Cicero, Friendship and Justice in Political Society

Open Journal of Philosophy, 2015

Friendship is one the anthropological and existential concepts bothering the human society. It is a factor seen as common yet powerful. It is a tool for development. When there is friendship, be it among equals, nations, communities, races and religions, there would be peace and love, hence there would be development. This work will therefore make an analysis of the notion of friendship, narrowing it down to the thought of Cicero, targeting the causes, types, as well as the importance of friendship in the contemporary society. It, however, concludes that since we cannot exist alone and learning to resolve conflict is an important function of friendship, families, churches, members of various tribes and nations should therefore adopt cicerone notion of perfect friendship for the growth and development of the society.

2024

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Res Publica, 2013

My aim in this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of the Aristotelian notion of civic friendship to contemporary political discussion by arguing that it can function as a social good. Contrary to some dominant interpretations of the ancient conception of friendship according to which it can only be understood as an obligatory reciprocity, I argue that friendship between fellow citizens is important because it contributes to the unity of both state and community by transmitting feelings of intimacy and solidarity. In that sense, it can be understood as an important relationship predicated on affection and generosity, virtues lacking from both contemporary politics and society that seem to be merely dominated by Post-Enlightenment ideals. For Aristotle, friendship is important for society because it generates concord, articulating thus a basis for social unity and political agreement.

Universitas Philosophica, 2009

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Revue Horizon Sociologique, 2011

Abstract: Cicero maintains that one should choose one’s friends carefully, choosing men of good character. One should moreover freely share all of one’s concerns, plans, and aims with one’s friends. Friendship should be based on steadfastness, loyalty and trust, with no deception or hypocrisy. Absolute honesty is thus essential for friendship, and one should be congenial and show pleasant manners to friends, treating them as equals, and being generous and helpful to them. One should also encourage one’s friends in developing virtue, reprimanding them in a tactful, gentle manner if necessary, and accepting reprimand with forbearance. One should always behave respectfully to one’s friends, maintaining particular respect for friends of long standing. He stresses that the excessive pursuit of wealth and power is detrimental to friendship. One can make concessions to friends by agreeing to do improper things if these do not damage our reputation; however, one should not do fundamentally wrong acts on account of friendship. He points out that one should not have unrealistic expectations or be too demanding towards one’s friends nor should one engage in behaviour of a flattering or sycophantic nature. One need not give more help to a friend than one is able nor is one obliged to, nor to place pleasing a friend above matters of duty. He allows that friendships can be ended if the friend behaves badly or if common interests change. In that case, one should strive to end the friendship gradually and quietly.

Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 61 (1999), 525-45.

Viator, 2007

Most people are not prepared in their daily lives to accept that anything can be good unless it is a source of profit. They choose their best friends as they choose their cattle, lavishing the greatest affection where they hope for the most lucrative results. But if this is what they are going to do, they will miss the finest and most natural sort of friendship; I mean the sort which is desirable for its own sake and for itself. Such people deprive themselves of the opportunity to experience for themselves how powerful, how wonderful and how all-embracing this kind of relationship can be. 1 These reflections of Cicero (106-43 BCE) in his treatise De amicitia (also known as Laelius) had a powerful impact on medieval readers. Cicero was contrasting the ideal of pursuing friendship for its own sake with purely instrumental friendship, pursued out of self-interest. 2 In this article, I consider how some of the central elements of Cicero's discussion of friendship, originally formulated within the political context of the late Roman republic, were transformed in twelfth-century Europe, when the De amicitia enjoyed a surge of popularity within an educated elite, not just among a male readership. Cicero's ideas about friendship were never completely forgotten during the early Middle Ages, but they did come to be much more widely read in the twelfth century. 3 The figure most often associated with this renewal of interest in Ciceronian ideals in the twelfth century is Aelred of Rievaulx (1110-1167), whose writings are given a preeminent place by Brian McGuire within his survey of the monastic tradition of 1 Cicero, De amicitia 21.79-80, ed. K. Simbek (Leipzig 1917): "Sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quicquam bonum norunt nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potissimum diligunt, ex quibus sperant se maxumum fructum esse capturos. Ita pulcherrima illa et maxuma naturali carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, haec vis amicitiae et qualis et quanta sit. Ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae, sed quod per se sibi quisque carus est." The translation here, as elsewhere, is that of Michael Grant in Cicero, On the Good Life (London 1971) 216, unless otherwise indicated. There is also a translation by Frank Copley in Other Selves. Philosophers on Friendship, ed. Michael Pakaluk (Indianapolis 1991) 108. 2 Perhaps the best philosophic overview of the transmission of Ciceronian ideals in the medieval period is

Contemporary Political Theory, 2020

One might be forgiven for believing, upon opening this book, that the early 1980s debate between liberals and communitarians is back. A feeling of nostalgia almost arises for the times of that dispute-one that, for those like me who received higher education in the new millennium, has quasi-legendary undertones. Meanwhile, history had ended, and liberalism had triumphed. But a quick look at political developments since the second half of the past decade, with its surge of successful nationalistic and identity-based claims, suggests that there is fertile ground for a new wave of communitarian thought. With this political context in mind, Ludwig seeks inspiration from classical texts, and the final product is a fascinating, authoritative, and complex volume. The book, however, is not the revival of a debate but rather a reconciliation. Rediscovering Political Friendship attempts the reconstruction of this concept-usually thought of as a stronghold of communitarian ethics-as a supplement for 'liberalism's attempts to negotiate the real difficulties pointed out by liberalism's opponents' (p. 39). This dialogue between ancient texts and the politics of modernity brings to mind masterpieces of the 1980s, such as Walzer's Exodus and Revolution (1985) or Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness (1986). Ludwig draws on classic texts of political thought from Plato to Hegel and from Tocqueville to Walzer to reflect on contemporary politics and about the world as it should be. The book's epigraph quotes Cicero: 'Our nature is to be in a sort of league (societas) with everyone-the closer the person, the stronger it becomes (maior autem ut quisque proxime accederet)'. This quote really expresses, and powerfully so, the terms in which Ludwig presents his argument. The key tenet of the book is that 'political friendship', a direct translation of Aristotle's politike philia, is a feeling which must be studied carefully, and indeed elevated-or countered when it cannot be elevated-by political theory. Granted, friendship occupies a special