Deciphering Cyberpower: Strategic Purpose in Peace and War
John Sheldon2011, Strategic Studies Quarterly
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Abstract
What is the strategic purpose of cyberpower? All too many works on cyberspace and cyberpower are focused on the technical, tactical, and operational aspects of operating in the cyber domain. These are undoubtedly important topics, but very few address the strategic purpose of cyberpower for the ends of policy. Understanding its strategic purpose is important if policy makers, senior commanders, and strategists are to make informed judgments about its use. Cyberpower does indeed have strategic purpose relevant to achieving policy objectives. This strategic purpose revolves around the ability in peace and war to manipulate perceptions of the strategic environment to one's advantage while at the same time degrading the ability of an adversary to comprehend that same environment. While it is proper to pay attention to the technological, tactical, and operational implications, challenges, and opportunities of cyberspace, this article concerns itself with its use-"the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in all the operational environments and across the instruments of power"-for achieving the policy objectives of the nation. 1 Transforming the effects of cyberpower into policy objectives is the art and science of strategy, defined as "managing context for continuing advantage according to policy" (emphasis in original). 2 The definition provides the overall strategic impetus for the use of cyberpower. To fully understand the power of cyber, one must acknowledge the character of cyber-power and cyberspace. The linkage between strategic context, strategy, and
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Colarik is an independent consultant, author, researcher, and inventor of information security technologies. He has published multiple security books and publications in the areas of cyber terrorism, information warfare, and cyber security. He has made presentations before a host of groups and organizations; has appeared on syndicated TV and radio shows such as Fox News, The 700 Club, and Coast to Coast; and is a Fox News contributing cyber security and terrorism expert. Dr. Colarik's research interests involve technology's impact on social, political, legal, and economic structures in society; the design and implementation of secure communication systems; and the evolving applications and consequences of the global information infrastructure on businesses, governments, and individuals. For more information on Dr. Colarik, visit his website at: http://www.AndrewColarik.com. Dr. Lech Janczewski has over thirty-five years' experience in information technology. He was managing director of the largest IBM installation in Poland, and project manager of the first computing center in Nigeria.
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