On the Epistemology of Chance

2018

In this paper I will examine and defend a type of propensity theory of objective chance that, while far from new, has been largely neglected in recent decades. I am not aware of a general term for views of this sort, but I will call it the epistemic view of chance. Physical chances, on this view, have all their generally-accepted properties, so that the view does not offer some mere epistemic surrogate for chance, but the real thing. After surveying the history of this approach to chance, I will advocate a particular version of it. The epistemic view of chance has a long history, and (as shown in Section 6) it entails all our common beliefs about chance, so why is it often overlooked? The main reason, as far as I can judge, is that it conflicts with accepted views in related areas such as causation, laws of nature, and the extent of rational constraints on subjective probability. In particular, the three problems of chance, causation, and natural laws are interlocked, like pieces of...

In a rarely quoted paper, published in 1958 in the American Journal of Physics, T. Ehrenfest-Afanassjewa introduced the idea that the concept of chance as employed in physics is subject to what she called a "Limited Belief in Chance". In this paper I elaborate the latter concept and the distinction between absolute chance and relative randomness, where the latter, but not the former, is governed by the theory of probability. I argue that in the twentieth century virtually nobody believes seriously in the possibility of absolute chance, whereas the concept of chance in the Scientific World Picture (including quantum mechanics) is only "chancy" relative to a limited belief in chance grounded in the Manifest World Picture of an orderly world.

Philosophy Compass, 2010

This article surveys several interrelated issues in the metaphysics of chance. First, what is the relationship between the probabilities associated with types of trials (for instance, the chance that a twenty-eight-year old develops diabetes before age thirty) and the probabilities associated with individual token trials (for instance, the chance that I develop diabetes before age thirty)? Second, which features of the the world fix the chances: are there objective chances at all, and if so, are there non-chancy facts on which they supervene? Third, can chance be reconciled with determinism, and if so, how? Philosophy Compass 5/11 (2010):

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)

Epistemic deference is the phenomenon in which one person uses the deliverances of some information source, perhaps the opinions of another person, as a model for what to believe. The paper aims to clarify the nature of epistemic deference in probabilistic contexts, to explain the conditions under which deference is appropriate, and to examine deference to objective chances, as epitomized in David Lewis's Principal Principle. This latter analysis will show, in contrast with views that portray chance as an ideal inductive logician with total recall, that our deference to chance is grounded in contingent limitations on our ability to access information and our recognition that the physical probabilities that instantiate the actual chances codify all the types of information that humans are able to possess.

Faith and Philosophy, 1987

Although the doctrines of theism are rich enough to support a distinctively theistic conception of probability, historically there has been little discussion of probability from a theistic perspective. In this article I investigate how a theist might view epistemic probability. A unique conception of probability naturally follows from ideas central to theism, and it is argued that this conception of probability avoids many problems associated with other interpretations of probability.

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2013

I argue against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, I claim, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of ‘chance’ and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic is also a reason for adopting a much stronger, and far less attractive, position. I suggest an alternative account, according to which chances are probabilities that play a certain explanatory role: they are probabilities that explain associated frequencies.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1994

International journal of Systematic Theology, 2023

This article addresses the question: how can divine providence be reconciled with statistically random events? To limit the scope of the article, I focus on one popular version of meticulous providence that relies upon the primary/secondary causation distinction, influentially defended by Kathryn Tanner and her book God and Creation in Christian Theology. I argue that modern conceptions of chance and probability have made it more difficult to interpret chance events as part of God's meticulous providence since divine intentions in nature are expressed in ways that remove evidence of their purpose. The difficulty for meticulous providence is not that some events seem too random to be reconciled to God's providence, but rather the opposite: chance events do not have specific purpose behind them because they are predictable. I conclude that any satisfactory theological response to the problem of randomness necessitates a robust account of general providence that cannot be reduced to special providence.