TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

2005

Military; Military/Defense policy and doctrine; Military/Operations other than war; Politics and government; Politics and government/Foreign governments; Politics and government/Intergovernmental relations; Politics and government/International relations; Terrorism and society; Terrorism and society/Racial and ethnic relations; Terrorism and society/Religion and belief; Terrorism and society/Social and cultural policies; Terrorism and threats; Terrorism and threats/Counterterrorism

Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism?, 2015

What provided the impetus for your recent book entitled Whither Southeast Asian Terrorism? What issues and trends called for an updated examination of terrorism in Southeast Asia? Acharya: This book is the outcome of my more than twelve years of work in Southeast Asia before I came to the United States. I have also worked in India and conducted extensive research in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and in other Central Asian countries, as well as in China. I came to Southeast Asia in 2002almost eight months after 9/11. I joined the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore. Then, the 2002 Bali bombings happened in Indonesia. I have studied almost all the major attacks in South, Central, and Southeast Asia as well as in various European countries. However, this book is not a handbook on terrorist groups or their leaders, attacks, tactics, and targets. In this book, I look at the conflicts in Southeast Asia broadly and those leading to political violence and terrorism particularly. I also look at counterterrorism measures by individual countries and the region as a whole, as well as the role of extra-regional powers like the United States. This book focuses on what I perceived to be a number of myths or misperceptions about terrorism in Southeast Asia. First, there was the labeling of the region as the "second front" in the global war on terror, even though almost all of the conflicts in the

2005

Since September 2001, the United States has been concerned with radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore that are known to have ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. Southeast Asia is a base for past, current, and possibly future Al Qaeda operations. For nearly fifteen years, Al Qaeda has penetrated the region by establishing local cells, training Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing and cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. Indonesia and the southern Philippines have been particularly vulnerable to penetration by anti-American Islamic terrorist groups. Members of one indigenous network, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), with extensive ties to Al Qaeda, are known to have assisted two of the September 11, 2001 hijackers and have confessed to plotting and carrying out attacks against Western targets. These include the deadliest terrorist attack since September 2001: the October 12, 2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia, that killed approximately 200 people, mostly Westerners. On September 9, 2004, a suicide bombing attack thought to be the work of Jemaah Islamiya struck the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, killing 10 and wounding around 200. The attack suggests that JI remains capable of carrying out relatively large-scale plots against "hard" Western targets, despite the arrest or death of hundreds of JI members, including most of its known leadership. To combat the threat, the Bush Administration has pressed countries in the region to arrest suspected terrorist individuals and organizations, deployed over 1,000 troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military in their fight against the violent Abu Sayyaf Group, increased intelligence sharing operations, restarted military-military relations with Indonesia (including restoring International Military Education and Training [IMET]), and provided or requested from Congress over $1 billion in aid to Indonesia and the Philippines. The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U.S. reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics. In general, Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines were quick to crack down on militant groups and share intelligence with the United States and Australia, whereas Indonesia began to do so only after attacks or arrests revealed the severity of the threat to their citizens. That said, many governments view increased American pressure and military presence in their region with ambivalence because of the political sensitivity of the issue with both mainstream Islamic and secular nationalist groups. Indonesia and Malaysia are majority Muslim states while the Philippines and Thailand have sizeable, and historically alienated and separatist-minded, Muslim minorities. This report will be updated periodically.

When the United States declared the global war against terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Southeast Asia was named the “second front,” next to Afghanistan. The presence of Al-Qaeda linked and inspired terrorist groups in the region, notably the Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), considered Southeast Asia as one of the world’s epicenters of terrorism studies and counter terrorism operations. Since 9/11, the region has seen the implementation of various counter terrorism measures at the national, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. These measures resulted in the arrest, neutralization and even killings of key terrorist personalities in Southeast Asia. Some were convinced to disengage from the use of political violence and leave terrorism behind. Yet, terrorist threats continue to loom large in the security agenda of Southeast Asian states as surviving elements of JI and AS are still planning to and wreaking terrorist havocs. While many leaders have been killed in battle, executed, imprisoned or convinced to leave terrorism behind, there are still younger members willing to take the place of their predecessors. This is attributed to the fact that the ideology of Al-Qaedaism that informs the actions of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia remains alive. Moreover, terrorism in Southeast Asia has long standing underlying ideological origins that require comprehensive and more nuanced counter terrorism measures.

The word ‘terrorism’ does not have a clear and internationally recognised definition. It has been described by analysts and strategists as ; ‘globalized informal violence’ or ‘asymmetrical war’. The reasons of this violence might be political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious. this is a widespread issue challenging the contemporary world. In Southeast Asia, for nearly fifteen years, Al-Qaeda has penetrated regions by establishing local cells and training militants in its camps in afghanistan. They also finance indigenous radical groups in Indonesia and Southern Philippines. This paper analyzes the terror problem in Southeast Asia Region, and provides solutions in light of Turkey's terrorism experiences.

Asian Conference on Human Security, Multiculturalism and Democracy, Thailand, 2019

The Post-Cold War Period has paved the way for more awareness towards non-traditional security concerns, including terrorist attacks, and the Southeast Asian Region is no exemption. This paper examines the factors that made Southeast Asia a suitable breeding ground for terrorist groups since the deadly 2002 Bali Bombings up to the present, how both state and non-state actors in the region have been responding to this issue over the years, and its implications to security management in the region. It is argued that factors such as geography, weak regimes, and weak regional counterterrorism measures have all contributed to the attractiveness of the Southeast Asian region to terrorist groups. The paper’s implication for future research is that a closer attention should be paid to Southeast Asia in terms of terrorism studies compared to the rest of the world because most of the terrorist activities have indeed pivoted towards the region in the past few years.

S+F, 2013

In this paper we use the Global Terrorism Database to examine terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2008 in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. In support of a special effects model, terrorism trends and characteristics in each country are distinctive. 77 percent of all terrorism in Thailand occurred between 2004 and 2008, peaking in 2007. In contrast, since the Jemaah Islamiya suicide bombings in Kuta, Bali in 2002, the frequency of terrorist activity in Indonesia has declined dramatically. Terrorism in the Philippines has been a considerable threat continuously since the late 1970s, with an average of over 80 attacks per year since 2000. In short, in the Philippines terrorism is more dispersed and constant than in Indonesia and Thailand.

Based on a paper presented at an international conference on "Dialogue, Competition and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region after China's Accession to WfO", Zhongshan University, 28-29June 2002.

2004

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2003

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