On Skepticism about Unconscious Perception

2020

This thesis examines whether humans and animals have unconscious perception. I explain that it is currently not beyond a reasonable doubt that we can be both unconscious and perceive. However, I pave a path forward to show how we might find instances of unconscious perception in the future.

The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2017

It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast between epistemological disjunctivism and epistemic externalism explains the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious perception.

In this chapter I examine past and recent theories of unconscious inference. Most theorists have ascribed inferences to perception literally, not analogically, and I focus on the literal approach. I examine three problems faced by such theories if their commitment to unconscious inferences is taken seriously. Two problems concern the cognitive resources that must be available to the visual system (or a more central system) to support the inferences in question. The third problem focuses on how the conclusions of inferences are supposed to explain the phenomenal aspects of visual experience, the looks of things. Finally, in comparing past and recent responses to these problems, I provide an assessment of the current prospects for inferential theories. (A revised version of this paper is reprinted in Hatfield 2009, Perception and Cognition: Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology, Clarendon Press, 124-152.)

Acta Analytica, 2024

According to Phillips, (1) genuine perception is attributable to the individual (i.e. it is a personal state/event, as opposed to sub-personal states/events in the individual's brain); (2) since unconscious perceptual representations are ill-suited to guide action, there is no good reason to attribute them to the individual; (3) not being attributable to the individual, they do not instantiate genuine perception, thereby failing to support the hypothesis that genuine perception can occur unconsciously. I argue that this reasoning is flawed and cannot be easily fixed. Phillips contends that unconscious perceptual representations do not guide action because they fail to meet certain conditions that are sufficient for action guidance. But those conditions may not be necessary for action guidance. Consequently, unconscious perceptual representations may guide action even if they do not meet Phillips' conditions. Furthermore, due to his commitment to the distinction between personal and sub-personal states/events, Phillips is not in a position to argue that his conditions are necessary for action guidance. For the distinction applies to action as well as to perception, and when genuine action is identified by personal-level criteria, Phillips' conditions turn out unnecessary for action guidance.

Neuroscience of Consciousness

Perception & Psychophysics, 2004

Unconscious perceptual effects remain controversial because it is hard to rule out alternative conscious perception explanations for them. We present a novel methodological framework, stressing the centrality of specifying the single-process conscious perception model (i.e., the null hypothesis). Various considerations, including those of SDT , suggest that conscious perception functions hierarchically, in such a way that higher level effects (e.g., semantic priming) should not be possible without lower level discrimination (i.e., detection and identification). Relatedly, alternative conscious perception accounts (as well as the exhaustiveness, null sensitivity, and exclusiveness problems- predict positive relationships between direct and indirect measures. Contrariwise, our review suggests that negative and/or nonmonotonic relationships are found, providing strong evidence for unconscious perception and further suggesting that conscious and unconscious perceptual influences are functionally exclusive (cf. Jones, 1987), in such a way that the former typically override the latter when both are present. Consequently, unconscious perceptual effects manifest reliably only when conscious perception is completely absent, which occurs at the objective detection (but not identification) threshold.

Phenomenal Intentionality, 2013

2010

Since antiquity, visual theorists have variously proposed that perception (usually vision) results from unconscious inference. This paper reviews historical and recent theories of unconscious inferences, in order to make explicit their commitments to inferential cognitive processes. In particular, it asks whether the comparison of perception with inference has been intended metaphorically or literally. It then focuses on the literal theories, and assesses their resources for responding to three problems that arise when visual perception is explained as resulting from unconscious inference: the cognitive machinery problem, the sophisticated content problem, and the phenomenal problem. Comments University of Pennsylvania Institute for Research in Cognitive Science Technical Report No. IRCS-01-04. This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports/9 Perception as Unconscious Inference* Gary Hatfield University of Pennsylvania Consider for a...

Synthese, 2019

Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception.

Consciousness and Cognition, 2019

In this manuscript, the authors present an overview of the history, an account of the theoretical and methodological controversy, and an illustration of contemporary and revised methods for the exploration of unconscious processing. Initially we discuss historical approaches relating to unconsciousness that are, arguably, defamed and considered extraneous to contemporary psychological research. We support that awareness of the history of the current subject is pedagogically essential to understand the transition to empirical research and the reasons for which the current area is still so contentious among contemporary psychologists. We proceed to explore the current experimental canon. Contemporary theoretical and methodological issues relating to unconscious processing are discussed in detail and key issues and key advancements in contemporary research are presented. Developments that have, in recent years, being suggested to contribute to a possibly reliable method for the assessment of unconscious processing are practically-methodologically and statisticallyillustrated using easy-to-follow steps applied in real experimental data. Mindful of our own place in the long history of this topic, we conclude the manuscript with suggestions concerning the future of the current area.