ali ahmed
Abstract
(JNU), has been an infantryman, an academic and a UN official. His second doctorate, a PhD under Special Regulations from Cambridge University, was awarded based on his publications-inter-alia-on nuclear doctrine. This book is second part of a compilation of his writings on nuclear doctrinal issues in South Asia. Foreword This is the second part of Nuclear Heresies. The title owes to the main theme of the book, that a nuclear doctrine that was genocidal to begin with, is now suicidal. The doctrine self-interestedly assumes that South Asia is not in the state of Mutual Assured Destruction. Since at the crunch this notion will be rudely dispelled, the book endeavours to make the case that it would not do to wait that long and instead rethink deterrence and rework doctrine, if not be rid of the wretched weapons themselves. The book has been twenty years and more in the making. It comprises commentaries with focus mainly on the India-Pakistan strategic equation, of which the nuclear factor is a critical part. It engages with the doctrinal interconnection between the two subcontinental states, arguing that their two doctrines taken together make for a combustible mess. The book covers the century so far. Since we have managed to avoid a nuclear punch up, this implies we can get along. By no means is this thanks to nuclear weapons. We can thus coexist if not collaborate, and without nuclear weapons at that. This vision needs to energise people, lest someday nuclear use be the trigger for good sense. I thank the publications in which these commentaries appeared over the years. I have used others’ works as peg for my arguments, sometimes using their ideas for target practice. While some were genuine bhakts of the false god, deterrence, there has been over the years an ideological contamination of doctrinal space by bhakts of the better-known variety. My singular contribution, if any, has been to point to this, hopefully to the betterment of strategic thinking in general. I hope the commentaries inspire students in particular. Here they can access the nuclear field through an Ashokan lens. The liberal rationalist perspective has a long historical tradition in South Asia. It needs airing in order that someday it gets the momentum and escape velocity to reclaim its place, if not sway, in Indian strategic culture. Contents 1. The Nuclear Domain: In Irreverence 8 2. Modi at the Helm: Whither Nuclear Decision-making? 17 3. Indian Nuclear Command and Control 21 4. Indian Nuclear Command and Control – II 29 5. The Scientific Establishment: From the Brahmachari Bomb to Brahmastra 34 6. Information Operations in Limited Nuclear War 52 7. A Call for nuclear sanity 54 8. Avoiding Nuclear War in South Asia 56 9. India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Strategic Direction or Drift? 58 10. Modi May Say Otherwise, But India Is Still Short of ‘Survivable Nuclear Deterrent’ 59 11. What nuclear weapons have done to us 61 12. Are India’s nuclear weapons in safe hands? 63 13. Nuclear Battlefield Preparedness 64 14. India-Pakistan: Contrasting Doctrines 66 15. Conventional Backdrop to the NuclearForeground 72 16. Visualising the Impact of Nuclear Operations at the Conventional Level 78 17. India’s forthcoming nuclear doctrine review 81 18. At the Conventional-Nuclear Interface 88 19. The Doctrinal Challenge 93 20. The Danger of Strategic Determinism 99 21. India and China: Nationalism and Nuclear Risk 101 22. Political Dimensions of Limited War 102 23. What Does India Mean By ‘Two Front’ Problem? 105 24. Mountain Strike Corps: The Nuclear Dimension 108 25. Exit Points and the Updation of Cold Start Doctrine 109 26. What Does India Mean By ‘Massive’Retaliation? 112 27. Nuclear Use: Need for Thinking on Political-Level Considerations 115 28. India’s Nuclear Doctrine Review: Don’t Leave It to the Hawks! 116 29. Nuclear Doctrine Review: NRRC 118 30. Diplomatic Engagement in a Post Nuclear Use Environment 121 31. The Aftermath of Pakistani Nuclear First Use 123 32. Nuclear Doctrine Review: Three Deterrence Models 125 33. Severe Indigestion From Nuclear Orthodoxy 127 34. An Indian Nuclear Doctrine Review: A Third Model 129 35. Kashmir and the Bomb 131 36. Nuclear Doctrinal Revision for the China Front 133 37. India’s Nuclear Doctrine: The Storm in India’sNuclear Teacup 135 38. India-Pakistan: Distancing the Spark from theNuclear Tinderbox 136 39. Rethinking India’s Nuclear Doctrine 140 40. The Post Conflict Factor in Nuclear Decision Making 144 41. India, Nuclear Weapons and ‘MassiveRetaliation’: The Impossibility of Limitation? 146 42. Nuclear Use Consequences for Pakistan 147 43. Hatf IX and Possible Indian Responses 149 44. Deterrence has a Shaky and Brief Shelf Life 151 45. Demonstration Strikes, in an Indo-Pak Conflict Scenario 152 46. Tit for Tat: A Nuclear Retaliation Alternative 154 47. What Does Pakistan Hope to Achieve with Nasr? 156 48. Pakistan’s ‘First Use’ in Perspective 158 49. Making Sense of ‘Nasr’ 161 50. Nuclear Targeting Caveats 163 51. The Military Intelligence Function in Future War 166 52. Implications of Indian BMD Developments 168 53. Nuclear Implications of the ‘Two Front’ Formulation 170 54. Re-visioning the Nuclear Command Authority 172 55. Policy Brief Reviewing India’s Nuclear Doctrine 175 56. The Need for Clarity In India’s Nuclear Doctrine 181 57. India’s Response to CBW Attack 184 58. India’s Nuclear Doctrine 187 59. Taking Nuclear War-Fighting Seriously 193 60. India-Pakistan: Missing NCBMs 196 61. Prospects of India-Pakistan Nuclear ConfidenceBuilding 198 62. NCBMs: Scaremongering, But with a Purpose 200 63. The Direction of India’s Deterrent 201 64. Implications of Indian BMD Developments 203 65. Should India Give Up its NFU Doctrine 205 66. The Logic of the ‘Sundarji Doctrine’ 206 67. The Illogic of ‘Unacceptable Damage’ 208 68. The Illogic of ‘Massive’ Punitive Retaliation 209 69. Nuclear Trajectory in South Asia 211 70. Nuclear C2: The Balance Agenda 212 71. Deterrence Stability in a Context of StrategicInstability 214 72. Hatf IX and Possible Indian Responses 216 73. Arguing for NBC Training 218 74. Mountain Strike Corps: The Nuclear Dimension 220 73. One gaffe too many 221 74. Whose command? Whose control? 224 75. The nuclear numbers game 226 76. Wanted: A peace movement 228 77. Making nuclear sense 230 78. The Bright Side of ‘Asymmetric Escalation’ 232 79. On Disarmament Prospects in South Asia 234 80. Yet Another Nuclear Controversy 235 81. The Myth of ‘Weapons of Peace’ 237 82. Getting it Right: Rereading India’s NuclearDoctrine 239 83. Pakistan’s Possible Nuclear Game Plan 240 84. The Calculus of ‘Cold Start’ 242 84. Limited Nuclear War, Limitless Anxiety 244 85. The Day After ‘Cold Start’ 247 86. The Logic of Nuclear Redlines 248 87. A Smoke Screen called Limited War 250 88. The Need to Revisit Conventional Doctrine 251 89. The Impetus Behind Limited War 252 90. Preparing for ‘Limited Nuclear War’ 253
