Causality and Hume's Foundational Project

British Journal of Multidisciplinary and Advanced Studies, 2023

Hume's construal of causation historically lays out a philosophical puzzle towards realism and anti-realism; in fact, this scholarship deliberately offers a bit of thoughts for causal realism-in virtue of the Old Hume and New Hume debate, as well as its contextual language. Nevertheless, this dialectic is significantly underestimated by plenty of counterexamples such as empiricism, liberty and necessity, the immateriality of the soul, and copy principle. In response to these brainstorming facets, this research article intends to determine that Hume is a causal anti-realist; I have, in turn, explored three supporting arguments to defend the compelling idea: conventional manifestation of causality-Hume's advocacy of necessary connection-the idea of liberty and necessity. However, this critical study is restricted to examine other substantial reflections on those which are included in the compositions of Treatise and Enquiry.

2000

Hume presents two definitions of cause in his Enquiry which correspond to his two definitions in his Treatise. The first of the definitions is ontological and the second is psychological; indeed, the definitions are extensionally and intensionally distinct. The critical mistake of the skeptical interpretation is the assumption that the two definitions are equivalent, and the critical mistake of the necessitarian is the assumption an association of ideas can be had from one experiment. This paper attempts to clarify Hume’s finally considered position of causality.

We give a brief introduction of Hume’s epistemology and his penetrating analysis of causality. It is pointed out that there are some flaws in his epistemology and his theory of causation. Alternative theories of causation are then briefly introduced. Partly inspired by Hume’s analysis of necessary connexion, we present a new argument of causation. We argue that Hume’s removing necessary connexion from causality can help to provide a promising way to unify the law of causality and indeterminism. We then propose a generalized principle of causality, according to which there are two kinds of causes: concrete causes and universal causes, and correspondingly there are two kinds of effects: lawful events and random events. Each actual effect is composed of both lawful element and random element. A detailed analysis of the motion of objects is also given to support the new principle.

An Enquiry Concerning Humean Understanding: A Criticism of Hume's Conception of Causal Events In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume provides an empirical account of knowledge that hinges upon the Copy Principle. The Copy Principle states that for every idea there is a corresponding impression or set of impressions that gives rise to the idea itself or its component ideas. With this foundation, Hume criticizes the idea that we have access to causation as the necessary connection between cause and effect. Considering the collision of two billiard balls, Hume identifies no sensory impression from which we copy our notion of causation. Therefore, he concludes that we perceive nothing in the collision that necessitates the outcome,

A specter is haunting Hume scholarship: the specter of the “New Hume.” Contrary to more traditional interpretations, according to which Hume rejects belief in any conception of causation that invokes (metaphysically) necessary connections between distinct existences, proponents of the New Hume hold that Hume at the least allowed for the possibility of such connections—it’s just that he thought we couldn’t know much, if anything, about them, if we assume that they do exist. I will argue that the views of the “New Humers” (as I shall call them) are mistaken. I will begin by discussing their reading of Hume on causation, using Galen Strawson as a foil. I then examine the relation between Hume’s view of relations (pun intended) and his account of “necessary connexions”. Next, I argue that this account, once properly understood, shows that he did not believe in what we would think of as necessary connections while at the same time explaining why, as the New Humers point out, Hume sometimes writes in ways that can make it sound like he does, as well as reconciling Hume’s two definitions of causation. After that, I answer objections, and then raise some doubts about Hume’s account before finally concluding the paper.

2009

The goal of this dissertation is to follow the discussion about causation on David Hume's philosophy. First, I try to show how such concept was treated by previous philosophers that might somehow have influenced Hume. I then analyze his contribution to the subject up to the point in which he introduces the idea of necessary connection. The final part of the work is aimed at studying the most important interpretative branches that try to make sense of Hume's ambiguous statements about necessary connection, and the implications the correct understanding of this concept has for his theory of causation.

Synthese, 2014

Interpreters have found it exceedingly difficult to understand how Hume could be right in claiming that his two definitions of 'cause' are essentially the same. As J. A. Robinson points out, the definitions do not even seem to be extensionally equivalent. Don Garrett offers an influential solution to this interpretative problem, one that attributes to Hume the reliance on an ideal observer. I argue that the theoretical need for an ideal observer stems from an idealized concept of definition, which many interpreters, including Garrett, attribute to Hume. I argue that this idealized concept of definition indeed demands an unlimited or infinite ideal observer. But there is substantial textual evidence indicating that Hume disallows the employment of idealizations in general in the sciences. Thus Hume would reject the idealized concept of definition and its corresponding ideal observer. I then put forward an expert-relative reading of Hume's definitions of 'cause', which also renders both definitions extensionally equivalent. On the expert-relative reading, the meaning of 'cause' changes with better observations and experiments, but it also allows Humean definitions to play important roles within our normative practices. Finally, I consider and reject Henry Allison's argument that idealized definitions and their corresponding infinite minds are necessary for expert reflection on the limitations of current science.