a revisioning of the scientist–practitioner model. This model perpetuates bipolarity because of a scientistic understanding of what it means to be scientific. This article describes a realist model of science that avoids some of the more serious dichotomies so prevalent in South African psychology departments, namely, the quantitative–qualitative divide, the positivist–constructionist split, and possibly also the scientist–practitioner model. A realist image of science might achieve this integration because of the simple fact that both science and practice involve critical enquiry. Two examples of a realist psychology from neuropsychology are discussed.

CASN NeuroNotes, 2017

The propensity in research in the last 20 years, especially in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience, has been to design a study with no attempt to operationalize terminology, so that it is impossible to replicate the study since there is no definitive expected outcome nor any rationale by which to tie any outcome to a specific theory, hypothesis or proposition, and, consequently, no real control for random variables; hence a result that proves nothing and a study with absolutely no meaning or validity whatsoever despite whatever claims are made for the study. The fundamental tenet for valid scientific evaluation is replicability. In this paper we explore the question of reliability and integrity of research in the field of psychology, the field of neuroscience, and in the broad arena of science itself.

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 2008

In 1988, the control of the American Psychological Association shifted to those advocating the interests of professional practice and a substantial segment of the scientific community in psychology seceded to form the American Psychological Society, devoted to scientific psychology and scientific-based practice. In this climate, it has become increasingly difficult for scientists and practitioners to maintain analytical discussions of the philosophical and methodological issues that divide these two groups. For over 25 years, the authors have been fortunate to have the professional and intellectual luxury of just such a discussion, and present here a dialogue that attempts to capture their initial stark differences in perspective and the process by which differences have been clarified, and areas of agreement established.

Postmodern scholarship poses significant challenges to pivotal assumptions of individual knowledge, objectivity, and truth. In their place we find an emphasis on the communal construction of knowledge, objectivity as a relational achievement, and language as a pragmatic medium through which local truths are constituted. While these developments in understanding may seem opposed to psychological science, they are not. Rather, they invite a new range of questions about the potentials of traditional research. These questions are vitally concerned with the significance of such inquiry in cultural life. More importantly, the emerging view of psychological science opens new and exciting vistas of theoretical, methodological, and practical significance. Increasing manifestations of movement in these directions suggest the possibility of profound change in the profession.

Frontiers in Psychology, 2023

Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2009

Unexpected empirical findings lead Schwarz (2009) to question current methodological approaches within psychology. He claims that distribution anomalies, which cannot be explained by independent variables, actually prove an error in classical test theory, which then leads him to criticize current scientific conventionalism. In this commentary, it is shown that the current university system not only uses, but often reproduces conventionalism. It is, of course, necessary to teach certain techniques and tools to future psychologists, but using these critically seem to be essential in preventing scientific approaches turn into ideologies that are or must not be questioned-even if this is sometimes less threatening to one's identity as a scientist/psychologist. This is true for all sciences, but understanding the bio-psycho-social interdependencies of human nature (ambiguities), as Schwarz describes it, seems to be a particular challenge that is in many ways different from other disciplines. Instead of striving to be like them, it is suggested we establish an ambiguity-accepting and critical environment in psychology in which theories and approaches are not considered final but temporary to foster change and progress.

This article is an invited comment on the article by George Mandler in the same issue. It is suggested that the latter contains a series of myths that are popular among psychologists. These are that psychology was fragmented into “schools” in the 1920s and 30s and that this led several writers to declare that it was in a state of crisis. It is said to have overcome this crisis by becoming more eclectic and incorporating the best aspects of the various schools. The author suggests that the reality is very different; there is no evidence to suggest that modern psychology has incorporated different aspects of the various schools. It is just as fragmented as it was in the early part of the 20th century, and the crisis literature has continued to the present day. It is suggested that the myths serve the quasi-religious function of keeping faith in the progress of psychology toward “mature science” alive.

Qualitative Methods in Psychology Bulletin, 2014

There is a frequently cited epistemological link made in contemporary qualitative psychology between quantitative methods and positivism. In fact, quantitative methods are based on a pluralist hybrid of philosophies, none of which are positivist. This eclectic philosophical mix provides a more fertile soil for hybridisation with qualitative techniques within mixed-methods research than is commonly appreciated.