Socrates on being good

Ancient Philosophy, 2023

In this book review, I discuss Smith’s new interpretation of Socrates' epistemology of virtue, according to which (a) Socratic virtue knowledge is craft knowledge (knowing how to live well), and such knowledge comes in degrees; and (b) Socrates has a certain degree of virtue knowledge, and one does not have to be an inerrant expert to have any virtue knowledge at all. I argue that Smith succeeds in presenting Socratic philosophy in a new light, while also pointing to remaining questions about his account of virtue—specifically, about what exactly the craft of virtue is and how we can practice it and thereby improve ourselves.

An anthology of philosohicl studies, v. 9

Nietzsche once said: " Aristophanes was right: Socrates was a Sophist ". Indeed, when we examine the Sophist, we note a suggestion that the most elevated sophists bear many similarities to the character of Socrates as depicted by Plato. Thus, at the end of the dialogue, at 268 c-d, the Stranger and Theaetetus seem to agree that: " He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows – who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling (εἰρνωνικοῦ) section of the art of causing self-contradiction, is an imitator of appearance, and is separated from the class of the phantastic which is a branch of image-making into that further division of creation, the juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine – anyone who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage will say the very truth. " In this paper, I will attempt to demonstrate that Socrates was a character situated between the Sophist and the philosopher, but a new kind of philosopher, of which he is the paradigm: the ironical, self-suspicious searcher of truth.

Aither, 2018

This philosophical essay aims to return to the Socratic problem, ask it anew, and make an attempt to find its possible solution. In the introduction, the author briefly discusses to genesis of the Socratic problem and the basic methodological problems we encounter when dealing with it. Further on, it defines five basic sources of information about Socrates on which the interpretation tradition is based. Then the author outlines two key features of Socrates’ personality, aligned with the vast majority of sources: (1) Socrates’ belief that he has no theoretical knowledge; (2) Socrates’ predilection towards practical questions, and the practical dimension of his activity. In conclusion, the author expresses his belief that it is just this practical dimension of philosophy that has been in the ‘blind spot’ of the modern study of Socrates which paid too much attention to the search for his doctrine. The history of philosophy, however, does not only have to be the history of doctrines, but can also be the history of reflected life practices which inspire followers in their own practices while reflecting on them. The author therefore proposes to understand the historical Socrates as the paradigmatic figure of practical philosophy.

2016

The Question of Socrates' Method 166 Chapter VII: So What Did Socrates Do in the Agora? 216 Bibliography 248 ! 2 ! 3 'I realized some time ago that the conversation would not be about the boys but about ourselves, if Socrates were present.' 26 (e) assisting them to make 'correct' steps towards learning At the start of the Theaetetus Socrates says to Theaetetus: Laches 187e-188c 26 ! 24 'But with those who associate with me it is different. At first some of them give the impression of being ignorant and stupid; but as time goes on and our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make progress-a progress which is amazing…. Yet it is clear that this is not due to anything they have learned from me; it is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light.' 'But it is I, with God's help, who deliver them of this offspring. And the proof of this may be seen in the many cases where people who did not realize this fact took all the credit to themselves and thought I was no good.' 'They have then proceeded to leave me sooner than they should…. And after they have gone away from me resorted to harmful company, with the result that what remained within them has miscarried; while they have neglected the children I helped them to bring forth, and lost them, because they set more value upon lies and phantoms than upon truth; finally they have been set down for ignorant fools…. Sometimes they come back…. and they begin again to make progress.' 27 In this confession that Socrates makes it is shown that he considered himself as serving a vital role: that of helping others to think properly. He guides them, as is suggested, to place value upon truth and not upon lies and phantoms, and in this way, assisted people to think well and to form correct concepts. Socrates had a method, we are told here, of ensuring that people are thinking truthfully. By concentrating on truths, and by shunning falsehood and 'phantoms', people become able to think successfully. (f) …so as to improve their method of dealing with knowledge And finally, consider Socrates' statement of the truth condition of knowledge. In the Republic Socrates states that the objects of knowledge must be true .

Dialogue, 2013

University of the Witwatersrand The concept of human wisdom is fundamental for an understanding of the Apology. But it has not been properly understood. The received interpretations offer insufficient resources for explaining how Socrates could have been humanly wise before Apollo’s oracle, when he falsely believed that he was not wise at all. I argue that a satisfactory interpretation of human wisdom can be given in terms of “philosophia”. Socrates was humanly wise before the oracle because he loved wisdom—even though he did not know that he did. The analysis is confirmed by its resolution of some enduring difficulties in the interpretation of Apology, in particular, the question of why Socrates continued to search for knowledge he thought impossible to attain.La notion de sagesse humaine est fondamentale pour comprendre l’Apologie — mais elle n’a jamais été comprise correctement. Les interprétations généralement acceptées n’offrent pas assez d’éléments pour expliquer comment Socrate pouvait faire preuve d’une sagesse humaine devant l’oracle d’Apollon, alors qu’il croyait à tort ne pas être sage du tout. Je soutiens qu’une interprétation satisfaisante de la sagesse humaine est possible en termes de «philosophia». Socrate fut humainement sage devant l’oracle parce qu’il aimait la sagesse — même s’il ne savait pas qu’il l’aimait. L’analyse est confirmée par le fait qu’elle résout certaines difficultés bien établies de l’interprétation de l’Apologie, en particulier la question de savoir pourquoi Socrate continuait à chercher un savoir qu’il savait être hors d’atteinte.

In this paper, I explore three autobiographical narratives that Plato’s Socrates tells: his report of his conversations with Diotima (Symposium 201d–212b), his account of his testing of the Delphic oracle (Apology 21a–23a), and his description of his turn fromnaturalistic philosophy to his own method of inquiry (Phaedo 96a–100b).1 This Platonic Socrates shows his auditors how to philosophize for the future through a narrative recollection of his own past. In these stories, Plato presents us with an image of a Socrates who prepares others to do philosophy without him. In doing so, Plato’s Socrates exhibits philosophical care for his students. In the first part of the paper, I briefly discuss Socrates’ overall narrative style as Plato depicts it in the five dialogues that Socrates narrates. I then analyze each of these autobiographical accounts with an eye toward uncovering what they reveal about Plato’s presentation of Socrates’ philosophical practice.2 Finally, I offer a brief description of what it might mean to practice philosophy as care for self and care for others in a Socratic fashion.

In this paper, I intend to argue that within the early Platonic dialogues, the activity of Socratic ignorance is equivalent to self-knowledge, which, if practiced expertly, is necessary and sufficient for virtuous action.

Journal Philosophical Study of Education, 2021

Nehamas (1999) emphatically stresses that Socrates is “not a teacher of arête,” but as educators know well, it is undeniably the case that Socrates is often “perceived as a teacher,” and beyond, held up as a paragon of pedagogy to be emulated and imitated (62). At his trial, Socrates is accused of “wrongdoing because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in” (Ap. 24c). Beyond these charges, he is accused, in the manner of Anaxagoras and other Greek physical scientists, of “investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens,” and also charged with, in the manner of the sophists, “making the weaker argument stronger,” importantly, Socrates is, according to his accusers, “teaching [/didaskon] these things to others” (Ap. 19b-c). In his defense (apologia), Socrates distances himself from both the natural philosophers and the sophists, such as Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Ellis, who all charge fees for their services and usually teach through speeches or didactic methods that communicate or transfer knowledge to their pupils. In light of these remarks, returning to Nehamas, although his accusers, and even his friends consider Socrates a teacher, this offers no valid reason or sufficient evidence for us “to refuse to take his own disavowal of that role as face value” (71). The Greek, “” (didaskalos) defines a “teacher or master” of one or another subject, such as rhetoric, medicine, craft making, or even poetry (Lexicon 2015, 169). With the understanding of the didaskalos related to the type of instruction in virtue (arête) offered by the sophists, it is against the charges of Meletus that Socrates emphatically denies that he is teacher, specifically of the virtues, claiming that he “was never anyone’s teacher” (Ap. 33a).