The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning

Aristotle's famous contention that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action ( "The Aristotelian Thesis") often baffles action theorists. The first part of the paper examines the case against the Aristotelian Thesis, and in favour of the main alternative view, the view that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an intention. In the second section, I argue that when we properly understand the subject matter of the Aristotelian Thesis, that is, when we understand what can be properly considered a conclusion of practical reason, it turns out that this alternative view is indefensible. The third section argues that, on the other hand, with this proper understanding of its subject matter in hand, we can show that the Aristotelian Thesis is immune to the objections canvassed in the first section.

Ratio, 2010

This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as 'I want to ϕ'; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as it is in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent action; second, that the premises of such reasoning show the goodness of the action to be undertaken; third, that the conclusions of such reasoning may be actions or decisions, that can be accompanied by expressions of intention, either in action, or for the future; and that these are justified, and might be contradicted, in ways that are not only peculiar to them (i.e. in ways that diverge from those found in theoretical reasoning), but are distinctively practical, in that they involve reference to reasons for acting and to expressions of intention, respectively. 1 This paper explores practical reasoning. In particular, it seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning (premises and conclusion) and their relation. These are large and much debated issues. I shall first focus on the question: 'What are the premises of practical reasoning?' and, towards the end of the paper, will say something about the conclusion of practical reasoning. As will become clear, my discussion is inspired in Elizabeth Anscombe's remarks on practical reasoning in Intention and in her paper 'Practical Inference'. 2 A preliminary point. The term 'practical reasoning', one might think, is ambiguous, for it can be used to refer to the process of practical reasoning, or to the 'content' of that reasoning. I am not convinced by this ambiguity claim. At any rate, by 'practical reasoning' I shall here mean the reasoning that we, as rational agents, engage in. Engaging in such reasoning is taking certain statements as premises and, if all goes well, reaching a 'practical' conclusion, which has those premises as its grounds. So the questions I am concerned with can be put without ambiguity: what kind of statements play the role of premises when we engage in practical reasoning? And what is the conclusion of such reasoning? The premises of practical reasoning 1 I should like to thank John Broome, Alex Neill, Aaron Ridley, Daniel Whiting and participants at seminars where earlier versions of this paper were presented for their comments and suggestions.

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 2001

European Journal of Philosophy

In this paper I take up the question of whether and in what sense action might be the conclusion of practical reasoning and argue against the answer provided by Sebastian Rödl's account of practical reasoning. Rödl's account aspires to steer a middle ground between the attitudinal and the neo-Aristotelian accounts of practical reasoning, by proposing that its conclusion is at once a thought and a movement. This account is worth considering for it promises to explain both practical reasoning's practicality (that it brings about action) and its rationality (that it is subject to thought governing norms) in one move. But, I argue in this paper, a Rödlian account-an account which grants Rödl's central theses-fails to deliver on its promise. The reason is that, like others, a Rödlian also assumes that the only sense in which practical reasoning is practical is the sense in which it has a conclusion. Challenging this assumption in the right way, I finally suggest, helps us reassess the task of explaining practical reasoning in a way that goes beyond Rödlian, attitudinal and neo-Aristotelian accounts alike.

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2017

According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that the norms of practical reasoning, like the norms of theoretical reasoning, are characteristically defeasible, in a sense I make precise. Recognizing this property of those norms makes space for a solution to the problem. The resulting view is in a way analogous to familiar defeasibility theories of knowledge, but it avoids a standard objection to that theory.

The concepts of reasons as supporting elements, of practical reason as a capacity, and of practical reasoning as a process are central in the theory of action. This paper provides a brief account of each. Several kinds of reason for action are distinguished. Practical reason is characterized both as a capacity whose exercise is largely constituted by a kind of responsiveness to reasons and as governed by certain normative principles; and practical reasoning is described as a kind of mental process in which reasons figure as premises and, from those premises, a practical conclusion is drawn. Much of the paper undertakes two related tasks: to distinguish the main kinds of practical reasoning and the associated criteria of assessment and to formulate some important substantive principles of practical reason. These principles yield criteria of several sorts: logical, inferential, epistemic, and material. On the theory presented, although any (non-basic) intentional act can be grounded in practical reasoning, the same acts can be performed for the relevant reason(s) without being so grounded, and in either case their rationality depends on adequate support by the reason(s). One kind of reason is commonly thought to be captured by Kantian hypothetical imperatives. The final sections explore what constitutes a hypothetical imperative and what other principles are needed to account for practical rationality. A major conclusion is that in the domain of practical reason, if there are no categorical imperatives, there are no hypothetical imperatives either. Reasons are central in understanding both practical reason and theoretical reason. But there are many kinds of reasons. Partly because of this, philosophical writing is often unclear about what counts as a reason and about how reasons are connected with various closely related elements. One of these is reason, as a general capacity. A second is reasoning, as an exercise of that capacity. My concern is the practical domain, but much of what I say also applies to the theoretical realm. I begin with the nature of reasons for action, proceed to connect these with practical

Reasons without Rationalism. By Kieran Setiya. (Princeton UP, 2007. Pp. ix + 131. Price £23.95.) 1.

Is knowledge necessary or sufficient or both necessary and sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning and rational action? Several authors (e.g., Williamson, Hawthorne, and Stanley) have recently argued that the answer to these questions is positive. In this paper I present several objections against this view (both in its basic form as well in more developed forms). I also offer a sketch of an alternative view: What matters for the acceptability of practical reasoning in at least many cases (and in all the cases discussed by the defenders of a strong link between knowledge and practical reasoning) is not so much knowledge but expected utility.

In this talk I present a new approach to modeling practical deliberation (deliberation with a choice in view). This approach models deliberation as the intersection of a plurality of deliberational “moving parts”, that consequently can result in a plurality of outputs for the same input. (This can be conceptualized in computational terms as a multi-tape Turing machine, though I shall not be concerned with computational issues in this talk. This talk will take up philosophical issues exclusively.) My approach competes with the expected utility approach to decision making (a single-output approach), and has the potential for quite different powers of prediction. In particular, it has the power to diagnose (by pinpointing precisely) errors of practical judgment, whereas a single-output approach (if and when it’s actually correct) can signal only that a mistake has occurred. The familiar term is “irrationality”, meaning a failure to comply with the axioms chosen by experts—a pronouncement too vague to be of any diagnostic use. The multi-output approach is also in possession of significant resources to diagnose many things now lumped together under the heading of “risk aversion”.

Cogency Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation, 2011

Formal logic, probability and decision theory are not theories of the reasoning process. Internal reasoning in thought must be distinguished from external reasoning with others. It is difficult to distinguish internal reasoning from certain other internal computational processes. Differences between theoretical and practical reasoning tell against trying to reduce one to the other. Internal reasoning tends to be unconscious, although its products may be conscious. There is evidence for a parallel constraint satisfaction model of reasoning toward a reflective equilibrium. Relevant principles in moral reasoning may not be the sort of familiar principles people appeal to in discussion. Emotion may play a significant role in reasoning.