The Material Theory of Induction at the Frontiers of Science

I argue that if John D. Norton's "Material Theory of Induction" could be combined with a theory of direct inference, then several novel and outstanding issues for his theory could be addressed. Most strikingly, there might be a promising answer to Hume's Problem of Induction, often thought to be a major weakness of Norton's theory.

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

John D. Norton says that philosophers have been led astray for thousands of years by their attempt to treat induction formally . He is correct that such an attempt has caused no end of trouble, but he is wrong about the history. There is a rich tradition of non-formal induction in the writings of, among others,

2003

Unisinos Journal of Philosophy, 2021

The problem of unconceived alternatives (or the New Induction) states that, since scientists have recurrently failed to conceive relevant theoretical alternatives for some domains of science, current scientists are probably also failing to do so. Therefore, there may be theories which still exceed the grasp of scientists' imagination, and one should not endorse a realist stance towards current science. In this paper, I raise a conceptual worry for the formulation of this problem: what does it mean to say that scientists failed to conceive a relevant theory? What aggravates the problem is that no simple notion of relevance makes the New Induction as strong as it initially seems. I consider the three more obvious interpretations of relevance: relevance as objective probability; relevance as epistemic probability assessed by current scientists; and relevance as epistemic probability assessed by past scientists. I argue that assuming any of these three notions implies difficulties for the New Induction, hence their proponents shouldn't take the notion of relevance for granted. A more precise definition of relevance is essential to understand what are the difficulties surrounding the problem of unconceived alternatives as an epistemic worry. Until now, such notion is missing.

The traditional problem of induction consists of seeking a formalism that will allow us to assess the support hypotheses receive from a body of evidence that is relevant but not conclusive. A major limitation of this project arises because new data and new ideas provide challenges that were not previously imagined. Since this is an ongoing process, it a mistake to think of the limitations of inductive support as a problem to be solved; instead we need a strategy for coping with a permanent feature of our epistemic life. In fact, the required strategy has already been developed and implemented in the practice of scientific research. It is a social strategy that consist of maintaining a multi-generational community of researchers with diverse skills and cognitive styles who are capable of making new discoveries, introducing new ideas, and evaluating new proposals.

Metascience, 2022

In his recent book, John Norton has created a theory of inference to the best explanation, within the context of his "material theory of induction". I apply it to the problem of scientific explanations that are false: if we want the theories in our explanations to be true, then why do historians and scientists often say that false theories explained phenomena? I also defend Norton's theory against some possible objections.

Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference, 1973

Synthese 85 (1990): 95-114, 1990

This paper begins with a rigorous critique of David Stove's recent book The Rationality of Induction. In it, Stove produced four different proofs to refute Hume's sceptical thesis about induction. I show that Stove's attempts to vindicate induction are unsuccessful. Three of his proofs refute theses that are not the sceptical thesis about induction at all. Stove's fourth proof, which uses the sampling principle to justify one particular inductive inference, makes crucial use of an unstated assumption regarding randomness. Once this assumption is made explicit, Hume's thesis once more survives. The refutation of Stove's fourth proof leads to some observations which relate Goodman's 'grue' paradox with randomness of a sample. I formulate a generalized version of Goodman's grue paradox, and argue that whenever a sample, no matter how large, is drawn from a predetermined smaller interval of a population that is distributed over a larger interval, any conclusion drawn about the characteristics of the population based on the observed characteristics of the sample is fatally vulnerable to the generalized grue paradox. Finally, I argue that the problem of justification of induction can be addressed successfully only from a cognitive point of view, but not from a metaphysical one. That is, we may ask whether an inductive inference is justified or not within the 'theories' or 'cognitive structures' of a subject, but not outside them. With this realization, induction is seen as a cognitive process, not unlike vision, that is useful at times, and yet has its own illusions that may make it a serious obstacle to cognition at other times.

2010

Abstract Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to scientific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic Induction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Contra Anjan Chakravartty's suggestion that the NI is a 'red herring', I argue that it reveals something deep and important about science. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, which lies at the heart of the NI, yields a richer anti-realism than the PI.

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2020

John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn't been much written about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton's fundamental philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought experiments and towards a more pluralist position.