The Prospects of a Political Transition in Syria

Syria After the Fall of Assad: A Landscape of Uncertainty and Competing Interests, 2024

This paper explores the multifaceted landscape of Syria in a hypothetical post-Assad scenario. It examines the potential trajectory of the nation considering the attitudes of key international players, neighboring states, and the intricate socio-political dynamics within Syria itself. By analyzing historical precedents, current power structures, and potential future alliances, this research aims to identify the most probable pathways for Syria's future and offer recommendations for fostering stability and reconciliation. The study employs a mixed-methods approach, combining theoretical frameworks of state-building, international relations, and conflict resolution with empirical analysis of available data and scholarly literature. It hypothesizes that a power vacuum following Assad's fall will lead to further fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines, exacerbated by external intervention, necessitating a comprehensive and inclusive governance model supported by international consensus to achieve lasting peace.

Abstract: A political transition managed by a “Transitional Governing Body” was at the core of the United Nations approach for building a sustainable peace in Syria. The Syrian opposition committed itself to this principle during the Geneva negotiations of 2014 with broad international support and backing. The core group of the Friends of the Syrian People states initially advocated for delegating the management of the transitional period to this body by offering it wide executive powers. Nonetheless, the emergence of ISIS, the direct Russian military intervention in Syria, and the subsequent weaker opposition on the battlefield have contributed in a change of demands. In 2016, the international community adopted a much looser framework for political transition in Syria based on constitutional reform and elections instead. The Syrian opposition responded in the subsequent talks of 2017–2018 by adopting this international “shift” and has ultimately failed in producing their own frame of reference for the political transition in Syria. This paper delves into the reasons behind these dynamics and offers an alternative path for the opposition to move forward.

2020

Against the backdrop of Iraq's fragmentation and Egypt's derailed revolution, bold steps are clearly needed to prevent Syria from a likewise destiny, far worsened by the level of violence in the country and its role in the region's geopolitics. The degeneration of the crisis into sectarianism and social conflict is an increasingly tangible threat. Arguably, this degeneration is fuelled by the lack of a common vision for the future of Syria among those international players capable of influencing the conflict and within the internal opposition front. This paper analyses the anti-Assad front and outlines a post-war plan for national reconciliation framed in the context of the country's own past and experiences from other countries in the region.

2013

The Assad dictatorship in Syria, backed by Iran and Hezbollah, is now regionalizing the Syrian crisis, while simultaneously carving out a coastal rump state. Sectarian fighter-terrorists from Hezbollah have emerged as the regime's most reliable foot soldiers, and are being deployed across Syria. In a desperate bid to advance its regional power, Iran is also deploying thousands of other sectarian fighters inside Syria. Assad is gaining due to this heavy foreign support. The fall of Khalidiya in central Homs and the Kurds’ plans for an autonomous region increase the risk that the country will dissolve into three hostile enclaves. Assad will not negotiate in good faith until his calculus is changed. To blunt Assad-Hezbollah advances and prod Assad to the negotiating table, a three-part comprehensive strategy is needed. First, the United States should exert military pressure on Assad, by arming vetted opposition elements in the Free Syrian Army and eliminating Assad’s air power monopoly. Second, the U.S. should exert political pressure to isolate and undermine the Assad regime. Third, the U.S. should promote a clear alternative to Assad by supporting civilian governance efforts.

Hinnebusch, R. and J. Gani (eds.), Actors and Dynamics in the Syrian Conflict's Middle Phase: Between Contentious Politics, Militarization and Regime Resilience, Routledge , 2022

Aurora Sottimano’s chapter (Chapter 7) focuses on the exiled political opposition, the Syrian National Council, later replaced by the National Coalition of Opposition Forces (NC), and the Syrian Interim Government (SIG). While the Local Coordination Councils, revolutionary experiments in alternative democratic governance, enjoyed domestic legitimacy, the external opposition, largely made up of exiles whose funding and backing came from external governments, struggled to acquire it. In an attempt to coordinate opposition governance, local councils were brought under the authority of the NC, which had some nominal successes, e.g. in holding local elections in the early phase. However, the NC’s efforts disintegrated due to internal squabbles and corruption and its main achievement was to facilitate humanitarian assistance on the ground. The Syrian Interim Government was designed to have greater coordinating presence on the ground and it did gain greater legitimacy in the majority of rebel held territories and enabled greater coordination of local councils and civil- military cooperation, although its commitment to preserving existing state institutions (to prevent state fragmentation) undermined trust on the ground. However, donors bypassed the SIG to fund local councils directly or else reduced their commitments over time; insufficient funding from the international community prevented the SIG from paying its employees on the ground in Syria, opening the way for militant groups to fill the vacuum. Sottimano argues there was a period in 2015 just prior to Russian intervention when significant progress in alternative governance was made by the opposition, but it was not properly supported by external funders. Thus, the relationship of the outside and inside opposition was more complex than a simplistic binary of local 'authenticity’ and external ‘illegitimacy.’

2008

On April 24, 2008, I became the first Syrian citizen to deliver a testimony in the U.S. Congress. My co-panelists included my colleagues from the Brookings Institution: Martin Indyk and Peter Rodman. In the testimony I try to set the record straight on the deteriorating internal situation in Syria focusing on Assad's weakening grip and signs of growing popular discontent. The text of the testimony can be found below, and also on the House Foreign Affairs Committee website.

LUGARIT, 2024

This paper examines Syria’s volatile landscape on the eve of the collapse of the Assad regime, a moment marking the end of 62-years-long Baathist rule and the beginning of a new chapter. Despite Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) gaining control over key territories, including Damascus, the country remains deeply fragmented across diverse governance models, with significant areas outside HTS authority. The paper explores the entrenched economic collapse, characterized by pervasive poverty and a dysfunctional war economy, as well as the persistent security instability driven by militia activity, smuggling networks, and regional conflicts. Offering a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and opportunities ahead, the paper advocates for gradual, inclusive pathways toward stabilization. It emphasizes the importance of fostering economic opportunities to support refugee reintegration, initiating context-specific constitutional dialogue to address Syria’s unique realities, and achieving international consensus to navigate the complexities of this transition. While acknowledging the uncertainties of the current landscape, the paper outlines a framework for uniting the country under decentralized governance, ensuring accountability, and preserving territorial integrity. As a snapshot of Syria during a pivotal moment, the paper provides critical insights into the evolving dynamics and offers practical recommendations to inform policymaking, international collaboration, and sustainable recovery efforts. This work is part of an ongoing effort to envision realistic solutions to rebuild Syria in the aftermath of regime collapse.

Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 2014

The inability of the Syrian government to internally manage the popular uprising in the country have increased international pressure on Syria as well as deepen international efforts to resolve the crisis that has developed into a full scale civil war. It was the need to end the violent conflict in Syria that informed the appointment of Kofi Annan as the U.N-Arab League Special Envoy to Syria on February 23, 2012. This study investigates the U.S and Russian governments' involvement in the Syrian crisis and the UN Kofi Annan peace process. The two persons' Zero-sum model of the game theory is used as our framework of analysis. Our findings showed that the divergence on financial and military support by the U.S and Russian governments to the rival parties in the Syrian conflict contradicted the mandate of the U.N Security Council that sanctioned the Annan plan and compromised the ceasefire agreement contained in the plan which resulted in the escalation of violent conflict in Syria during the period the peace deal was supposed to be in effect. The implication of the study is that the success of any U.N brokered peace deal is highly dependent on the ability of its key members to have a consensus, hence, there is need to galvanize a comprehensive international consensus on how to tackle the Syrian crisis that would accommodate all crucial international actors. We recommended that there is need for a negotiated solution that will involve a compromise agreement by the conflicting parties on the basis of mutual consent since the zero-sum nature of the Syrian conflict in which both regime and its opponents seek total victory make political settlement elusive.