Meinong on the Foundations of Deontic Logic

Although Kant introduces the idea of a good will in the first sentence of the GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 1 he does not (at least at that point) offer a clear definition of this concept. Many readers, influenced perhaps by the fact that this discussion is followed by an account of the moral worth of actions (or maxims), have been led to posit a straightforward connection between the two concepts: a good will (which is a property or characteristic of persons) consists in performing morally good actions, i.e., in acting from the motive of duty. 2 Thus, according to H.J. Paton, Under human conditions a good will is one which acts for the sake of duty, and only the actions in which such a will is manifested have moral worth. 3 Lewis White Beck draws the same conclusion: An action having this motive [i.e., respect] is moral, and a being which acts from this motive has a good will. 4 I shall argue that the account offered by Paton and Beck (which I shall call the Traditional View) misrepresents the connection between the moral worth of actions and the good will of persons. To arrive at the proper understanding of this relation, the following three questions must be considered. (1) Does a good will consist simply in acting from the motive of duty? Do people have a good will just because they fulfill their duties from the motive of duty? (2) Does acting from duty presuppose that one has a good will? (3) Does the fact that one has a good will entail that all of one's duty-fulfilling actions have moral worth, even if they are not (directly) motivated by duty? Briefly stated, I shall argue that while it is true that only persons with a good will are capable of acting from the motive of duty (Section II), it does not follow either that a good will consists in acting from duty (Section I) or that if one has a good will, all of one's dutiful actions will be (or must be) motivated by duty and have moral worth (Sections III-V). In order to allow for the possibility of frailty or weakness of the will (as well as of impurity), the good will should be conceived of as a second-order disposition, that is, as the unconditional willingness to do what is morally required (and to omit what is morally prohibited), whereas the moral worth of actions is a function of the agent's first-order maxims.

2000

Utilitas, 2004

The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implies can’ is certainly plausible in some form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this has happened in the way it has been taken up in some of the current literature. Second, Kant's understanding of the principle is considered. Here it is argued that these problematic conceptions put the principle to work in a way that Kant does not, so that there is an important divergence here which can easily be overlooked.

Florida Philosophical Review, 2006

I argue that Kant can be read as holding that "ought" judgments follow from certain "is" judgments by mere analysis. This rejection of the is-ought gap, I further argue, is not as implausible as it might seem.

Kant's moral theory is one of the reason based theory .In this paper I just emphasize Kant's view on morality and the basic fundamentals of his theory. His moral theory is very much dependent on his epistemology. And according to Kant as reason is guiding notion of our every cognition that's why morality is also guided by reason rather than feelings. So morality is much objective than subjective. Task of ethics is to evaluate human conduct. An act of evaluation always follows a standard which is widely accepted by a practical society. Though philosophers agree to accept a standard for the purpose of evaluation, but they differ regarding the nature of the standard. At the same time philosophers disagree with one another about the object of evaluation. In Greek philosophy, especially in Aristotle, we find a concern for good living. Their main question is how to live a good life? Greek thinkers emphasized on the acquiring virtues in our character as their main aim was to Eudaimon or to flourish. Flourishment means ―living well and doing well'. But in modern period, we find, a revolutionary change occurs in the history of western ethics as philosophers their focused from character to action and they started to evaluate the rightness or goodness of particular actions. In this respect we must mention about two theories which have dominated the history of western ethical thought in modern period. These two theories are teleological and deontological. Teleological theory concerned about the consequence of an action. And deontological theory concerned about the guiding principle of that action, motive of the agent. Though these two theories focused on the evaluation discrete action, but their views are entirely different from one another. Though these two theories are following two different type of methods for judgement of action but both of them considered as principle-based theory. They opine that they are must be single general principle which should be accepted universally by all. As teleological theory aims to bring maximum utility or happiness for the people. This theory is hugely refuted by rationalist philosopher as in the view of pleasure or utility cannot be considered as the ultimate goal of ethics. According to these rational philosopher ethics is the rational discipline and should aim to higher goal. But deontological theory is founded on the concept of duty and develops an entirely reason-based approach which dismisses every kind of subjective interference. And Kant's moral philosophy is one of the deontological approaches. And as Kant's theory is one of the principle-based approaches it introduces the concept of moral obligation very firmly. He has developed different arguments in favour of accepting

Sonja Haugaard Christensen, 2013

Two things fill the mind with ever new increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. (1:5:162) For Kant our existence is divided into two: The first implies our place in the world of sense and extension. The second points to the invisible self – our personality, which we meet during understanding because the world is not contingent but universal and necessary. The second raises our worth as intelligent beings with personality, to the moral law revealing a life independent of animality. (1:5:163) The questions of freedom and our ability to be responsible agents will be considered in relation to Kant´s work Critique of practical reason.

Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 2022

This article questions the central role of the good will in the moral theory of Immanuel Kant. The good will, according to Kant, is the only thing that is good in itself, and therefore good without limitation or qualification. This is an objectionable claim in support of a controversial position. The problem is not just that the good will is not the only thing that is good in itself, which indeed it is not, but more importantly, that the good will is not so much a thing that is good in itself as it is the good kind of a thing that is otherwise neither good nor bad in itself. The goodness of a good will is no more intrinsic than the goodness of a good act. A good will, whatever else it may be, is a will that is good, much like how a good act is an act that is good, neither of which is good for any reason other than the goodness predicated of the corresponding subject. This article thus challenges Kant’s position on ontological grounds. It questions the validity of claiming intrinsic goodness for a complex construct whose goodness is, in fact, extrinsic to its substance.

2009

The first section of the Groundwork begins “It is impossible to imagine anything at all in the world, or even beyond it, that can be called good without qualification–except a good will”(G 4: 393). Kant's explanation and defense of this claim is followed by an explanation and defense of another related claim, that only actions performed out of duty have moral worth.

Inquiry 55 (2012): 567-83

Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant's contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth-and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern's interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, Stern contends that Kant was a moral realist of sorts, holding certain substantive views that are best characterized as realist commitments about value. In this paper, I raise two central objections to Stern's reading of Kant. The first objection concerns what Stern identifies as Kant's solution to the problem of moral obligation. Whereas Stern sees the distinction between the infinite will and the finite will as resolving the problem of moral obligation, I argue that this distinction merely explains why moral obligations necessarily take the form of imperatives for us imperfect human beings, but does not solve the deeper problem concerning the obligatory nature of morality-why we should take moral norms to be supremely authoritative laws that override all other norms based on our non-moral interests. The second objection addresses Stern's claim that Kantian autonomy is compatible with value realism. Although this is an idea with which many contemporary readers will be sympathetic, I suggest that the textual evidence actually weighs in favor of constructivism.