The Military Economy and Military Reform in Russia

This critical comment examines the incentives, major priorities, difficulties and first results of the Russian military reform that is being implemented since 2008. The authors conclude that despite numerous drawbacks and barriers to the reformist efforts certain successes can be identified. Particularly, there is a clear shift from the old-fashioned, Soviet-type army to a more compact, mobile, better equipped and combat-ready armed forces that are capable to cope with today's challenges to Russian national security.

Rev. Cient. General José María Córdova, 2016

Applying a military sciences’ methodology namely DOTMLPF, this paper examines the 2008 Russian military reform to determine whether or not it will prepare Russia to face contemporary threats and challenges. Analysing published studies with the results of a DOTMLPF assessment and essentials of modern military thinking, this paper offers conclusions on the effectiveness of the reform. Besides, it provides a new perspective when analysing military reforms and emphasises the significance of Russia and its military capability for the global balance of power [Mediante la aplicación de una metodología de las ciencias militares llamada DOTMLPF (por sus siglas en inglés), este artículo examina la reforma militar rusa de 2008 para determinar si preparará a Rusia para afrontar amenazas y desafíos contemporáneos. Al analizar la literatura existente con los resultados del análisis DOTMLPF y los principios de pensamiento militar moderno, este artículo ofrece conclusiones sobre la eficacia de la reforma. De igual forma, provee una nueva perspectiva cuando se analizan reformas militares y enfatiza la relevancia de Rusia y su capacidad militar para el balance de poder global]

Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2003

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have now succeeded in achieving the main goal of their security policy aspirations: all three were invited to join NATO at the November Prague Summit. The mature political and economic development in the three-very different-states has made this step natural. During the last five or so years the three have also gradually accelerated their efforts to prepare their developing armed forces for a role in the Alliance. This task has not been and will not be easy. One of the reasons is that this task included first a build-up from scratch and thereafter a total reform of those first structures. The latter challenge is similar to that required everywhere in the Central and Eastern European armed forces: to make them focused and cost-effective. This article will cover different key aspects of the security reform needs in all these states, thereby indirectly covering the security situation in the Baltic States since 1991 and into the coming years. It is built on eight years of observation, study, conversations, and work in the three states as an insider, albeit one with the perspective of an outsider. In the last three years, the regional perspective has been supplemented and enriched with observations and conversations in several other Central and East European countries. The initial build-up of the Baltic states' armed forces In the period immediately following independence, the build-up of the armed forces was seen as urgent. During the first few years, there was an acute perception of threat. The Russian occupation troops were still present, and statements from a variety of sources in the Russian Federation reinforced the inherently problematic nature of their presence. Something had to be done, quickly, to develop the ability to fight back. This was not easy. Cadres for the armed forces had to be recruited. Some were found among the limited number of relatively untainted professionals from the Soviet Armed Forces. Others came from the volunteer cadres of the home guard forces that were created or recreated in 1990-91. The latter group was supplemented with officers, normally retired, from the Baltic diaspora in the U.S. and elsewhere. A strained relationship between these two groups and their political friends added to the problems on several occasions. None had any experience in building and operating armed forces in small democracies. © The operational forces must be organized as flexible "tool boxes," where the elements are equipped and well exercised in cooperation between themselves and with forces from other states.

2011

Russia has undertaken several largely piecemeal and halting efforts to revamp the armed forces it inherited from the Soviet Union. In 2007, near the end of then-President Vladimir Putin's second term in office, he appointed Anatoliy Serdyukov-the former head of the Federal Tax Service-as defense minister as part of an effort to combat corruption in the military and carry out reforms. After the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict revealed large-scale Russian military operational failures, the leadership became more determined to boost military capabilities. U.S. government and congressional policymakers are following the progress and goals of these reforms as they consider issues related to U.S.-Russia relations and U.S. national security interests. The reforms launched by Russian leadership called for reducing the total size of the armed forces from its size of 1.2 million in 2008 to under 1 million. Three major initiatives included accelerating planned cuts in the officer corps to reduce their numbers from 355,000 to a lateradjusted total of 220,000. The reforms also included revamping the training of noncommissioned officers to make them more effective and introducing military police, both aimed partly at boosting discipline in the barracks. The reforms aimed to reduce the four-tier command system of military districts, armies, divisions, and regiments to a two-tier system of strategic commands and fully manned brigades that could be quickly deployed for combat. A large-scale 10-year weapons modernization plan also was launched, and military budgets are being increased substantially. The weapons modernization plan prioritizes the procurement of new missiles and platforms to maintain strategic nuclear deterrence, but also includes new planes, helicopters, ships, missiles, and submarines for the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, and other arms of service. Russia's national security strategy, military doctrine, and some aspects of the military reforms reflect assessments by some Russian policymakers that the United States and NATO remain concerns, if not threats, to Russia's security. Other assessments, however, emphasize enhancing counter-terrorism capabilities and possibly hedges against the rise of China. Seeming to stress these latter concerns, in December 2008, Serdyukov asserted that the reforms were aimed at switching to a performance-capable, mobile, and maximally armed military ready to participate in at least three regional and local conflicts. Compared to Russia's previous attempts to revamp its armed forces, the current reform effort has gone further in altering the force structure and operations of the armed forces, according to most observers. However, the reforms face daunting delays, modifications, and setbacks. It remains highly uncertain whether Russia will be able to marshal the budgetary and demographic resources to field a substantially professional military with high readiness, as planned, or to modernize its ailing defense industries to obtain a new array of weaponry over the next 10 years. U.S. policymakers have maintained that Serdyukov's defense reforms pose both risks and opportunities for the United States and the West. While warning that Russian military programs are driven largely by Moscow's perception that the United States and NATO remain the greatest potential threats, U.S. policymakers also have raised the possibility that Russia's military reforms might in the future make it feel less strategically vulnerable and that it might participate more in international peacekeeping operations. In general, U.S. policymakers and others have urged a policy of hedging against these possible risks through countervailing diplomacy and defense efforts while also following an engagement policy with Russia to cooperate on global issues of mutual interest and to encourage Russia to democratize, respect human rights, and embrace pro-Western foreign policies.

Sodobni vojaški izzivi, 2024

After the end of the Cold War, when the Warsaw Pact was abolished and consequently the Soviet Union collapsed, the Atlantic Alliance lost its main adversary. As a result, European countries in particular started to cut their defence budgets, which affected the size, weapons and capabilities of their armed forces. It was not until the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2011 and the (US-led) global war on terror that the trend of military capability cuts slightly changed. However, strategically, the Europe's ability for (self) defence has not changed. Even the armed conflicts in the Middle East and the Caucasus, as well as the Russian occupation of Crimea and Donbas, have not changed the minds of European politicians and economists that military capabilities -not only armed forces, but also military industry -need to be strengthened. The new Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine opened the eyes of politicians, who substantially increased defence budgets, which in turn translated into increased purchases of weapon systems and military equipment, increased staffing levels, increased investment in military and dual-use industries, as well as other measures to transform the armed forces and protection and rescue forces.

Revista Científica General José María Córdova, 2016

Applying a military sciences’ methodology namely DOTMLPF, this paper examines the 2008 Russian military reform to determine whether or not it will prepare Russia to face contemporary threats and challenges. Analysing published studies with the results of a DOTMLPF assessment and essentials of modern military thinking, this paper offers conclusions on the effectiveness of the reform. Besides, it provides a new perspective when analysing military reforms and emphasises the significance of Russia and its military capability for the global balance of power.

2016

La reforma militar rusa de 2008: ¿una respuesta adecuada a las amenazas y retos del siglo veintiuno? La réforme militaire russe de 2008: une réponse adéquate aux menaces et aux défis du XXIe siècle? A reforma militar russa de 2008: uma resposta adequada às ameaças e desafios do século XXI? Andres Eduardo Fernandez-Osorio a 2008 Russian military reform: An adequate response to global threats and challenges of the twenty-first century? *

Defense & Security Analysis, 2013

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2019

Russia-Georgia relations had been declining since Georgia first voiced its intention for NATO membership in 2005 which later escalated into a war in 2008. Despite being victorious in the 2008 Russo-Georgian Five-Day War, the shortcomings of the Russian Armed Forces that were exposed during the war had led the country towards its “New Look” military reform announced months after the war. Many International Relations scholar draw a connection between the reform and Russia’s increasing assertiveness marked by the Crimean annexation and Russia’s involvement in Syria. This piece will then try to understand how Russian military performance in the 2008 war led to Russia’s most rigorous military reform, and more importantly, how did Russia implement its “New Look” reform during 2008 until 2013. Russia had underwent far reaching efforts and goals to transform the armed forces into combat-ready forces but had also faced challenges in modernizing its weaponry system, in increasing the quality...

Research for Policy, 2020

2011

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:* Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined employment of military forces;* Regional strategic appraisals;* The nature of land warfare;* Matters affecting the Army's future;* The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and* Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community.In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of conferences and topically-oriented roundtab...

Caucasian review of international affairs. online, 2008

After years of neglect due to financial constraints, the Russian military has entered a period of systemic development. The ongoing defense reform has introduced a few important changes, but so far the pace of the reform is slow. In order to review the current reform effort, a number of factors - the resistance of the military elite to reform, the demographic factor, the lack of a clear defense doctrine, the restructuring of the defense industry and the state of the civil control over the military - will be analyzed. These limitations will define not only the pace of the defense reform, but also Russia’s ability to play a more active role in the international arena.

1998

Rev. Cient. General José María Córdova, 2015

This paper examines contemporary Russian military thinking in relation with the concept of modern warfare and its adequateness to manage future threats and challenges. After providing an analysis on Russia’s defence and security policies and the historical transformation of its military, this paper argues that the concept of full spectrum operations has been key factor to plan and develop the 2008 Russian Military Reform. In addition, it provides a framework to both analyse Russia’s international policy and its influence on the international system, and endorses this reform as a remarkable case study for the discipline of military sciences [Este artículo analiza el pensamiento militar ruso contemporáneo con relación al concepto de guerra moderna y su capacidad para el manejo de amenazas y desafíos futuros. Luego de presentar un análisis de las políticas de seguridad y defensa de Rusia y de la transformación histórica de sus Fuerzas Armadas, se argumenta que el concepto de operaciones militares de espectro total fue crucial en la planeación y ejecución de la Reforma Militar Rusa de 2008. Asimismo, ofrece un marco de referencia para el análisis tanto de la política internacional de Rusia como de su impacto en el sistema internacional, y propone esta reforma como un estudio de caso de gran importancia en el contexto de las ciencias militares]

SSRN Electronic Journal