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Emotions have often been considered a threat to morality and rationality; in the Romantic tradition, passions were placed at the center of both human individuality and moral life. This ambivalence has led to an ambiguity between the terms of emotions for vices and virtues. Epicureans and Stoics have argued that emotions are irrational. The Stoics believed that virtue is nothing but knowledge, and emotions are essentially irrational beliefs. Skeptics believed that beliefs were responsible for pain, recommending rejection of opinions of any kind. These schools emphasized the general value of "ataraxia", the absence of mental disturbance, the philosophy being regarded as therapy for the cleansing of the emotions in the soul. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27533.77282
Roy. Inst. Philos. Suppl., 2003
There are now quite a number of popular or semi-popular works urging rejection of the old opposition between rationality and emotion. They present evidence or theoretical arguments that favour a reconception of emotions as providing an indispensable basis for practical rationality. Perhaps the most influential is neuroanatomist Antonio Damasio's Descartes' Error, which argues from cases of brain lesion and other neurological causes of emotional deficit that some sort of emotional 'marking,' of memories of the outcomes of our choices with anxiety, is needed to support learning from experience. 2 Damasio's work has interesting connection to such issues as how to understand psychopaths, agents who lack normal feelings of guilt and other moral motives based on empathy. 3 It seems that psychopaths are not like the rational 'amoralists' of philosophic lore but rather are unable to follow through reliably on long-term plans they make in their own interests. A failure of emotional empathy-with one's own future self, in effect-apparently yields elements of practical irrationality. On the other hand, Damasio wrongly sets up Descartes and mind/body dualism as a philosophic foil for his view. 4 His real
Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, 2004
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 1998
A Sketch of Emotions, Meaning, and Systems of Symbols & the Role of Emotions in Spiritual and Religious Beliefs- Including Jung, Damasio, Eric Klinger, Solomon, Tolstoy, William James, Furlotti and Kalsched., 2023
A very basic underlying function of emotions as Eric Klinger points out is as a "primary function of several emotions is to direct attention to concern-related stimuli. (p.42) Eric Klinger elaborates and states that: "Emotion is relevant to goal striving, purpose, and meaning in at least two fundamental ways. First, it constitutes the ultimate system for evaluation. It thus is the basis for value, which in turn determines what people strive for; and it is the internal code for experiencing goal pursuits as going well or ill. Second it is intertwined with cognitive processing-for example, with attention, recall, thought content, And dream content-and may very well be necessary for quickly noticing and processing events around us and inside us. In the second role, it codetermines people's inner experience and their construals of the world around them." (Quest p.34) The famous neuroscientist Ramachandran believes that in contrast to the ordinary view that emotions are more phylogenetically primitive and often thought almost as something primal, emotions in some situations appear to have a fairly sophisticated aspect to them. The notable philosopher Robert Solomon observed, "Emotions are intelligent, cultivated, conceptually rich engagements with the world, not mere reactions or instincts." (p. ix passions) Eighteen years before the neuroscientist, Damasio, concluded that emotions are essential and vital to decision making and judgment, Solomon stated unequivocally that "emotions are judgments." Andrew Newberg, a neurologist, summarizes Damasio's research, "Damasio contends that our emotions are fundamental to our ability to make decisions and understand the world, a view that is now widely accepted in the neurosciences." (p 42 believe) He argues that emotions have purposes, which would mean that emotions must be intimately linked with the process of setting goals, a process generally often misunderstood to understood to be an abstract logical process. process. In talking with many students and some social scientists as well, many seem to misunderstand the limits of strict rational analysis and about the limits of rational analysis and fail to distinguish between rational analysis and reason.. Strict rational analysis is essentially the application of logical and rational analysis based on a set of assumptions. Many "assume" that rational analysis is inherently "good" when the truth of it is that rational analysis has no conscience. rational analysis can be applied to making nuclear bombs as well as designing the holocaust as to medicine or feeding the poor. In a somewhat humorous synopsis of his thesis, Solomon states unequivocally, “The many varieties of “objective reason,” for example, however brilliantly they perform in their own quarters – in mathematics and scholarship, in theoretical biology or chess matches – are often profoundly inept at dealing with life….But this much is clear, that pure theoretical reason is as intimately related to the day-to-day problems of life as good taste in wine to the task of cleaning out the cat litter.” (p.63 Passions) That is actually a factual statement. I have come across people who tell me id it isn't rational and logical then it is "superstitious nonsense. It is ironic because neuroscience has shown that the "standard" mode of thought of the human mind, when not occupied wit a task is the Theory of Mind Process or the Default Mode Network which focuses on assessing intentions of others - primarily an intuitive process. So those who adamantly insist that rational analysis is the Only Way, as Solomon points out actually use very little of their rational analysis processes.
2001
Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multi-dimensional and relative to human realities. The "axiological" position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony.
MANAGED TO DEATH: A HISTORY 2 Managed to Death: A History of Emotions Attempting to recount the extensive history of emotion theory is an ambitious pursuit.
WIREs Cognitive Science, 2015
We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then address the question of the social dimension of emotions, explaining how the traditional nature vs. nurture contrast applies to the emotions. We finish by exploring the relations between emotions, motivation and action, concluding this overview with a more specific focus on how these relations bear on some central ethical issues.
Qualitative Sociology, 2002
What Emotions Really Are, by Griffiths, Paul E. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. 286 pages, ISBN: 0-226-30871-5.
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