Genetic Enhancement and The Child's Right to an Open Future

This paper considers children's rights with respect to genetic enhancement (GE). It is focused on the futuristic prospect of postnatal GE, namely, genetic modifications, in vivo, of actual existing individuals. More specifically, the paper examines whether, in a future reality where pre-and postnatal human GE is safely and prevalently practiced, a child would have a right to be genetically enhanced by her parents or guardians, as well as the right not to be genetically enhanced. It is in fact the postnatal phase, inhabited by persons of indisputable moral status, subject of rights against others, which makes the child's putative right (not) to be genetically enhanced a relevant and legitimate subject of exploration. Since postnatal GE is a futuristic technology, an appropriate, concrete, rights-discourse has not yet been developed. In this paper, I therefore attempt to initiate such discourse, by identifying, through legal analysis, potential sources for the child's right to be genetically enhanced, and theorizing about its nature (derivative, or a newly created independent right; positive or negative right). I begin by considering several (mostly) contemporary candidate core rights, from which the child's right to be genetically enhanced could potentially derive; next, I consider the child's right not to be genetically enhanced, through ethical analysis; finally, I look into the merits of creating such a novel right of the child. I conclude, that the direct translation of the child's interests in being genetically enhanced, into any kind of recognized positive or negative right – whether derivative or a newly emerging independent right – is unlikely. As per the putative child's right not to be genetically enhanced postnatally, I determine that such a right could be recognized as a relative right, balanced against parental autonomy in rearing and shaping one's child.

Journal of Value Inquiry, 2011

With the advances in biomedical sciences over the last decade and the possibility of genetic interventions becoming less speculative, it is natural that ethical questions concerning this uncharted territory have moved into the focus of philosophical debates. It is now considered a possibility that we will reach a level of biotechnological knowledge that would provide the technical means to genetically intervene to cure and radically enhance human life in the near future, forming, as Allen Buchanan says, ''important biological characteristics of the human beings we choose to bring into existence.'' 1 Even if with current scientific sophistication, such prenatal enhancement techniques are not genuine possibilities, their possibility can alone be instructive in thinking about ethics and morality. 2 As Eduarto Mendieta has observed, biotechnology, and its application ''demand that we reflect on what it means to be human in an age in which human nature is up for grabs.'' 3

2019

Among all human practices, procreation seems the most paradoxical. It starts as a fully personal choice and ends with the creation of a new subject of rights and responsibilities. Advances in reproductive genetics pose new ethical and legal questions. They are expected to prevent the transmission of genetic diseases to progeny and also to improve genetically-endowed mental and physical attributes. Genetic selection and enhancement may affect a child’s identity, as well as the parent-child relationship. The authors are committed to a pluralistic approach that captures all aspects of this relationship in terms of moral virtues and principles. They elucidate that most of the conflicts between parental preferences and a child’s rights could be resolved with reference to the meaning and nature of procreation.

Philosophy Compass, 2008

Advances in reproductive genetic engineering have the potential to transform human lives. Not only do they promise to allow us to select children free of diseases, they can also enable us to select children with desirable traits. In this paper, I consider two clusters of arguments for the moral permissibility of reproductive genetic engineering, what I call the Perfectionist View and the Libertarian View; and two clusters of arguments against reproductive genetic engineering, what I call the Human Nature View and the Motivation View. I argue that an adequate theory of the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering should take into account insights gained from these views.

1997

In this paper, I examine three difficult issues raised by the Human Genome Project, and lay out an approach that takes seriously the interests of the child, present or future, while preserving the traditional commitment of professional geneticists to patient autonomy. The approach I take is based on Joel Feinberg\u27s concept of the child\u27s right to an open future. In Part II, I describe the Human Genome Project, as well as the advances in assisted reproduction which give people ways to make use of the information engendered by the HGP. In Part III, I discuss the ethics of medical genetics, especially the primacy of client autonomy and how it grounds the tenets of value neutrality and nondirective counseling. I describe three current issues that pose challenges to a professional ethic of value neturality: (1) disabled parents who seek assistance in ensuring the birth of a child who shares their disability (e.g. hereditary deafness or dwarfism); (2) predictive testing of children ...

Essays in Philosophy, 2019

There are few technological innovations that have galvanized public ethical debates more then the application of genomics biotechnology in human medicine. Case in point is the public outcry that resulted from He Jiankui’s use of CRISPR to alter the genomes of twin girls. While the alteration was intended to increase the children’s resistance to HIV, medical professionals and bioethicists alike called the research highly problematic and ethically troubling (Normile 2018). This outcry was the result of clear violations of research standards, but also was due to how biotechnology was applied and the nature of the genetic changes themselves. As illustrated by this case, biomedical technologies have the promise of promoting social benefits, such as reproductive freedom, healthy aging, and the prevention and/or treatment of genetic diseases. Indeed, Farrelly argues that “an understanding of the role that genes play... could expand the domain of interventions (both environmental and genetic) to improve our opportunities for living flourishing lives” (p.2). However, these technologies could also be applied in ways that are ethically problematic, as we have learned from the history of eugenics, where advances in knowl- edge of genetics led to outrageous social injustices...

The debate over whether germ-line genetic engineering is justified on the basis of the consent or presumed consent of future generations is mired in philosophical confusion. Because of this, the principle of informed consent fails to provide a reason to restrict germ-line genetic engineering. Most recent bioethicists ground the consent requirement on individual autonomy. While conceptually coherent, the notion of individual autonomy also fails to provide a reason for prohibiting germline genetic engineering. Moreover, it offers little in the way of useful guidance for regulating genetic engineering. I argue, however, that respect for autonomy in the sense of moral agency -the ability to reflect on moral considerations and conform one's behavior to those reflections -provides a principle that can be used for a nuanced evaluation of proposals for genetic engineering.

Journal of Philosophical Research 30 (Supplement):95-104 (2005) Ethical Issues for the Twenty-First Century Can Genetic Enhancement Be Morally Obligatory? Four Arguments: 1. The Health Argument 2. The Easy Benefit Argument 3. The Comparative Advantage Argument 4. The Talent Development Argument

2019

As the science related to genetic engineering becomes more advanced, more and more ethical questions relating to technologies such as CRISPR and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) arise. If we have the opportunity to choose the genes of our future children in order have children with our desired characteristics, should we do so? Is it okay to mess with some genes of your future child and not others? In this paper, I discuss arguments and objections associated with these questions. The aim of this paper is to show that it is ethical to alter the DNA of your future child or select a specific child only when you are attempting to improve the health of that child. Many might find the possibility of designing their own baby exciting. What could be better than creating the exact baby that you have always dreamed of? While it is easy to fantasize about the positives of genetic engineering, when we really dig deep into what such technology would mean for society, many problems emerge. ...

This paper takes a step beyond the enhancement debate, into the domain of genetic design. It explores what morality may have to say about the creation of "designer babies," that is, about new human beings whose genetic code is either composed from scratch or produced through modification of a fertilized human egg cell or of a human clone. I pose this bewildering question in the context of an imagined future world in which genetic design is much more advanced in a way that makes it safe, predictable, and reasonably affordable. Such a future world may be less than a century away. I also impose three artificial limits on the discussion: I consider genetic design or redesign only in regard to a one-cell organism that, once designed, will grow and develop "naturally" without any further genetic interventions. I confine the discussion to the design of what clearly are human beings, that is, beings whose genetic endowments all lie within the parameters of the existing human gene pool. And I assume a social world much like ours, in which the creation of new human beings is initiated by human adults who generally love and care for the child and who bear a legal responsibility to safeguard the child's basic interests until it reaches maturity. In such a world, I conclude, the law may be quite permissive with regard to the genetic design choices of parents.