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2021, Berkeley Insights in Linguistics and Semiotics, vol 101
While Joseph Galasso's new book 'Reflections on Syntax' certainly delivers a fresh attempt at revisiting traditional orthodoxy related to syntax and the generative grammar enterprise, in addition, here enclosed one will also find quite interesting and unorthodox views surrounding concepts of language in general. For instance, the perceived commonsensical view that it is the 'child that acquires language' gets turned on its head with the assertion that it is rather 'language which acquires the child'. This is not a new concept overall, as this has been suggested for the processing behind Creolization. However, such an expansion to child first language gives the flavor of suggesting that there are in reality all these multiple languages 'out there', each falling somewhere along a spectrum from a very basic and prosaic language-state to that of the adult target-state-and that the child's developmental process involves the act of an appropriate language-state being assigned to an appropriate child. These multilanguage-states are all legitimate in their own rights, as they are often observable instantiations of language typologies found across the world's languages (e.g., non-inflectional languages, Pro-drop, non-agreeing languages, etc.). The unique property which governs language has an immense recursive complexity, and it becomes quite difficult to ponder the exact nature of its origins. The unique property which governs recursive syntax is an outlier-it is a black-swan event. <> This book provides a fascinating and highly individual perspective on language. It deals with a wide range of topics including the philosophy of language, its biological basis and evolution, as well as language acquisition, language disorders, language processing and language universals. Andrew Radford, Emeritus Professor of Linguistics, University of Essex, UK. Galasso builds a beautiful explanatory edifice that, engagingly, weaves together empirical evidence and current abstract theory of grammar in the best tradition of science: it combines "a passion for abstraction with a devotion to detail". Implications for language acquisition, philosophy and every dimension of "biolinguistics" are skillfully incorporated with a core representation of the concept of recursion. It should be very useful for scholars and students alike. Tom Roeper, Professor of Linguistics, UMass, South College.
LINCOM Europa: Studies in Theoretical Linguistics, 61. ISBN: 978-3-86288-988-4 (Hardbound), 2019
My Acknowledgements go out to several people & experiences, all of which have in one way or another helped to inform my understanding of syntax. Noam Chomsky, particularly his Spring 1995 University College London lectures during which he unveiled his Minimalist Program stands out most in my memory. I can still recall the buzz in the room we all felt as young Ph.D. students at the time, as a type-o correction was still being hashed-out, under our breath, over the fresh manuscript—‘correcting an “A-position” to an “Ā-bar position”’, (it seems the bar had failed to be properly inserted in the draft manuscript above the A-argument position, and so we collectively talked about its subsequent correction, the error which was found on so and so page). Or, I can clearly recall another ‘daunting’ question of whether or not Icelandic had certain movement properties? (I don’t think we ever settled that question on the day). Chomsky’s opening remark was: ‘So, I see I have you all on the edge of your seats’ (a real fire-hazard to be sure: the auditorium was so packed that many of us had to squeeze tightly with our neighbor, two to a single seat). I remember Chomsky using the chalk-board only once that bright, London day— to draw a light verb vP with hovering multi specs, [spec>spec>vP…]: as he said, ‘This is now our minimalist theory’: I can still feel the collective jaw-drop in the room. Neil Smith at UCL never failed at the chance to have Chomsky near students whenever he came to London. Andrew Radford (my Ph.D. dissertation supervisor at Essex) knew ‘he was coming’—nothing could have prepared us for such a visit, but it is universally accepted (as he is the Cambridge University Press best-selling author of all Chomskyan syntax), that without Radford, a very large part of the theoretical-syntax community would have been even more desperately lost. Just as we were beginning, I think, to understand GB, we were now being informed to dismantle its very core, eliminating everything that was learned that generation: e.g., Spec-Head relations would surrender to probe-goal relations, AGR projections (AGR-O) would be forever lost to us, the idea that all was to be compressed into a prosaic Merge/Move-operation, etc., and much, much more—such once-prized concepts now being forever relegated to the dusty archives of Government & Binding. I thank Andrew for our wonderful ongoing correspondences, whether or not the topic is minimalist syntax, or just plain maximalist ‘life and such-like’. I thank Harald Clahsen who exposed our Essex research group to the important works of Steven Pinker and Gary Marcus at the time (among so many others who came to give talks on connectionism)…these guys were hot off the press back then. The pending debates with Jeff Elman, and the rest of the Southern California PDP-group, whose leanings towards ‘language as connectionism’ stimulated much of our discussion. My personal correspondences and/or ‘after- talk’ chats with the likes of Neil Smith, Nina Hyams, Alec Marantz and Tom Roeper were always so stimulating that after each of my/their visits, I always felt the impending impulse to immediately go home and draw syntactic trees: yes, light verb vP-trees, (with multi spec positions). I thank all my colleagues of the faculty of linguistics at California State University— Northridge, where I have been a proud part of this fine theoretical department over the past twenty years.
PhD Dissertation, University of East London, 2007
Grammar is more than just order and hierarchy; it is a way of expressing complex multidimensional schemas in one dimension. The need to communicate these schemas is the concern of language, but how they are communicated is the concern of grammar. Because grammar does not necessarily rely on the preexistence of language, it is possible for the elements of grammar to be prototyped as features of other mental systems before language appears. These elements can then be exapted as needed for language. So the genesis of language and the genesis of grammar do not necessarily need to be considered as a single process.
Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft, 2009
(Note: These lectures include the 'Four-Sentences'). The chapters contained in this e-book derive from a series of accumulative course lectures given across several semesters to my graduate students of theoretical syntax, as well as to my many undergraduate students of child language acquisition, both at California State University Northridge, as well as Cal State Long Beach where I have lectured as an adjunct professor over the past twenty years. I’d like to thank all my students over the years that have helped shape these lectures. Our collective class discussions have better sharpened my own understanding of these issues. If these lectures in linguistics have improved at all since their first incarnation, it is only because they have benefited from the many discussions, multifaceted argumentation, and the steadfast persistence on seeking-out diverting points of departure on given topics—all respectively instigated by you, my students, over those years. The lectures are immensely Chomskyan in spirit, recursive-syntactic in nature, and are tethered to a framework which takes as the null hypothesis the notion that language is an innate, pre-determined biological system—a system which by definition is multi-complex, human-specific, and analogous to a philosophy highly commensurate of Descartes’ great proverbial adage which announces the calling for a ‘ghost-in-the-machine’. And for those today who wish-way Descartes’ Mind-body dualism as no longer tenable, Chomsky turns the table and suggests that all we have achieved thus far is exorcise the machine (via Newtonian mechanics), we have left the ghost intact. Hence, while philosophical dualism may be no longer tenable, it is not for the typical reasons assigned to the break. Rather, dispensing with a duality, all we are left with is the singular haunting ghost. (Chomsky 2002, p.53). <> Joseph Galasso is on the Linguistics Faculty at California State University, Northridge (and is an adjunct professor of linguistics at California State University, Long Beach). His main research involves issues surrounding early child language development. He is interested in pursuing certain ‘Minimalist Program’ assumptions (Chomsky 1995) which ask how such assumptions might explain observed early stages of morphosyntactic development in Children. His 2016 monograph is entitled ‘From Merge to Move: A minimalist perspective on the design of language and its role in early child syntax’. LINCOM Studies in Theoretical Linguistics, 59. His last monograph in the same theoretical series is entitled ‘Recursive Syntax’ LINCOM, 61.
2018
Noam Chomsky's notion of an innate universal grammar (see e.g. Hauser & Chomsky, 2002; Chomsky, 1976) is known to be problematic, not least for identifying recursion as the defining aspect underlying human language, given the extremely limited use of recursion in known languages and ongoing claims (see e.g. Evans & Levinson, 2009) that some languages lack recursive capacity altogether. Far more serious, perhaps, is the sense that universal grammar is delivered by a priori fiat and empirical evidence is all but completely lacking. As Evans and Levinson argue, few aspects of language, indeed, are, on closer examination, in any meaningful sense universal, which might seem to point against universal biological foundations. Although a couple decades ago Chomsky's views on language still dominated the field, recent years have seen such notions as universal grammar being increasingly called into question. Whether taking the form of a universal grammar or not, innate linguistic capacity has another consequence that might seem undesirable: by suggesting that syntactically and grammatically structured language is uniquely human, it risks creating an absolute divide between human beings and other terrestrial species-a number of which, as the burgeoning field of comparative cognition has revealed over the past couple decades, show complex cognitive abilities, including abilities, such as spontaneous tool use (e.g.,
Journal of Linguistics, 1992
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2003
The goal of this study is to reintegrate the theory of generative grammar into the cognitive sciences. Generative grammar was right to focus on the child&amp;amp;amp;amp;#39;s acquisition of language as its central problem, leading to the hypothesis of an innate Universal Grammar. However, generative grammar was mistaken in assuming that the syntactic component is the sole course of combinatoriality, and that everything else is &amp;amp;amp;amp;quot;interpretive.&amp;amp;amp;amp;quot; The proper approach is a parallel architecture, in which phonology, syntax, and semantics are autonomous generative systems linked by interface components. The parallel architecture leads to an integration within linguistics, and to a far better integration with the rest of cognitive neuroscience. It fits naturally into the larger architecture of the mind/brain and permits a properly mentalistic theory of semantics. It results in a view of linguistic performance in which the rules of grammar are directly involved in processing. Finally, it leads to a natural account of the incremental evolution of the language capacity.
European Journal of Language and Literature, 2017
This paper aims to discuss the two main approaches to language acquisition and present the main ideas behind the nativist and the usage-based account. The concomitant argument between the two sides has been present in linguistics ever since the proposal of innateness was provided by the paradigm of mainstream generative grammar (Chomsky 1965). In order to contribute to the ongoing discussion, we will attempt to outline the main challenges that the both theoretical strands are faced with and provide an overview of syntactic evidence provided by linguists whose work was devoted to understanding the mechanisms of language acquisition. Our goal is to analyze the insights provided by the phenomena such as syntactic bootstrapping, poverty of the stimulus, multiple argument realizations and non-canonical syntactic constructions and argue that integrating these findings into a usage-based framework (Tomasello 2000, 2003 - 2009) or various instances of Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995 - 1...
On Nature and Language, 2002
Editors' introduction: some concepts and issues in linguistic theory 1 The study of language in a biological setting Dominant linguistics paradigms in the first half of the twentieth century had centered their attention on Saussurean "Langue," a social object of which individual speakers have only a partial mastery. Ever since the 1950s, generative grammar shifted the focus of linguistic research onto the systems of linguistic knowledge possessed by individual speakers, and onto the "Language Faculty," the species-specific capacity to master and use a natural language (Chomsky 1959). In this perspective, language is a natural object, a component of the human mind, physically represented in the brain and part of the biological endowment of the species. Within such guidelines, linguistics is part of individual psychology and of the cognitive sciences; its ultimate aim is to characterize a central component of human nature, defined in a biological setting. The idea of focusing on the Language Faculty was not new; it had its roots in the classical rationalist perspective of studying language as a "mirror of the mind," as a domain offering a privileged access to the study of human cognition. In order to stress such roots, Chomsky
LINCOM Studies in Theoretical Syntax, 2019
Links to complete series of papers (PDFs) available on Academia: <htps://csun.academia.edu/josephgalasso/Minimalist-Perspectves-on-Child-Syntax>... •If there is no recursion, there can be no language. What we are left in its stead is a (Merge-based) broad 'beads-on-a string' sound-to-meaning recurrent function, serial sequenced, combinatory non-conservative and devoid of the unique properties of recursion which make human speech special. It may be 'labeling' (see Epstein et al.)-the breaking of 'combinatory serial sequencing' found among sister-relations-that constitutes the true definition of language since in order to label a phrase one must employ a recursive structure-JG. •If Continuity is allowed to run freely, in all aspects in respect to biology, and is therefore the null hypothesis, then what we may be talking about is a 'function' that matures over time, and not the 'inherent design' (UG) which underwrites the function, since, given strong continuity claims, the design has always been there from the very beginning. It may be that the (Move-based) function 'Recursion' may mature over time, in incremental intervals, leading to stages of child language acquisition, and in the manifesting of pidgin language. But when all is said and done, strong continuity claims don't necessary span across other species or even intermediate phases of our own species. In fact, strong evidence suggest the contrary-that the unique recursive property found specific to our own species, early Homo Sapiens (Cro-Magnon) has in fact no other antecedent that can be retraced past a date of approximately 60kya-JG.
It seems the human brain/mind is unique in its capacity to move from (i) a recurrent mental-processing through to (ii) a recursive mental-processing. Some scientists argue that this 'uniquely human-speciesspecific capacity' has emerged on our evolutionary scene as recently as 40KYA (thousand years ago). While there may be more general-cognitive and learning schemes tethered to such recursive processing (e.g., theory of mind, declarative vs procedural knowledge, etc.), on a pure linguistics footing, this recurrent + recursive progression defines what we find in the two stages of child language syntax-whereby a recurrent stage-1 manifests primary base-lexical stems (as well as the stacking of such bases), while the recursive stage-2 manifests movement-based operations (what was once termed the classic Lexical vs Functional dual stages of child syntax). Recall, one very simple example of the functional vs lexical distinction can be found in our 'How do you Do?' example, where the first functional do constitutes an Auxiliary Verb (something like a light verb √do)-Aux verbs are 'category-based', provided merely for an interrogative/question syntax, are non
Final version available in: K. Allan (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Linguistics, London: Routledge, pp. 516-531, 2016
Philosophy and the study of language are intimately connected, to the extent that it is impossible to say from which point in human intellectual history the study of meaning in natural language can be regarded as an independent enterprise. Natural language syntax, semantics and pragmatics are now considered to be sub-disciplines of theoretical linguistics, surrounded by the acolytes in the domains of language acquisition, language disorders, language processing (psycholinguistics and neuroscience of language), all using empirical, including experimental, methods in addition to rationalistic inquiry. However, philosophical problems associated with the structure of language as well as with meaning in language and in discourse still remain, and arguably will always remain, the backbone of syntax and semantics, and a trigger for progress in theorizing. It is impossible to summarise the impressively rich tradition of thinking about language in the history of philosophy. One would have to start with Presocratics in the 6 th and 7 th centuries BCE in Ancient Greece (see e.g. Curd 2012) and cover two and a half millennia of intensive questioning and argumentation over the relations between language, reality, truth, and the human mind. Or, one could try to delve into the history before the Greeks, then move through the landmarks of Plato, Aristotle, and the later Stoics into the current era (see e.g. . In this brief introduction we shall focus on much later debates, starting from the period when discussions about topics that are currently in the focus of debates originated, that is late 19 th century, marked by Frege's insights into an ideal language for describing knowledge and the origin of modern logic that is now used as a metalanguage for theorizing about meaning in natural human languages. From formal approaches within analytical philosophy I shall move to the 'language-as-use' paradigm of the ordinarylanguage philosophy, followed by the more recent debates on meaning as it is to be understood for the purpose of formal representation and linguistic theory. In the process, I shall address some of the core areas that philosophers of language have been drawn to such as reference and referring or propositional attitude reports. Next, I move to the topic of the role of intentions and inferences, and finish with a brief attempt to place 'linguistics and philosophy' on the map of language sciences and research on language in the 21 st century.
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