Experience and Self-Consciousness
Joseph Schear2009, Philosophical Studies
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Abstract
Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers “yes”. I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the “interview argument,” and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness.
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Thinking about (self-)consciousness: Phenomenological perspectives
In the following contribution, I will outline and discuss some central elements in the phenomenological account of consciousness. Generally, one should not overestimate the homogeneity of the phenomenological tradition-a tradition inaugurated by Husserl (1859Husserl ( -1938, and comprising among its most well-known champions philosophers like Scheler, Heidegger, Schutz, Gurwitsch, Fink, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Levinas, Ricoeur, and Henry. Like any other tradition, it spans many differences. When it comes to the question concerning the relation between consciousness and selfconsciousness, however, one will fi nd a case of widespread agreement. Literally all of the major fi gures defend the view that the experiential dimension of consciousness is as such characterized by a tacit self-consciousness.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies Consciousness and the self
With his notion of absolute consciousness, Sartre tries to rethink the relation between consciousness and the self. What is the origin of subjectivity in relation to a consciousness that is characterized as impersonal and as a radical lucidity? In this article, I attempt to question that origin and the nature as such of the subject in its relation to a consciousness that in its essence is not yet subjective. On the contrary, it is characterized by a selfpresence that is so radical that it threatens every form of self-knowledge
Consciousness, Self-consciousness, Selfhood: A reply to some critics
Review of Philosophy and Psychology has lately published a number of papers that in various ways take issue with and criticize my work on the link between consciousness, self-consciousness and selfhood. In the following contribution, I reply directly to this new set of objections and argue that while some of them highlight ambiguities in my (earlier) work that ought to be clarified, others can only be characterized as misreadings.
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Anthropology & Philosophy, 2015
Several authors have recently defended the idea that there is a “pre-reflective self-consciousness”, or “pre-reflective self”, which is regarded as a very precocious psychic function that grounds every conscious act. In particular, Prebble, Addis & Tippett (2013) argue that this kind of self-consciousness is a fundamental prerequisite for episodic memory and is very similar to the Jamesian notion of I, or subjective self (as opposed to Me, or objective self). In this paper we will argue that the identification of the Jamesian notion of I with pre-reflective self-consciousness is a misunderstanding of James’ account and that self-consciousness is, properly said, the result of a gradual process of objectification, which requires conscious (but not self-conscious) activities of representation. Indeed, the subjective self (or self-consciousness), far from being the grounding source of every conscious mental activity, is the result of a complex neurocognitive and psycho-social construction, where the understanding of other minds both ontogenetically precedes and grounds the understanding of our own minds.
Introspective Knowledge of Experience and Its Role in Consciousness Studies
2011
In response to Petitmengin and Bitbol's recent account of first-person methodologies in the study of consciousness, I provide a revised model of our introspective knowledge of our own conscious experience. This model, which I call the existential constitution model of phenomenal knowledge, avoids the problems that Petitmengin and Bitbol identify with standard observational models of introspection while also avoiding an underlying metaphorical misconception in their own proximity model, which misconstrues first-person knowledge of consciousness in terms of a dichotomous epistemic relationship. The end result is a clearer understanding of the unique nature and epistemic properties of our knowledge of consciousness, as well as the epistemic status of subsequent first-person reports on conscious experience .
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Philosophical Explorations, 2020
The purpose of this paper is threefold: First, I shall first attempt to criticize a certain strand of thinking about self-consciousness that is prevalent in contemporary phenomenological circles. My specific target, in particular, will be Dan Zahavi’s notion of the ‘experiential self’ as the latter is presented and developed in his recent book Self and Other (2014). I will argue that Zahavi’s ‘experiential self’ is so thin that its connection with the pre-reflective dimension of selfhood at the distinctively human, conceptual, ‘space of reasons’ level becomes problematic. Second, I shall suggest that an alternative account of self-consciousness first developed by Kant and refined by Sellars, which I shall call the ‘Kant-Sellars’ thesis about self-consciousness, can help us do justice to the insights contained in Zahavi’s account of experiential self, while at the same time avoiding its more problematic features. All this, of course, come at a cost: Contra phenomenology, we must acknowledge that there is no such thing as a direct, immediate phenomenological intuition which transparently reveals the ‘self’, whether pre-reflectively or reflectively in propria persona, i.e. ‘as it really is’. Finally, I shall offer a brief response to the objection that by dropping the phenomenological ‘bridge’ between the normative and empirical-material dimensions of the pre-reflective self, the above ‘Kant-Sellars’ account of self-consciousness leaves us with an essentially ‘bifurcated’ conception of ‘pre-reflective’ self-consciousness. Specifically, I will suggest that what unites those two dimensions of the pre-reflective self can be best described not as a phenomenological unity but rather as a ‘dialectical’ unity.
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Filozofski godišnjak, 2023
I aim to show that, contrary to standard deflationary or eliminativist theories of the self, we can argue from the phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness for the thesis that subjects of experience are substances. The phenomenological datum of subjectivity points to a specific metaphysical structure of our experience, that is, towards the substance view rather than the bundle or the minimal self view. Drawing on modern philosophical accounts of pre-reflective self-awareness, mineness and (self-) acquaintance, I will argue that a subject is aware of being the one individual who has many experiences and that it is revealed to the subject that it is the bearer of experiences and their unifier. The subject is present in pre-reflective awareness and known as the subject of experiences, and even this minimal self-awareness gives us reason to favour the substance view. Thus, one can demonstrate how the debates on the phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness and the metaphysics of selfhood intersect.
Subject and Consciousness: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Self-Consciousness
1990
This work takes a basic phenomenological distinction (between the object and the process of consciousness) and examines it both from a historical perspective, and as it applies to the social and political realm. Self-consciousness not only has a cognitive meaning but also constitutes the human subject according to the specific way in which consciousness is grasped. Historically, the author shows that many of the problems that have appeared in the history of the study of human consciousness and self consciousness could either have been avoided altogether or greatly clarified if only both sides of the situation had been seen in conjunction with one another. The author shows how this conceptual clarification can be applied to specific problems concerning the nature of consciousness and to the social and political realm.
Consciousness and the First Person: A Critical Appraisal of
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2007
First-Person Investigations of Consciousness
2016
This dissertation defends the reliability of first-person methods for studying consciousness, and applies first-person experiments to two philosophical problems: the experience of size and of the self. In chapter 1, I discuss the motivations for taking a first-person approach to consciousness, the background assumptions of the dissertation and some methodological preliminaries. In chapter 2, I address the claim that phenomenal judgements are far less reliable than perceptual judgements (Schwitzgebel, 2011). I argue that the main errors and limitations in making phenomenal judgements are due to domain-general factors, which are shared in the formation of perceptual judgements. Phenomenal judgements may still be statistically less reliable than perceptual judgements, though I provide reasons for thinking that Schwitzgebel (2011) overstates the case for statistical unreliability. I also provide criteria for distinguishing between reliable and unreliable phenomenal judgements, hence defending phenomenal judgements against general introspective scepticism. Having identified the main errors in making phenomenal judgements, in chapter 3, I discuss how first-person experiments can be used to control for these errors. I provide examples, and discuss how they overcome attentional and conceptual errors, minimise biases, and exhibit high intersubjective reliability. In chapter 4, I investigate size experience. I use first-person experiments and empirical findings to argue that distant things looking smaller cannot be explained as an awareness of instantiated objective properties (visual angle or retinal image size). I also discuss how an awareness of uninstantiated objective properties cannot adequately account for the phenomenal character of size experience. This provides support for a subjectivist account of variance in size experience. In chapter 5, I investigate the sense of self. I distinguish between a weak sense of self (for-me-ness) and a strong sense of self in which there is a polarity between subject and object. I use first-person experiments from Douglas Harding to demonstrate an explicit strong sense of self, specifically when I point at where others see my face. I also argue that this sense of self is not explained by inference, thoughts, feelings, imagination nor the viewpoint. Rather, it is part of the structure of experience that I seem to be looking from here. Even if there is a sense of self, there may be no self. The question of chapter 6 is whether there can be a direct experience of the self. I argue that to function as a bearer of experience the subject must be single and lack sensory qualities in itself. I use Harding’s first-person experiments to investigate the visual gap where I cannot see my head. I argue that it conforms to the above criteria, and hence is a candidate for being the subject. This finding, in conjunction with the fact that I seem to be looking from the same location, provides prima facie evidence for the reality of the subject. I hold then that contrary to Hume and most philosophers since, that there can be a direct self-experience, if one knows which direction to attend.
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Forthcoming in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2024
The nature of pre-reflective self-consciousness—viz., the putative non-inferential self-consciousness involved in unreflective experiences—has become the topic of considerable debate in recent analytic philosophy of consciousness, as it is commonly taken to be what makes conscious mental states first-personally given to their subject. A major issue of controversy in this debate concerns what pre-reflective self-consciousness is an awareness of. Some scholars have suggested that pre-reflective self-consciousness involves an awareness of the experiencing subject. This ‘egological view’ is opposed to the ‘non-egological view’, according to which the subject is just aware of their own occurrent mental state in being pre-reflectively self-conscious. In this paper, I argue in favour of the egological view. The argument I develop is a qualified version of a line of reasoning originally provided by Rosenthal and builds on a proper clarification of the ontological status of token mental states. More precisely, I argue that token mental states are structured ‘fact-like’ entities having their subject among their constituents. Accordingly, one cannot be aware of one’s own occurrent mental state without thereby being aware of oneself. I conclude by dismissing a potential objection to my argument.
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Analytic philosophy in the 20th century was largely hostile territory to the self as traditionally conceived, and this tradition has been continued in two recent works: Mark Johnston's Surviving Death, and Galen Strawson's Selves. I have argued previously that it is perfectly possible to combine a naturalistic world-view with a conception of the self as a subject of experience, a thing whose only essential attribute is a capacity for unified and continuous experience. I argue here that this conception of the self is unthreatened by the otherwise valuable considerations advanced by Johnston and Strawson. Both are inclined to identify selves-at-times with momentary episodes of experience (or centres or 'arenas' of consciousness). Both go on to argue, albeit in di erent ways, that individual selves cannot extend beyond the confines of these brief episodes. However, in so doing they give insufficient weight to an important phenomenological datum: the continuity of our ordinary experience. When the latter is recognized, and appropriately understood, it provides us with a secure basis upon which a more recognizable conception of the self can be constructed.
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Charles Larmore sums up in three statements the traditional position of philosophy about the self (with particular reference to René Descartes and John Locke): 1) it is impossible to be a self without being in relation with itself; 2) the relation that the self has with itself (and by which it is a self ) is a cognitive relation, it is a self-knowledge; 3) this relation of self-knowledge is of the same kind as the cognitive relation that the self has with the objects of the world. Larmore criticizes statements 2 and 3 and maintains that the relation (of the self with itself ) in which the nature of the self consists is not cognitive, but practical and normative: the nature of the self is the same relation of commitment that exists between my beliefs and my actions; each of my beliefs commits me to behave a certain way. In this paper, I want to refute Larmore’s criticism of statement 2 and to show, following Michel Henry, that the relation in which the nature of the self consists is actually a self-experience; I maintain that we can affirm statement 2 of the traditional position about the self without being forced to affirm also statement 3.
The self and conscious experience
Frontiers in Psychology, 2024
The primary determinant of the self (S) is the conscious experience (CE) we have of it. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that empirical research on S mainly resorts to the CE (or lack of CE) that subjects have of their S. What comes as a surprise is that empirical research on S does not tackle the problem of how CE contributes to building S. Empirical research investigates how S either biases the cognitive processing of stimuli or is altered through a wide range of means (meditation, hypnosis, etc.). In either case, even for different reasons, considerations of how CE contributes to building S are left unspecified in empirical research. This article analyzes these reasons and proposes a theoretical model of how CE contributes to building S. According to the proposed model, the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is produced by the modulation-engendered by attentional activity-of the energy level of the neural substrate (that is, the organ of attention) that underpins attentional activity. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness supplies the agent with a sense of S and informs the agent on how its S is affected by the agent's own operations. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness performs its functions through its five main dimensions: qualitative, quantitative, hedonic, temporal, and spatial. Each dimension of the phenomenal aspect of consciousness can be explained by a specific aspect of the modulation of the energy level of the organ of attention. Among other advantages, the model explains the various forms of S as outcomes resulting from the operations of a single mechanism and provides a unifying framework for empirical research on the neural underpinnings of S.
The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications
In this paper, I will first outline a view regarding the relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness and a minimal notion of self that is widespread in the phenomenological tradition. I will discuss some of the motivations behind this proposal and then in the main part of the paper critically engage with various objections that have recently been raised against this view by Albahari and Dreyfus. Discussing these objections will allow for an important clarification of the view I am defending.
López-Silva, P. (2014). Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience. In A. Gerner & J. Gonçalvez (Ed), Altered Self and Altered Self-Experience (209-224). Germany: Norderstedt BoD.
Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim). The main argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of 'mineness' of the experience reveals the self as a part of all experiences. Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC. In this essay, I assess this claim and its main argument. After describing the phenomenological approach to selfawareness that grounds the discussion, I comment on some pathological cases that challenge the SPC. After this, I examine the standard reply in defence of the SPC and I focus the discussion on cases of thought insertion. I conclude that although the standard reply adds interesting elements to the general discussion, it becomes philosophically problematic especially when it tries to deal with cases of thought insertion.
Stefan Lang and Klaus Vierbauer eds. Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: A First Sketch
Stefan Lang and Klaus Viertbauer: Editorial: Self- Consciousness Explained—Mapping the Field, 2022
Review of Philosophy and Psychology Stefan Lang with Klaus Vierttebauer eds. Self-Consciousness explained. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00641-1 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13164-022-00641-1 Self-Consciousness ranks among the most urgent topics in today's Philosophy of Mind. In particular, one of the most challenging agenda is the explanation of pre-reflective self-consciousness. 1 According to philosophers like Anna Giustina and Uriah Kriegel pre-reflective self-consciousness consists in a subject's awareness of her ongoing experience. 2 It is a case of "peripheral" self-consciousness, i.e. while a subject's attention is mostly focused on the external objects, events, and states of affairs, the experience itself is much more dimly conscious. 3 Pre-reflective self-consciousness is a constant "humming in the background of our stream of consciousness." 4 By consciousness Giustina and Kriegel mean phenomenal consciousness, i.e. conscious mental states, such as a conscious visual perception of a tomato, which have a conscious qualitative character. 5 The conscious qualitative character is characterized, in Thomas Nagel's famous words, by "what it is like" for a subject to have conscious-1 Instead of the expression 'pre-reflective self-consciousness' the expressions 'inner awareness', 'subjective character', 'sense of self' and others are also used. For an overview cf.
GPreyer.Preface.Lecture.Self-Consciousness
Self-Consciousness Theoretical Background: Philosophy of the Mental 1. Initial theoretical situation. The analytical philosophy of self-consciousness has not been adequately included within the mainstream of the philosophy of mind since the 1960s. This longstanding neglect is surprising, because the era of classical analytical theories of self-consciousness covers the period from 1966 to 1991 and has taken effect continually. These dates mark the publication of Hector-Neri Castañeda's "'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness" and the year of its author's death. One of the main subjects was the de se constraint/emphatic self-reference/essential indexicals (see, for example, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Roderick M. Chisholm, David Lewis, and, on essential indexicals, John Perry); one should also mention Sydney Shoemaker, with his critiques on the inward glance (inner sense) account. But on the other hand, such a state of affairs is not surprising because the philosophy of mind was dominated by naturalism and materialism. With the analysis of the de se constraint since the second part of the 1970s, the theory of self-consciousness has been restacked by the property theory into a critique of the propositional theory. The overall problem is that self-consciousness is pre-reflective and non-relational (irreflective), as well as non-objective (Aron Gurwitsch: anonymous field); no I is an inhabitant of this domain. The problem reference takes effect in parts of the philosophy of consciousness till the present day. We need an ontology of non-objective consciousness and subjectivity in the philosophy of the mental.
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