From Taqleedi Ilm al-Rijal to Ijtihadi Ilm al- Rijal

This paper tries to answer the question of whether there is an overall line of argument in al-Ghazali’s Tahāfut al-falāsifa. The book is divided into twenty discussions, most of which could stand by themselves and are not explicitly connected to an overall aim of the book. The book, however, also has five different “introductions” (singl. “muqaddima”) where al-Ghazali addresses a number of subjects. This paper offers a close reading and analysis of these introductions and concludes that there is indeed an overall strategy in the Tahāfut that is different from being a straightforward “refutation” (radd) or the philosopher’s (falāsifa) teachings. Al-Ghazali identifies two kinds of adversaries, first a group of “vulgar followers” (“jamahir”) of the philosophers, who misunderstand their teachings, believe that the falāsifa offer an alternative to revealed religion, and use their teachings as an excuse to neglect religious duties. Then, there are the philosophers themselves, or “leaders and the heads of the falāsifa,” who do believe in God, divine prophecy, and who abide by the religious law. Yet, through their claim of apodictic or demonstrative knowledge in the field of metaphysics they have led people astray. In his Tahāfut, al-Ghazali aims at addressing this claim of apodeixis or demonstration (Arab. “burhān”) in the metaphysical sciences. While he acknowledges that demonstration is possible in such sciences as geometry, for instance, he denies its possibility in metaphysics. In the twenty discussions, he aims to show that “in [their] metaphysics, they are unable to fulfill apodeixis (burhān) as they have set it out as a condition in their logic.” Thus, al-Ghazali made his “refutation” of the teachings of the falāsifa easy for himself. He does not need to show that their teachings are wrong, he only needs to show that they are not supported by demonstrative arguments.

The present study offers a comprehensive survey of al-Ghazali's classifications of the sciences and descriptions of the highest theoretical science, called the "science of un-* Works by al-Ghazali are abbreviated as follows: Arba'in = Kitab al- Arba'in fi usul al-din, ed. 'A.'A. 'Urwani and M.B. al-Shaqfa, Dar al-qalam, Damascus 1424/2003; Faysal = Faysal al-tafriqa bayn al-islam wa-l-zandaqa, ed. Mahmud Biju, Damascus 1993/1413 Ihya' = Ihya' 'ulum al-din, 5 vols., al-Maktaba al-tawfiqiyya, Cairo n.d.; Iljam = Iljam al-'awamm 'an 'ilm al-kalam, in: Majmu'at Rasa'il al-Imam al-Ghazali, ed. Ibrahim Amin Muhammad, al-Maktaba al-Tawfiqiya, Cairo n.d., pp. 319-355; Imla' = al-Imla' fi ishkalat al-Ihya', appended to Ihya', V:282-326; Iqtisad = al-Iqtisad fi al-i'tiqad, ed. I.A. Çubukçu and H. Atay, Ankara 1962; Jawahir = Jawahir al-Qur'an, ed. Rashid Rida al-Qabbani, Dar ihya' al-'ulum, Beirut 1411/1990; Kimiya = Kimiya-ye sa'adat, ed. Hoseyn Khadiv Jam, 2 vols., Sherkat-e Entesharat-e 'elmi va farhangi, Tehran 1383sh/2004; Laduniya = al-Risala al-Laduniya, Maragha MS, facsimile edition in: Nasrollah Pourjavady, Majmu'e-ye falsafi-ye Maraghe, Markaz-e Nashre daneshgahi, Tehran 1380sh/2001, pp. 100-120; Makatib = Makatib-e farsi-ye Ghazzali be-nam-e Fada'il al-anam min rasa'il Hujjat al-islam, ed. 'Abbas Eqbal, Tehran 1333sh/1954; Maqasid = Maqasid al-falasifa, ed. M.S. al-Kurdi, Cairo 1355/1936; Maqsad = al-Maqsad al-asna fi sharh ma'ani asma' Allah al-Husna, ed. F.A. Shehadi, Beirut 1971; Mishkat = al-Ghazali, The Niche of Lights, ed. and tr. D. Buchman, Brigham Young University Press, Provo, UT 1998; Mi'yar = Mantiq Tahafut al-falasifa almusamma Mi'yar al-'ilm, ed. S. Dunya, Dar al-ma'arif, Cairo 1961; Mizan = Mizan al-'amal, ed. S. Dunya, Cairo 1964; Munqidh = al-Munqidh min 2 Alexander TREIGER Dîvân 2 0 1 1 / 1 2 veiling" in the Revival of the Religious Sciences and the "science of the cognition of God" in the Jewels of the Qur'an.

2022

Known as the initiator of al-qirā'āt al-sab', Ibn Mujāhids commentary about particular ways of quranic reading (qirā'āt) must be considered by scholars after. This article focuses on what does Ibn Mujāhid mean in labeling galaṭ on some qirā'āt and how does it impact the subsequent development of 'ilm al-qirā'āt. By tracing all galaṭ labels in Ibn Mujāhids book, al-Sabah fī al-Qirā'āt, this study finds 21 cases in which the reasons of the labeling refer to two main categories: sanad and linguistic galats. This kind of labeling invites various responses from other scholars, so this impacts on the following study of qirā'āt such as the development of the term "syāzzah", some critics and commentaries about the meaning of the term "galaṭ", the elimination of the labeled qirā'āt from the list of al-qirā'at al-masyhūrah/ almutawātirah, and particular attention in the application of qirā'āt in the legal form of particular ṭāriq.

The Muslim World, 1993

Ulumuna, 2019

This study introduces some new ideas into the study of ideas in Sufism. Taking al-Jīlī and, esp., his al-Insān al-kāmil as a starting point this study argues a holistic worldview following the concepts of the oneness of being (waḥdat al-wujūd) will be able to integrate – and to be integrated – into contemporary scientific concepts like chemical fluctuation, the new synthesis, and holobionts. This will lead to creating a general philosophy of being beyond the Western biases.

2024

Medieval philosophy has often been stereotypically characterized as rigidly reliant on authority and lacking originality. However, the present research challenges this perception by unveiling the lively debates among medieval philosophers in the Islamic World regarding the autonomy of thought for both esteemed scholars and everyday individuals. Rather than passively accepting authoritative doctrines, these philosophers contemplated the extent to which independent reflection should play a role. Surprisingly, their reflections resonate in the contemporary world as we grapple with parallel questions about the balance between authority and individual inquiry in our society. The first part of the paper introduces a timeless challenge faced by medieval Islamic philosophers: the formation of beliefs. This predicament persists today—how much should we rely on authority without critical examination, and when should we subject our beliefs to scrutiny? The paper introduces an Islamic classical tradition followed by Muslim jurists, theologians, and philosophers: the nuanced distinction between Taqlid (following authority) and Ijtihad (independent reasoning) to address this. The perspective of Al-Ghazali, a prominent representative of this tradition, is thoroughly examined, highlighting its contributions and challenges. In its methodological approach, this paper rigorously analyzes primary and secondary sources relevant to Al-Ghazali's views in Arabic and English. This comprehensive analysis aims to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the intricate interplay between authority and independent reasoning in the context of medieval Islamic philosophy.

Studies in Honor of Shaul Shaked, 2019

2020

KADER, 2022

This article has been scanned with iTenticate software. No plagiarism detected. Ethical Statement It is declared that scientific and ethical principles have been followed while carrying out and writing this study and that all the sources used have been properly cited (Recep E). Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.

Al-Bayan: Journal of Qur'an and Hadith Studies, 2015

Ijtihād has been extremely important throughout Islamic history and seen as such by many Muslim scholars, both Sunni and Shiʿi, in early, medieval, and contemporary Islam. However, the phenomenon of ijtihad, in both traditional and contemporary Islam, is restricted to a set of rules that were outlined by earlier mujtahids. This poses a challenge in Qurʾanic hermeneutics as to whether contemporary mujtahids are performing ijtihād or merely imitating (taqlīd) the method of ijtihād. The purpose of this study is to investigate the following question: is ijtihād in the Qurʾanic Sciences today merely an imitation (taqlīd) of ijtihād? The paper opens with defining imitation (taqlīd) according to classical Muslim scholars, starting with the arguments that accepts imitation in Islam and then compares it with various scholars’ stances on ijtihād. The paper employs arguments from the Qurʾan, prophetic tradition (ḥadīth), and acts of the Companions (ṣaḥābah) that are typically used by Muslim scholars to argue in favor of ijtihād over imitation (taqlīd). It compares the stance of both Sunni and Shiʿi scholars on the roles of both mujtahids and sources of jurisprudence (marājiʿ) and muftīs. It shows that, in Qurʾanic Sciences, although the role of ijtihād is highly recommended, it continues to be part of a larger paradox, in which ijtihād may only be performed through a set of rules outlined by early scholars. This brings us to a paradox that to be a mujtahid, one needs to imitate (taqlīd) rules outlined by earlier mujtahids, which poses the challenging question on whether scholars today are truly performing ijtihād, or simply taqlīd al-ijtihād.

Nazariyat, 2020

A paradox that originated from Plato’s Meno and that perpetuated throughout the classical period of the history of Islamic philosophy within the same structure seems to have been reconstructed by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), and hence gained a new philosophical context. Upon this, both the statement of the paradox and the scholarly framework within which it came to be addressed were renewed. Rather than the issues surrounding the possibility of the acquisition of knowledge, the issue was centered in this framework on the structural relationship between the parts of knowledge (i.e., conception and assent ), and the impact such a relationship had on how the topics of logic came to be discussed. In this context, providing an explanation on how conception and assent arose became necessary for a suppositional concept such as “the-absolute unknown (al-majhūl mutlaqan)”. This inquiry into finding an explanation, in turn, led to our usage of the expression “knowing the unknowable”. To overcome this problem, esteemed logicians after Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī proposed several effective solutions. One such endeavor had continued up until the Ottoman period. Henceforth, the Ottoman philosopher Tashkoprīzāda (d. 968/1561) heavily critiqued these proposed solutions, and instead provided a much stronger alternative. For in the philosophical system that Tashkoprīzāda used, the proposed solutions provided by early philosophers such as al-Khūnajī (d. 646/1248) and al-Urmawī (d. 682/1283), and those provided by Ṣadr al-Sharī‘a (d. 747/1346) and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf Al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413), were equally weak, even though these latter were closer to Tashkoprīzāda in both time and methodology.

This article examines Avicenna's view of Aristotelian demonstrative science and the emergence of a competing philosophical system in the works of Fahr al-Dīn ar-Rāzī. The discussion focuses on the structure of Aristotelian science and the influence of metaphysics on the analysis of sensible phenomena. Rāzī assesses the epistemological and ontological principles underlying Avicenna's interpretation of demonstrative science. Finding knowledge of essences and the necessary relations posited in demonstrative science problematic, Rāzī develops an alternative to Aristotelian science based on a theory of phenomenal knowledge. A preliminary analysis of the reception of Rāzī's system is also conducted.

Theology and Science, 2023

This is an introduction to the special issue. It provides the historical context of Islam and Science that then leads to the theme of the issue. This special issue is the proceedings of a conference at Cambridge Muslim College that was held in December 2022.

Usul al-Fiqh Al-Shawkani's View on Ijtihad and Taqlid | Şevkânî'nin İçtihat ve Taklid Hakkındaki Görüşleri, 2021

Discourses of the renewal of Islamic Law in accordance with the age we live in and such calls immediately bring to mind the approach towards ijtihad and imitation of jurisprudence schools. It is observed that from the fourth Hijri century until the last century, scholars of fiqh generally have followed certain jurisprudence schools. However, it has always found among scholars who opposed imitation and called for independent ijtihad. Muhammed b. Ali al-Shawkani (d. 1250/1834), considered one of the last scholars of the classical period, was one of those scholars who supported independent ijtihad. His view on ijtihad was very effective on some contemporary scholars. In this article, I will study his opinions on this issue.

Frank Griffel (ed.): Al-Ghazālī & His Influence. Papers on the Occasion of the 900th Anniversary of His Death