Limits of Social Risk Research

Health, Risk & Society, 2006

Despite the apparent triumph of social perspectives on risk, the predominant approach to risk is less social and contextual than is often supposed. A widespread acceptance of a constructionist approach is more formal than substantive. Risk 'objects' and events remain given and objectified in many accounts, at the same time as they have been subject to little critical empirical enquiry. Iconic risk events such as the BSE crisis and Chernobyl have shaped academic and policy responses to risk despite the gap between their putative and actual impacts. This editorial calls for a more interdisciplinary approach able to trace the historical evolution and changing character of risk perceptions that rigorously analyses and clearly distinguishes the scientific/technical, and socially and politically manufactured dimensions of risk.

This book had its origins when all three of us were closely connected with Durham University's Institute of Hazard, Risk and Resilience. The Institute was established through a combination of university and philanthropic funding, so as 'to make a difference to those who live with risk'. This book reflects a shared sense that a moral imperative for critical risk research had become linked to this Institute, generally perceived to be benign, but which deserved a deeper and much more critical scrutiny. Indeed, critical risk research, as well as risk analysis and management more generally, is commonly invoked in terms of ways of reducing loss of life, of expressing a duty of care, of enhancing health and well-being and of increasing economic security. Such moral imperatives may be laudable, but they are equally bound to a set of other precepts and taken for granted assumptions: that risk can and should be studied and calculated; that we need institutions with the necessary expertise to do these studies and calculations for us; that those institutions should communicate what they have found and calculated; that risks are determinate in the sense that they are knowable even if not known; that risk can be approached objectively, independent from other ways of knowing the world, such as through systems of belief; and ultimately that the analysis and management of risk exists for the greater good. This book is about looking at these precepts critically and throughout we advance a notion of 'critical' risk research.

Risk Analysis, 2020

This article is one piece in a series of article that reflect on advances in ideas about risk made by social science over the past 40 years and more. It differs from the other articles: its focus is not on specific advances themselves, but rather on how those advances were received and were encouraged or discouraged by the natural science and technical members of the risk community. Thus, the principal goal of this article is to provide some context for the other articlers in this series. Those articles describe work and intellectual developments that consider human responses to particular sorts of issues, concerns, and needs that relate to risk. The framing of this work was partly driven and shaped by natural science and engineering communities. It is illuminating to reflect on how these technical communities viewed the social science developments and on the perspectives they brought to the framing of issues and concerns. Their views are described in three minihistories of risk developments pertaining to nuclear accidents, high level radioactive waste disposal, and toxic chemicals. After considering common themes among the stories, the article considers characteristics of expert communities and their implications. It then concludes with discussions of its secondary goals, (i) a look at some opportunities for future social science studies relating to risk, (ii) a consideration of the extent to which risk analysis and broader considerations of risk can be considered a truly interdisciplinary field rather than a loose assemblage of perspectives.

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014

Risk has become a central concern for businesses, regulators and communities. At one level, risk is about numbers and information. But at another level, risk is about narratives and meanings. In this paper, we describe four risk perspectives: technical, economic, perceptual, and cultural. Technical and economic perspectives inform techno-economic approaches to risk, whereas perceptual and cultural perspectives inform socio-cultural approaches to risk. We argue that understanding energy and environmental risks requires consideration of information and meaning, and numbers and narratives. We illustrate these perspectives with a brief case study of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant disaster and consider Canadian energy development debates. The discussion suggests that risks within and across societies-whether at a given point in time, or dynamically over time-can be more fully explained by going beyond technoeconomic conceptualizations of risk through consideration of socio-cultural issues.

Science of Societal Safety, 2018

We plan our safety measures under economic, personnel and time constraints. The extent of how far we take these measures depends on our acknowledgement of risk of whether we "stop because it is risky" or we "cannot stop because of its benefits despite its risks". This chapter discusses our risk recognition and concerns about mass media that strongly affect our risk recognition. It also overviews differences in risk evaluation about natural disasters and social disasters. Keywords Disaster frequency • Mass media • Risk assessment • Risk recognition • Vulnerability approach 3.1 How People Cope with Risks in Contemporary Societies 3.1.1 Risk Perception by Human Advancement of scientific technologies has given a great number of convenience and benefits to human. The power, however, that scientific technologies produce is far greater than what we, a mere biological being, are born with. We thus started to have anxiety against risks associated with scientific technologies going out of our control. In fact, the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill and the 2011 Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, although such events are rare, had us experience the great dangers and damages that accompany the introduction of scientific technologies. ISO defined risk as "effect of uncertainty" (ISO 2009). Risk perception is about acknowledging future dangers with uncertainty in whether they will actually take place or not and, at the same time, acknowledging future benefits with uncertainty in whether they can be gained or not.

2012

The Fukushima catastrophe tragically epitomizes the limitations of dealing with natural and technical hazards. Remarkably yet, authorities’ review of the catastrophe continue to be limited to mistakes and responsibilities of practical risk management. Although state regulations are questioned, technical protection measures verified, and disaster management processes optimized, no deeper discussion about the actual analytical limits of risk analysis has been engaged thus far. What can risk analyses address and what remains beyond their scope? How trustworthy can risk analyses be, and what kind of statements about the future can they actually formulate? This article examines these broader analytical and epistemological boundaries of risk analysis. Drawing on cases of international nuclear risk management, it tests and problematises how the definition of risk, the methodology of their registration, and the interpretation of results are reaching their limitations in contemporary risk analysis. Following this critical discussion of risk analysis, the article draws conclusions concerning the usefulness and necessity of a differentiated and informed discourse on the potential and the limitations of the risk analysis method, an approach which today enjoys increasing popularity in a variety of policy sectors ranging from critical infrastructure protection to national and international security.

The chapters collected in this volume display an extraordinary range of conceptual reflection, across a range of spatially and temporally distributed sites of empirical investigation. Given this heterogeneity what is perhaps most remarkable is the way in which a cluster of themes around the notion of criticality -and indeed need for critical interventions in the practice of risk research, risk assessment and post-disaster relief efforts -emerge across these chapters. At issue here is a shared concern for what might be thought of as situatedness of critical risk research; with the social, economic and political contexts that shape the conduct of approaches to risk, the continuing and persistent influence of particular academic disciplines at the expense of others, and the provisionality of expert knowledge claims . In addition, the chapters that comprise this volume highlight the ethical and normative implications of the situatedness of contemporary risk research, arguing that an important first step in generating self-reflexive approaches requires subjecting both the epistemological constitution and practical conduct of risk research to critical scrutiny.

1994

Sociologists tend to accept in an uncritical way the theories and research findings on risk, currently derived mostly from studies in anthropology and psychology.

Health Risk & Society, 2006

The nuclear accident in Chernobyl in 1986 is a dramatic example of the type of incidents that are characteristic of a 'risk society'. The consequences of the incident are indeterminate, the causes complex and future developments unpredictable. Nothing can compensate for its effects and it affects a broad population indiscriminately. This paper examines the lived experience of those who experienced biographical disruption as residents of the region on the basis of qualitative case studies carried out in 2003 in the Chernobyl regions of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Our analysis indicates that informants tend to view their future as highly uncertain and unpredictable; they experience uncertainty about whether they are already contaminated, and they have to take hazardous decisions about where to go and what to eat. Fear, rumours and experts compete in supplying information to residents about the actual and potential consequences of the disaster, but there is little trust in, and only limited awareness of, the information that is provided. Most informants continue with their lives and 'do what they must' or even 'what they like', even where the risks are known. They often describe their behaviour as being due to economic circumstances; where there is extreme poverty, even hazardous food sources are better than none. Unlike previous studies, we identify a pronounced tendency among informants not to separate the problems associated with the disaster from the hardships that have resulted from the break-up of the USSR, with both events creating a deep-seated sense of resignation and fatalism. Although most informants hold their governments to blame for lack of information, support and preventive measures, there is little or no collective action to have these put in place. This contrasts with previous research which has suggested that populations affected by disasters attribute crucial significance to that incident and, as a consequence, become increasingly politicized with regard to related policy agendas.

Postmodern Culture, 1993