Embryology: Medieval and Modern

The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 2005

In addressing bioethical issues at the beginning of human life, such as abortion, in vitro fertilization, and embryonic stem cell research, one primary concern regards establishing when a developing human embryo or fetus can be considered a person. Thomas Aquinas argues that an embryo or fetus is not a human person until its body is informed by a rational soul. Aquinas's explicit account of human embryogenesis has been generally rejected by contemporary scholars due to its dependence upon medieval biological data, which has been far surpassed by current scientific research. A number of scholars, however, have attempted to combine Aquinas's basic metaphysical account of human nature with current embryological data to develop a contemporary Thomistic account of a human person's beginning. In this paper, I discuss two recent interpretations in which it is argued that a human person does not begin to exist until a fetus has developed a functioning cerebral cortex.

Journal of Medical Ethics, 2005

At a time when bioethical issues are at the top of public and political agendas, there is a renewed interest in representations of the embryo in various religious traditions. One of the major traditions that has contributed to Western representations of the embryo is the Jewish tradition. This tradition poses some difficulties that may deter scholars, but also presents some invaluable advantages. These derive from two components, the search for limits and narrativity, both of which are directly connected with the manner in which Jewish tradition was constructed in Antiquity. The article accomplishes three goals: 􀁳􀀀 To introduce some central elements in ancient Rabbinic literature on the subject of the embryo and its representation; 􀁳􀀀 To present this body of literature as clearly as possible, noting some of the difficulties encountered by scholars who engage in its study; 􀁳􀀀 To explain how the literature’s textuality came about, examining the particular sociopolitical circumstances of Judaism at that time, including the reasons for the delay in the production of scientific texts, transmitted as such, as compared to other philosophical or religious traditions. The article claims that these circumstances engendered a tradition peculiarly relevant for the study and teaching of medical ethics today.

Medicina Y Ética, 2023

The human embryo in legislation has no defined status. As for its status in ethical debates, no consensus has been reached between the various parties of the different bioethical currents. What is certain is that in most legislations, in order to circumvent ethical debates, base their arguments above all on scientific data. As a result, ethics is limited to the scientific aspect. However, it is urgent to remember that bioethics does not stop solely at the scientific or sociological aspect. Particularly, the Personalist Bioethics approach invite us to consider the human being, including the embryo, in its meta-ontological aspect. The personalist vision is based on the notion of the “person” described by Saint Thomas Aquinas. Could the latter provide answers to the ethical dilemmas of our days? This article aims to answer this question by analyzing the issue of embryonic discontinuity and the unity of the person from a meta-ontological reflection.

Reproductive BioMedicine Online, 2010

and he obtained a position as attending physician in this department in December 2008.

2017

All throughout history the unborn, and implicitly its protection, have been subject for academics and practitioners of various areas. The problem of the origin of the soul and the exact determination of the moment when it is united with the body was crucial in enabling us to define the exact moment when the human life begins, and, consequently, for providing proper protection for the unborn child. In this context visions of the Greek philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, and of the Latin writer Tertullian, as well as Christian perspectives were analysed in order to identify the starting point of the human being to help determine the level of protection provided for the unborn in history. Finally, considering the fact that not even today has consensus been achieved concerning the beginning of human life, it was and still is difficult to provide proper legal protection for the unborn child, but in our opinion this is by far not impossible.

The question of the embryo's moral status _Original Article Abstract_French and German abstracts see p. 80 The embryo's moral status is a hotly debated question. Some authors give the embryo the same status as that of an adult human being, while others consider it as more akin to things or living beings such as animals. The difficulty is that, although an embryo will sometimes become an adult human being, he is not already one. To shed some light on this vexing topic, it is necessary to go back to the notion of moral status and examine the way in which we attribute it to human beings. We deem that a being's moral status depends on its intrinsic value, and that its intrinsic value depends on its intrinsic properties. The relevant intrinsic property for an adult human being is the possession of reason, and this property confers to its bearer the status of a person. So, is the embryo a person? The answer depends on the meaning we give to the expression «to possess reason». Is it an actual or a dispositional property? If it is a disposition, is it an actual one or a future-oriented one? The examination of the notion of a disposition gives a stronger support to the thesis that an embryo is not a person proper, but rather a potential one.

Law and Biomedicine, 2022

From a critical human rights-based approach, Law and Biomedicine addresses available international legal answers to various questions about human life and health affecting highly appreciated individual and social values—namely, autonomy, life, dignity, and moral status, among others. Papers of each lesson are available under request.

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2006

It is commonly assumed that persons who hold abortions to be generally impermissible must, for the same reasons, be opposed to embryonic stem cell research [ESR]. Yet a settled position against abortion does not necessarily direct one to reject that research. The differences between the embryos used in ESR and embryos discussed in the abortion debate can make ESR acceptable even if one holds that abortion is impermissible. This can be shown by use of the Aristotelian notions of active and passive potentiality, which shows the different sorts of embryos to be importantly different from each other with regard to a common reductio ad absurdum argument against the claim that we must show respect for embryos based on their potential. This difference creates a moral distinction between embryos in vivo and in vitro. Various attempts to refute this moral distinction, raised in the recent debate in this journal between Alfonso Gómez-Lobo and Mary Mahowald, are also addressed.

Thomist, 2003

I N HIS BOOK When did I begin?, Norman M. Ford argues that, because up until about the fourteenth day a single human embryo can split in such a way that twins (or other sibling groups) result, the embryo during this period cannot be considered a human individual. 1 In historical support of this thesis, he cites Aristotle, who, according to Ford, holds that the sensitive soul-which is a prerequisite for the presence of the rational or properly human soul-enters the embryo some forty days after conception for males, ninety days for females. 2 Ford has been challenged on his interpretation of Aristotle by the prominent Aristotelian Enrico Berti, who argues that, if we bear in mind especially Aristotle's application of the doctrine of first act to the beginnings of human life, we must acknowledge that for him the human soul is present from conception. 3

Birth Defects Research Part C: Embryo Today: Reviews, 2008

The following essay was delivered at the conference ''Ontogeny and Human Life'' at the Ponifical Athenaeum ''Regina Apostolorum,'' November, 2007. Sponsored by the Legion of Christ, the Pontifical Academy for Life, and the John Templeton Foundation, the sessions focused on when the conceptus became a ''person.'' My essay focused on the scientific conclusions that could aid such discussions. Moreover, after listening to the philosophical, legal, and theological discussions that ensued, I responded theologically as well. New concepts in modern embryology have made scientists revise their views concerning the autonomy of embryos and the mechanisms that generate such embryos. There are interactions between the sperm and the female reproductive tract and egg which had never been known until recently. There are also interactions between the developing organism and its environment that had been unsuspected a decade ago. Gut bacteria induce the development of the mammalian digestive system and immune system by changing the gene expression patterns in the mammalian intestine. Conversely, chemicals in our technological society can adversely affect the embryo, rendering it sterile or prone to tumors later in life. While there is no consensus among scientists as to when human life begins, both Church and science can become allies in persuading governments to regulate or ban the production and use of these fetotoxic chemicals. These new views of embryonic development change many of the stories told about human embryos and fetuses, and they have implications concerning the use of science as evidence for theological positions.

In Vitro Fertilisation in the 1990s, 2018

This paper is in three parts. Part I discusses some general matters concerning the attribution of moral status to the human embryo. Part II outlines the current situation regarding legal protection of the human embryo in the European Union. Part III sketches an approach to the moral status of the human embryo that lays claim to legal force within the European Union as a whole. The general moral status attributed to the human embryo depends, essentially, on two things: 1 which characteristics are deemed necessary or sufficient, on the one hand, for beings to be owed any duties of respect or concern for their interests or welfare, or rights in terms of their interests or welfare, on the other; and 2 beliefs about the ontological status of the human embryoits nature, capacities, and powers. Characteristics that have been deemed necessary/sufficient for duties of respect or concern to be owed (or rights to be held) include, e. g., (a) being a natural event or system; (b) being a living organism; (c) being a sentient being (one capable of pain and pleasure); (d) being a human being (biologically defined); (e) being a rational being;

The Linacre Quareterly, 2019

Philippiniana Sacra