Use and Utility of Russia’s Private Military Companies

2021

Two major geopolitical shifts – the Syrian civil war and the Ukrainian conflict – drew attention of the global academic and policy-related community to the issue of Russia’s private military companies (PMCs) and the so-called Wagner Group, which has become the living symbol of Russia’s covert use of ‘shady’ militarized groups in a powerplay against the west and its allies as well as securing Russia’s geo-economic/ strategic interests abroad. Although they are effective as a tool against weaker opponents, we argue that Russian PMCs should not be viewed as a strategic element in Russia’s military toolkit. Indeed, they are effective only when paired with Russia’s regular armed forces. We contend that PMCs are unlikely to be used against NATO members directly. Nevertheless, Russia will continue employing these forces in zones of instability as a means to engage the West in non-linear and asymmetric fashion.

Special Operations Journal, 2020

In recent years, the Russian private security and military company (PMSC) industry has evolved to serve the needs of both business clients as well as governments. Thus far, the ties between the Kremlin and the Russian PMSC industry are ambiguous and seem to vary across the different companies. What seems clear though, is that the Kremlin is experimenting with the utility of these companies and that the use of PMSCs is on the rise. Private security and military companies are neither explicitly legal nor illegal in Russia, a status that may serve Russian authorities well in situations where attribution and attention is unwanted. While the exact shape and role of the Russian PMSC industry may not be carved out fully, Russia is now home to a small, but potent, PMSC industry that can be mobilised to inflict harm on the country's enemies.

Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, 2022

This article investigates the Russian government's reliance on commercial soldiers in the hybrid war efforts against Ukraine until the invasion in February 2022. Russian private military companies (PMCs), such as RUSCORP and the Wagner group, have already been active in Syria and Africa over the last years, signalling the resurgence of Russian machinations on the world stage. They also played a key part in the annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as the struggles on Ukraine's Eastern border areas around Luhansk and Donbas. The article shows that PMCs have become an integral part of the Kremlin's approach to foreign policy. Unlike Western PMCs, which can arguably augment their ability to provide effective public security, Russian PMCs are used to construct insecurities to the point of fighting hybrid surrogate wars. While they fulfil the same outcome for the Russian state to be strengthened through the public-private security arrangements, their function is radically different: (1) providing deniability without the deployment of Russian troops, (2) providing

2019

An event that took place in early-February 2018, near Deir el-Zour, a city in eastern Syria, resulting in the decimation of between 60 and 200 Russian mercenaries2 fighting on the side of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, brought into the limelight the issue of Russian private military contractors – a tool of power politics allegedly increasingly relied upon by Moscow. A seemingly-local incident in a far-flung Syrian province uncovered unsavory details pertaining to activities of Russian quasi-Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) – a phenomenon of great complexity and outreach. This article will discuss Russian quasi-PMSCs from different aspects, concentrating upon the following key themes: Emergence, evolution, and development of Russian PMSCs/irregular forces through the lens of history; Main disadvantages characteristic of and associated with Russian PMSCs; Key functions and missions performed, depending upon the geographic theatre; and The nascent ‘division of responsibilities’ between various Russian quasi-PMSCs. From a methodological point of view, this article will make extensive references to Russian-language sources, as well as to the results of the author’s own research on the subject.

Proceedings of the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences, 2021

Contemporary conflicts often involve private military companies (PMCs) in addition to national or local armed forces. These groups are used by nations to forward national political or economic interests without direct contribution. The PMCs that have been present during the Syrian Civil War include those that have connections with Russia, represented by the Slavonic Corps and PMC ‘Wagner’. The purpose of the paper is to analyse Russian PMCs operations in Syria in the context of national legislation and as tools exploited by the state. It allows distinguishing if those PMCs are used in Syria for the benefit of Russian political and economy reasons, even though they are not acknowledged according to Russian law. The paper utilises qualitative research as case study method, comparative studies, and desk research from existing resources and available online sources. It is supported an analysis of available official documents from official websites. The limited use of quantitative data allows for the validation of the collected information.

Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS, 2000

On 1 July 1992, then Defence Minister Pavel Grachev stated that 'in conditions of civil chaos, clashes and reprisals, only the army can save thousands of lives, preserve morsels of good and defend what is sacred'. 1 In this statement, Grachev challenged the MFA on policy towards the former Soviet Union. Where the MFA was complacent and ineffectual, the Defence Ministry (MoD) pledged to be forthright and assertive. With little civilian control over the armed forces, the military leadership was able to act on these statements. 'Peacekeeping' operations have played an important role in Russian military relations with the new states. As early as July 1992, Grachev presented 'peacekeeping' as a main peacetime task for the armed forces. 2 In order to understand 'peacekeeping' as a tool of security policy, it is necessary to understand the broader evolution of Russian military approaches to the 'near abroad'. This evolution has been influenced by three sets of factors. First, the MoD inherited a deeply constraining military system. The new military leadership has faced problems in its manning, supervisory, training and equipment policies. The MoD inherited a doctrinal framework and a military district system that were inappropriate for Russia's new requirements. Second, Russian military policy has been influenced by the pressure of events in the 'near abroad'. The outbreak of conflicts has been the principal stimulus to military thinking on security in the post-Soviet 'space'. Events in the 'near abroad' have pulled MoD policy into new directions, as well as reinforced orientations already present. Finally, Russian military approaches towards the 'near abroad' have been influenced by the interaction between the MoD leadership, the General Staff, the CIS High Command (HC) and its successor Coordinating Staff, as well as the leadership of the Border Troops. 3 While the MoD has dominated the policy-making process, developments in the CIS and Europe, and within Russian politics, have strengthened the hand of its institutional competitors. The contest 62 D. Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS

War, Business and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow’s Interests, 2019

By promoting instability in southeastern Ukraine and becoming involved in the Syrian civil war, the Kremlin has shown growing resolve to militarily challenge the United States both within and beyond Russia’s self-proclaimed zone of “privileged interests.” Russian participation in these conflicts has also highlighted a new-old tool to fulfill Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions: the so-called Private Military Companies (PMC), irregular and de jure illegal private armies that directly or indirectly operate in the service of the Kremlin. PMCs have a deep historical legacy of helping Russia pursue state interests, and the sophistication and scope of Moscow’s use of this instrument continues to grow and evolve. Russian readiness to employ PMCs rests on “plausible deniability,” the commercialization of war, and the principle of asymmetricity. These three components have made PMCs an important, cost-effective means for Russia to act as the de facto key player in “gray zones”—both incidental and created by Moscow—and regional conflicts along its periphery as well as in places as far off as Central Africa and beyond. Though a series of forthcoming reports, this project seeks to explore the issue of Russian PMCs through the lens of continuity and tradition. The main project investigator, Dr. Sergey Sukhankin, a Research Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, will employ a broad range of primary- and indigenous secondary-source data to explain how Russia employs these irregular formations and what the West should do about it.

2020

In pursuit of its geo-economic/political objectives in Africa, Russia relies on military-technical cooperation and “security export” mechanisms as its main competitive advantages. Aside from legal tools, such as arms/weaponry deals, training and consulting, the Russian side also relies on illegal tools that include private military companies, entities that are de jure prohibited in Russia, and have been (since 2014) involved in conflicts in Ukraine, Syria and Libya. This paper argues that, despite their image of strength and efficiency gained in Ukraine and partly in Syria, their use will have limited strategic effect in sub-Saharan Africa and is unlikely to yield sustainable long-term benefits for Russia.

2020

• Between 2014 and 2019, Russian mercenaries and irregulars have been spotted on three continents, and the number of countries where they have carried out operations is growing. Among the newly emerging and potential destinations, the countries of Latin America (Venezuela and Nicaragua), the Maghreb (Libya), and Sub-Saharan Africa (Mozambique) deserve particular attention. • The tasks and functions performed by Russian private military companies (PMC) and other irregulars have evolved (in comparison with 2014) and gained additional complexity. Aside from (para)military functions-operations carried out as "shockwave troops" (Syria and Ukraine)-Russian irregulars are employed as paramilitary consultants, trainers for foreign militias and armed forces, and to carry out anti-insurgency operations in a host country. • Despite their undisputed strengths, Russian PMCs have demonstrated certain weaknesses, especially when confronted by a technologically superior adversary and/or operating in unfamiliar terrain (desert, tropical/equatorial forests) and challenging conditions (lack of coordination with local forces and/or lack of assistance from the Russian Armed Forces). • PMCs should not be looked at in isolation, but rather in conjunction with a) other irregular formations, b) Russia`s official governmental structures, as well as c) large corporations and Russian oligarchs close to the ruling elite. • Given their international image and reputation, Russia might be willing to increase its use of PMCs (and other irregular formations) in information-psychological operations to exert additional pressure on Western countries.