Societas Ethica, Annual Conference 2017, Giving an Account of Evil

This essay aims to bring out the differences between the approaches to the problem of evil in antiquity and our time. By design, the essay sketches out a picture of a large-scale transformation. Any painting with broad brushstrokes is bound to dissatisfy at the level of details. As someone who appreciates fine-grained historical contextualization of complex theological ideas—of the kind afforded by other papers at this symposium—I would be the first to acknowledge that the task of providing a master narrative is a very precarious affair. Admittedly, master narratives are not a popular sport nowadays. For some (presently audience excluded), such narratives are inherently " oppressive. " In other words, master narratives are a part of the problem of evil rather than its solution, and as such should be consigned to deconstruction. While such demolition work might in some cases be necessary, a dirge for all master narratives is not merely premature, but inevitably self-defeating. Aside from the general skepticism about the master narratives, one might doubt whether any narrative that assumes a shift in premodern and modern sensibilities is on the right track. I think that the transition needs to be handled with care and that this question cannot be answered in the abstract. The argument of this PAGE 4

2021

This book is an inquiry into particular matters concerning the nature, normativity, and aftermath of evil action. It combines philosophical conceptual analysis with empirical studies in psychology and discussions of historical events to provide an innovative analysis of evil action. The book considers unresolved questions belonging to metaethical, normative, and practical characteristics of evil action. It begins by asking whether Kant's historical account of evil is still relevant for contemporary thinkers. Then it addresses features of evil action that distinguish it from mundane wrongdoing, thereby placing it as a proper category of philosophical inquiry. Next, the author inquires into how evil acts affect moral relationships and challenge Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility. He then draws conceptual and empirical connections between evil acts such as genocide, torture, and slavery and collective agency, and asks why evil acts are often collective acts. Finally, the author questions both the possibility and propriety of forgiveness and vengeance in the aftermath of evil and discusses how individuals ought to cope with the pervasiveness of evil in human interaction.

2019

Although ‘evil’ has played an important, if subterranean, role in Western philosophical thought, this has not led to agreement regarding its meaning or significance. From this, the book defends four different but related arguments: (1) the problem of evil arose with the rise of Christianity from Judaism, (2) evil has not been defined by a singular meaning, but is heterogeneous, and (3) conceptions of evil are premised on various metaphysics, which, traditionally understood, were understood to create a fundamental cleavage between pre- and post-Kantian conceptions of the topic; the former based on theological Christian doctrine and the latter on non-theological premises. The fourth argument questions this narrative by showing that theological motifs, logic, figures, and ideas continue to implicitly influence post-Kantian, supposedly secular, thinking on the topic. In so doing, I argue that this does not simply point to a failure on the part of those supposedly secular theories, but shows that we have to abandon the notion that pits theology against secularity or that sees the latter entailing the absence of the former. Instead, it reveals that secularity entails an on-going and complex relationship to the theological tradition it emanates from. With this, the book contributes to the so-called theological turn that has marked contemporary theory and specifically the line of critique that disrupts the notion that there exists a straightforward binary opposition between the theological and secular.

2020

The problem of evil in its current state is an argument against the existence of God from the existence of suffering in the world. Theistic response has developed along two lines: theodicy, which attempts to explain suffering by appealing to overriding, justifying goods; and skeptical theism, which calls into question the argument itself, typically on the grounds of our limited capacity to know the reasons for suffering if they existed. In this thesis I compare the current way of framing the problem of evil to the way it was framed by St. Thomas Aquinas, and I find that compared to him contemporary philosophers are thinking about the problem in a very narrow way. For Aquinas, I argue, suffering was as much a challenge to interpersonal connection with God as it was a challenge to God's existence. I explore this broader way of framing the issue by reformulating the problem of evil as an argument against the Christian practice of trusting God. I conclude by surveying possible avenues of response by Christian theists to this new formulation of the problem of evil, arguing that there are serious barriers to a successful skeptical theistic response. As a result, I recommend theodicy as the most promising avenue. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work is indebted to many people. In particular, my supervisor, Dr. Carl Still, whose guidance made this project possible in the first place, and who took it on despite a very busy schedule, finding the time to meet with me in person to discuss many drafts, thank you. I would also like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Emer O'Hagan and Dr. John Liptay, as well as my external reader Dr Darren Dahl for their helpful questions and challenges. To the Philosophy faculty at the University of Saskatchewan and the St. Thomas Moore College, thank you for your care and instruction. This research was funded through the gracious award of a Graduate Teaching Fellowship from the College of Graduate Studies and Research. Finally, to my wife, Ashley Williams, and family who supported me, thank you for your patience, love, and trust.