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2021, Philosophia, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00318-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00318-y…
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According to a common opinion, human olfactory experiences are significantly different from human visual experiences. For instance, olfaction seems to have only rudimentary abilities to represent space; it is not clear whether olfactory experiences have any mereological structure; and while vision presents the world in terms of objects, it is a matter of debate whether there are olfactory object-representations. This paper argues that despite these differences visual and olfactory experiences share a hierarchical subject/property structure. Within this structure, olfactorily experienced odours and visual objects have the same status: they are primary subjects which unify other represented elements into perceptual units.
Philosophia, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-018-0017-3
In the contemporary analytic discussions concerning human olfactory perception, it is commonly claimed that (1) olfactory experiences are representations having content and (2) olfactory experiences represent odours, like coffee odour or vanilla odour. However, despite these common assumptions, there seems to be an ontological controversy between two views: the first states that odours are perceptually represented as features and the second states that they are represented as objects. In this paper, I aim to systematically address the Bfeature or object^ status of represented odours by concerning whether odours are represented (a) as subjects of properties, (b) as mereological wholes, and (c) entities persisting in a way characteristic for objects. I argue that olfactorily represented odours constitute a sui generis category and cannot be easily classified as objects or features. Such investigations constitute a step in establishing whether various human modalities are unified by organising the environment according to the same categories.
Disputatio, 2014
The philosophy of perception has been mostly focused on vision, to the detriment of other modalities like audition or olfaction. In this paper I focus on olfaction and olfactory experience, and raise the following questions: is olfaction a perceptual-representational modality? If so, what does it represent? My goal in the paper is, firstly, to provide an affirmative answer to the first question, and secondly, to argue that olfaction represents odors in the form of olfactory objects, to which olfactory qualities are attributed. In order to do this I develop an empirically adequate notion of olfactory object that is sensitive to the peculiarities of olfaction, and defend it against various objections.
Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision, with very little discussion of the chemical senses—olfaction and gustation. In this paper, I consider the challenge that olfactory experience presents to upholding a representational view of the sense modalities. Given the phenomenology of olfactory experience, it is difficult to see how a representational view of it might go. Olfaction, then, presents an important challenge for representational theories to overcome. In this paper, I take on this challenge and argue for a representational account of olfactory experience that honors its phenomenology.
Synthese, 2019
Objects are central to perception and our interactions with the world. We perceive the world as parsed into discrete entities that instantiate particular properties, and these items capture our attention and shape how we interact with the environment. Recently there has been some debate about whether the sense of smell allows us to perceive odours as discrete objects, with some suggesting that olfaction is aspatial and doesn’t allow for object-individuation. This paper offers two empirically tractable criteria for assessing whether particular objects are exhibited in perceptual experience—(1) susceptibility to figure-ground segregation and (2) perceptual constancies—and argues that these criteria are fulfilled by olfactory perception, and thus there are olfactory objects. I argue that there are, in fact, two different ways that olfaction allows for figure-ground segregation. First, I look at various Gestalt grouping principles, which are thought to govern when features are perceived as grouped into structured wholes, segregated from everything around them. I argue that these principles apply to olfactory experience, providing evidence of non-spatial figure-ground segregation. Second, I defend the contentious idea that a spatial variety of figure-ground segregation can also occur in olfaction. To see this, however, we need to look to empirical evidence showing that tactile stimulation and bodily movements play a crucial role in olfactory phenomenology. Finally, I draw on empirical evidence and olfactory phenomenology to argue that there are perceptual constancies in olfactory experience, allowing us to perceive odours as coherent objects that survive shifts in our perspectives on the world.
Synthese, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-018-02072-x, 2019
While there is a growing philosophical interest in analysing olfactory experiences, the mereological structure of odours considered in respect of how they are perceptually experienced has not yet been extensively investigated. The paper argues that odours are perceptually experienced as having a mereological structure, but this structure is significantly different from the spatial mereological structure of visually experienced objects. Most importantly, in the case of the olfactory part-structure, the classical weak supplementation principle is not satisfied. This thesis is justified by referring to empirical results in olfactory science concerning the human ability to identify components in complex olfactory stimuli. Further, it is shown how differences between olfactory and visual mereologies may arise from the way in which these modalities represent space.
Frontiers in Psychology, 2014
In the present work we present an overview of experimental findings corroborating olfactory imagery observations with the visual and auditory modalities. Overall, the results indicate that imagery of olfactory information share many features with those observed in the primary senses although some major differences are evident. One such difference pertains to the considerable individual differences observed, with the majority being unable to reproduce olfactory information in their mind. Here, we highlight factors that are positively related to an olfactory imagery capacity, such as semantic knowledge, perceptual experience, and olfactory interest that may serve as potential moderators of the large individual variation.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2018
Olfaction represents odors, if it represents anything at all. Does olfaction also represent ordinary objects like cheese, fish and coffee-beans? Many think so. It is argued here that such a view is in error. Instead, we should affirm an austere account of the intentional objects of olfaction: olfactory experience is about odors, not objects. Visuocentric thinking about olfaction has tempted some philosophers to say otherwise.
Frontiers in Psychology, 2013
Human and animal olfactory perception is shaped both by functional demands and by various environmental constraints seemingly peculiar to chemical stimuli. These demands and constraints may have generated a sensory system that is cognitively distinct from the major senses. In this article we identify these various functional demands and constraints, and examine whether they can be used to account for olfaction's unique cognitive features on a case-by-case basis. We then use this as grounds to argue that specific conscious processes do have functional value, a finding that naturally emerges when a comparative approach to consciousness across the senses is adopted. More generally, we conclude that certain peculiar features of olfactory cognition may owe more to limited neocortical processing resources, than they do to the challenges faced by perceiving chemical stimuli.
Philosophical Studies, 2020
Mental Imagery, whereby we experience aspect of a perceptual scene or perceptual object in the absence of direct sensory stimulation is ubiquitous. Often the existence of mental imagery is demonstrated by asking one’s reader to volitionally generate a visual object, such as closing ones eyes and imagining an apple. However, mental imagery also arises in auditory, tactile, interoceptive, and olfactory cases. A number of influential philosophical theories have attempted to explain mental imagery in terms of belief-based forms of representation using the Dependence Thesis, dependence upon means of access, such as enactivisim, or in terms of the similarity ofcontent with perceptual processing. The focus ofthis paper concerns the later approach and in particular assessing if Nanay’s promissory note that his theory is applicable to modalities other than vision, such as smell, seems likely to be of theoretical tender. The thesis argued for in this paper is that olfactory imagery exists and is best accounted for by considering it as a type of perceptual processing with a unique representational format relative to the olfactory perceptual modality. The paper concludes by summarizing the applicability of Nanay’s theory of mental imagery for olfaction and suggests some further issues that arise when transitioning to multi-modal mental imagery.
Perceptual Ephemera. OUP., 2018
It is natural to think that sight is unusually direct, at least in comparison to hearing and smell. We see tables and lemons and pigs directly, in that we do not typically see them by seeing anything else. Hearing and smell are not, according to this picture, direct in the same way. Auditory and olfactory perceptual contact with these sorts of ordinary objects is mediated by more direct perceptual contact with objects that are in some respect non-ordinary: sounds, in the case of audition, odours in the case of olfaction. These non-ordinary, mediating objects are sensibilia: they are intimately related to particular senses in a way that tables, lemons and pigs are not. 1 That is not to say that there are no visibilia, the visual variety of sensibilia. Rainbows, holograms and reflections, for instance, seem to be intimately related to the sense of sight. Rainbows, holograms and reflections then are, or might be, visibilia. However, it is not natural to think that visual perceptual contact with ordinary objects is mediated by perceptual contact with visibilia.
Biological Theory, 2014
Philosophical discussion about the reality of sensory perceptions has been hijacked by two tendencies. First, talk about perception has been largely centered on vision. Second, the realism question is traditionally approached by attaching objects or material structures to matching contents of sensory perceptions. These tendencies have resulted in an argumentative impasse between realists and anti-realists, discussing the reliability of means by which the supposed causal information transfer from object to perceiver takes place. Concerning the nature of sensory experiences and their capacity to provide access to reality, this article challenges the standard categories through which most arguments in this debate have been framed to date. Drawing on the underexplored case of olfaction, I first show how the details of the perception process determine the modalities of sensory experiences. I specifically examine the role of measurement and analyze its influence on the characterization of perceptions in olfaction. My aim is to argue for an understanding of perception through a process view, rather than one pertaining to objects and properties of objects.
This paper considers what olfactory experience can tell us about the controversy over qualia and, in particular, the debate that focuses on the alleged transparency of experience. Although some philosophers claim that transparency holds for all of the sense modalities, any detailed discussion of it focuses on vision. But transparency seems unintuitive for olfactory experience. This paper argues that olfactory experience is indeed transparent and that explanations of what transparency is have been obscured by a reliance on the visual model. In this way, the paper clarifies and advances the debate about transparency.
Revue Européenne de Psychologie Appliquée/European Review of Applied Psychology, 2006
The experiments conducted in this research aimed to increase our understanding of olfactory properties and classify them hierarchically through entailment. The research objective was to build an odor classification based on internal knowledge (i.e. mental context). Twelve floral scents were described freely by 60 participants. First, three sensory judges undertook a semantic analysis of the 1145 olfactory terms gathered. Secondly, a study of the entailment between olfactory properties was conducted using 42 subjects working on four lists of terms describing the characteristics of floral perfumes. The results confirmed the hypothesis that olfactory properties show tree-like structure. This allowed us to propose a classification system composed of two superordinate categories: First, objects, being olfactory sources, constitute the first category and are considered as olfactory properties themselves (i.e. civilization, food and natural sources). Second non-objects properties are those applicable to a diversity of objects: (i.e. properties, such as objects' physical state: sensory, intensity, space, time) and those related to the subject (as personal feelings and value judgments). Based on these results, it appears that olfactory properties can be organized as a semantic network in line with the general theory of categorization.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019
Several theorists argue that one does not experience something as being at or coming from a distance or direction in olfaction. In contrast to this, I suggest that there can be a variety of spatial aspects of both synchronic and diachronic olfactory experiences, including spatial distance and direction. I emphasise, however, that these are not aspects of every olfactory experience. Thus, I suggest renouncing the widespread assumption there is a uniform account of the nature, including the spatial nature, of what is experienced in olfactory experience.
Chemical Senses, 2008
Many previous studies have attempted to investigate the effect of visual cues on olfactory perception in humans. The majority of this research has only looked at the modulatory effect of color, which has typically been explained in terms of multisensory perceptual interactions. However, such crossmodal effects may equally well relate to interactions taking place at a higher level of information processing as well. In fact, it is well-known that semantic knowledge can have a substantial effect on people's olfactory perception. In the present study, we therefore investigated the influence of visual cues, consisting of color patches and/or shapes, on people's olfactory discrimination performance. Participants had to make speeded odor discrimination responses (lemon vs. strawberry) while viewing a red or yellow color patch, an outline drawing of a strawberry or lemon, or a combination of these color and shape cues. Even though participants were instructed to ignore the visual stimuli, our results demonstrate that the accuracy of their odor discrimination responses was influenced by visual distractors. This result shows that both color and shape information are taken into account during speeded olfactory discrimination, even when such information is completely task irrelevant, hinting at the automaticity of such higher level visual-olfactory crossmodal interactions.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2011
Chemical Senses, 2017
We can learn much about perceptual experience by thinking about how it can mislead us. In this paper, I explore whether, and how, olfactory experience can mislead. I argue that, in the case of olfactory experience, the traditional distinction between illusion and hallucination does not apply. Integral to the traditional distinction is a notion of ‘object-failure’—the failure of an experience to present objects accurately. I argue that there are no such presented objects in olfactory experience. As a result, olfactory experience can only mislead by means of a kind of property hallucination. The implications of my arguments are twofold. First, we see that accounts of representational content cannot always be based on the visual model. And, secondly, we see that we must recast the notion of non-veridicality, allowing for a notion of non-veridical experience that is disengaged from any particular object.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-023-00707-8, 2023
One of the crucial characteristics of the olfactory modality is that olfactory experiences commonly present odours as pleasant or unpleasant. Indeed, because of the importance of the hedonic aspects of olfactory experience, it has been proposed that the role of olfaction is not to represent the properties of stimuli, but rather to generate a valence-related response. However, despite a growing interest among philosophers in the study of the chemical senses, no dominant theory of sensory pleasure has emerged in the case of human olfaction. The aim of this paper is to develop an argument based on the way in which olfactory valence is neurally encoded; one that demonstrates an advantage of the indicative representational approach to olfactory valence over approaches that characterise valence in terms of desires or commands. The argument shows that it is plausible to understand olfactory valence, at least in part, in terms of indicative representations.
Perception, 2010
CITATIONS 45 READS 278 5 authors, including: Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: OPALINE observatory of food preferences and eating behaviors in children View project Facial perception in schizophrenia View project Alix Seigneuric Université Paris 13 Nord
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