Euthyphro and the Semantic

Minds and Machines, 2009

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

How are the meanings of words, events, and objects represented and organized in the brain? This question, perhaps more than any other in the field, probes some of the deepest and most foundational puzzles regarding the structure of the mind and brain. Accordingly, it has spawned a field of inquiry that is diverse and multidisciplinary, has led to the discovery of numerous empirical phenomena, and has spurred the development of a wide range of theoretical positions. This special issue brings together the most recent theoretical developments from the leaders in the field, representing a range of viewpoints on issues of fundamental significance to a theory of meaning representation. Here we introduce the special issue by way of pulling out some key themes that cut across the contributions that form this issue and situating those themes in the broader literature. The core issues around which research on conceptual representation can be organized are representational format, representational content, the organization of concepts in the brain, and the processing dynamics that govern interactions between the conceptual system and sensorimotor representations. We highlight areas in which consensus has formed; for those areas in which opinion is divided, we seek to clarify the relation of theory and evidence and to set in relief the bridging assumptions that undergird current discussions.

Theoria, 2005

  has been working on problems about primarily the representational properties of mind and psychosemantics for more than four decades. One of his central concerns is the compositionality of concepts and meaning, another the conceptual nature of the human mind. Martin Jönsson and Ingar Brinck arranged to meet Fodor in Lund in March 2005 to discuss Fodor's views on these matters. The major parts of the conversation are printed below, starting with the nature of compositionality, continuing with the relation between concepts and categorisation, then turning to the conceptual capacities of animals. Finally Fodor expresses his thoughts about conceptual analysis and its role for philosophy today, viz. to construct and clarify theoretical concepts in close collaboration with the empirical sciences. University Press. F, J. A. and Z. P (1988). "Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis." Cognition 28: 3-71.

Dialogue, 1974

1997

Derek Bolton seeks to "deconstruct" a number of traditional dichotomies. Among these are the dichotomies delineated by Karl Jaspers and other early writers in the Geisteswissenschaften between meaningful and causal connections, and the correlative methodological dichotomy between hermeneutic interpretation and causal explanation. Bolton attempts to surmount these traditional dichotomies by attributing a causal role to meaning: meaning, as encoded in the brain, causes various behaviors; in particular it causes intentional or goal-directed behaviors. Bolton contends that, when fully explicated, the notion of a neuro-causal role for meaning gives rise to a new research program that he calls "cognitive-behavioral semantics." This research program can provide the theoretical basis for the science of psychopathology as well as for other psychological and social sciences. Bolton's cognitive-behavioral semantics may prove to be a fruitful research program. Like all research programs, the proof will lie in its capacity to guide scientific investigations that do in fact make new discoveries. We wonder, however, why Bolton thinks it necessary to view his program as somehow "deflating" previous distinctions among conceptual and methodological approaches. We can discern no reason to believe that the causal properties of meaning, if there are such, are the only properties of meaning: meaning may have other properties as well, properties that can be characterized only by taking conceptual approaches quite different from Bolton's. Or, expressed slightly differently, there is no reason to assume that the neurological role of meaning in causing human behavior is the sole role of meaning in human life. Consequently, Bolton's cognitive-behavioral semantics can provide only one approach to the reality of meaning, one approach among others. We see no reason to follow Bolton in his attempt to "deconstruct" other, non-causal approaches to meaning. Indeed, we think this would be a serious mistake: it would blind us to properties of meaning that could be illuminated only from those other perspectives. By reasoning in this way we are, of course, simply endorsing Jaspers' multiperspectivalism (Jaspers 1963a, 555-62; 1965, 464-70; 1956, 149-239; McHugh et al., 1986; Schwartz et al., 1988).

2006

Leonard Talmy's cognitive semantics is analyzed here in the light of the recent findings of attentional semantics . Talmy's cognitive semantics is founded on the main assumption that language is a major cognitive system in its own right, distinct from the other major ones (perception, reasoning, affect, attention, memory, cultural structure, and motor control). As such, language has some structural properties that are uniquely its own and some others that are in common with the other cognitive systems. This assumption conditions and determines in a major way Talmy's approach to the study of meaning. In fact, he is led to analyze language mainly by relating it to the other major cognitive systems, with the consequence of describing it in terms of the procedures and patterns of the particular cognitive system to which the language system is each time related. The unavoidable outcome of this way of approaching language is that Talmy puts forward as many kinds of linguistic analyses as there are major cognitive systems related to the language system. These various kinds of linguistic analyses are so different and distinct from each other that they cannot be related to each other: the negative impression is thus engendered that Talmy's work suffers, despite his intentions, from a lack of uniformity and generality, his ways of analyzing meaning being not equally and widely applicable to all linguistic instances. The alternative view of attentional semantics is presented. For attentional semantics the meanings of words are condensed, de-contextualized and "frozen" instructions on the attentional (and related non-attentional) operations one has to perform in order to consciously experience what the words refer to. Attention becomes then the unifying principle capable of relating the various and different experiential and cognitive fields, in terms of which the meanings of all the words can be analyzed.