Bhartṛhari on Śakti: the Vaiśeṣika Categories as Śaktis

Journal of Indian Philosophy 31/1-3, pp. 285–301, 2003

2010

Sabda has got a prominent place in Indian philosophy. Most of the theistic schools of philosophy unanimously accepted śabda also as a means of valid cognition. Grammarians, Logicians and etymologists gave us several classifications of the concept of śabda or 'word'. A śabda uttered must denote a meaning. Acquiring meaning of words can be twofold -by self experience and by a trust worthy person. When one hears a sentence and decodes its meaning properly, it is possible only through a definite linguistic understanding. This linguistic understanding is called śābdabodha in Sanskrit. To acquire proper śābdabodha, sastras gave us eight means of denotative functions and fourteen kinds of powerful deciding factors which govern the meaning in ambiguity. In this paper I would like to discuss the fourteen deciding factors of meaning such as association, dissociation etc., according to Bhartrhari with examples and try to demonstrate on how these factors can be applied on polysemous words which makes the theory also universal with regard to other languages.

Source: Temenos XI (1975): 88-135.

Bhartṛhari: Language, Thought and Reality (Proceedings of the International Seminar, Delhi, December 12–14, 2003), 2009

The Vakyapadiya begins with a description of Brahman in karikas 1-4. Bhartrhari immediately introduces the theme of multiplicity and unity: Brahman is enunciated in the Veda as one, in that there is no separation between it and its powers (fakti); it appears as though distinct from these powers; and it appears as distinct things by virtue of its several powers. ekarri eva yad iimniitarri bhinnafaktivyapiisrayiit/ aprthaktve 'pi faktibhyaf;, frrthaktveneva vartate// VP 1.2 "Brahman is enunciated in the Veda as one. It appears as if distinct from powers although not distinct, by virtue of its severai powers." As shown in this karika, power plays a critical role in Bhartrhari's vivarta theory. Besides, not only from a viewpoint of Bhartrhari's metaphysics but also from that of his linguistic theory, we may point out that the notion of power plays an essential part in his abstraction theory (apoddhiira), a theory basic to his philosophy of grammar, since the theory presupposes a linguistic item's causal link with its meaning. I do not think however that the question of how Bhartrhari conceives of a power has been made sufficiently clear. Thus I intend this paper to be a closer investigation of Bhartrhari' s notion of power. 1 1 Chakravarti (1940) once attempted to give a historical outline of the doctrine of fokti in Sanskrit literature, though regrettably the work was not completed. He also touched on Bhartrhari 's use of the term sakti but could not find that Bhartrhari defined precisely what 5akti is.

2008

Journal of Indian Philosophy, 1978

THE NYAYA CONCEPT OF SVABHAVIKA SAMBANDHA: A HISTORICAL RETROSPECT Vrsagana, an early samkhya teacher formulated for the first time a definition of inference: 'Szmbandh~d ekasmrit pratyak$it ~e@ddhiranumdnam "r [inference is the establishment of the other from the one on the basis of a relation (between the two)]. This definition of inference clearly points to a relation holding between the hetu and the siidhya serving at the root of inference. &arakrsna defines inference as a 'cognition derived through the previous knowledge of the relation between the hetu and the s&ihya, (Tallirigalihgi~ piuvakam SK. V.). Gotama in his Nygyastitra 1 .l-5 characterises inference in a similar vein: Inference is preceded by that (tatpfirvakam), which the commentator VZtsyHyana explains as 'the knowledge of the mark and that of the relation between the mark and mark-possessor.2 During Vgtsyayana's time the question as to how this relation can be ascertained had not been raised and he considered his duty to give his opinion on the same. He prefers the terms 1i;Zga and tirigin, for such logical concepts as vy@pya and vy@zzka have not yet taken a concrete shape. But still he is conscious of the value of joint method which has, in a later period, been accepted as determinant to the ascertainment of universal relation. He'is also conscious of the services rendered by positive (sapok.=) and negative (vipaksa) instances. Vztsyzyana also informs US how through different stages knowledge of universal relation makes inference possible. In Trilocana we meet with a more comprehensive theory of Vyapti 'pervasion'. The old tradition of coexistence was replaced by a more consciously well-defined relation. Trilocana rejected the theory of external association and laid greater stress on the internal aspect of this relation; it is not merely a mechanical but a natural relation (Svabhiivika sambandha). Unfortunately no work of Trilocana has come down to us except a number of fragments preserved by JtianaSrimitra and Ratnakirti. It is clear that Trilocana had a far reaching impact on the contemporary logicians and Vgcaspati clearly admits his indebtedness to this doyen of logicians3 Trilocana asserts that if the relation of two terms (i.e. the hetu and the sadhya) is natural (Svrfbtivika) it will have the status of universal concomitance

Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2012

Journal of South Asian Studies (Minami Asia Kenkyu), 1999