Russia’s Cyber and Information Warfare

2023

— Russia’s use of cyber and information warfare against Ukraine has confirmed some previous assessments of Russian doctrine and capabilities and invalidated others. In both cases, observation of operations in the war to date provides valuable insights for other states and coalitions seeking to defend themselves effectively against Russia in the future. — Russia’s operations in Ukraine have provided a clear practical demonstration of the holistic and integrated nature of Russia’s approach to using information for effect in wartime conditions. This implies that potential future victims of Russian aggression should recognize the crucial interdependencies this approach exploits – not only between cyber and information activities but also between these and the physical environment and cognitive domain – and adjust defensive strategies accordingly. — In particular, information and assets not normally thought to be targets for combat operations must be protected. Private personal information captured before and during military operations has been used by Russia with lethal consequences for its subjects. — Ukraine’s successful resistance to Russian cyber campaigns has been substantially enabled by support from international partners but also, critically, from private industry. The involvement of private industry in hostilities raises issues of accountability and legal status, as well as the question of financial and other support for the organizations offering their services. These issues should be addressed as a matter of urgency so that policies are in place before they are next required. — The participation of private citizens in information activities as part of the defence of Ukraine potentially undermines the notional protection they are afforded as civilians rather than combatants. While there is no expectation that Russia will observe international humanitarian law, this has the potential to complicate eventual prosecutions for breaches of it. — This research paper offers policy recommendations for enhancing the resilience of Western states to cyber and information operations by Russia. These recommendations, by their nature, will also be relevant for protection against any other state or non-state threat actor seeking to exploit similar vulnerabilities.

Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ), 2021

The world has shifted to a digital landscape in the recent decade with both its perks and underlying threats. Russia, throughout history has experimented with its information along with cyber channels and have been able to generate fruitful results that are manifested in the contemporary era. Russian expertise towards merging cyber domain into its military capabilities is praiseworthy to the point that its Western adversaries, despite the fact being economically and technologically advanced compared to Russia, have not been able to effectively counter Russian aggression. This research examines the essentiality of cyber security as a mere software or cyber command can create instability and drastic consequences requiring millions for clean-up by examining Russian cyber-attacks on Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine, US and Western Europe and concludes that the first steps towards Cyber and Information Warfare have been made, it is now to be made sure this does not escalate into a Cyber Arms Ra...

The belief in the power of information is deeply ingrained in the minds of the Russian top leadership, which operates under the premise that public opinion can be effectively influenced in order to reach desired outcomes domestically as well as on foreign soil. Ever since the beginning of the Euromaidan demonstrations, Russia has been seeking to promote its own narrative domestically, in Ukraine, and beyond, making use of the unique features of the cyberspace. As the crisis deepened in early spring of 2014, information operations played an important role in facilitating the de facto annexation of the Crimean peninsula to the Russian Federation, as well as throughout the continuation of the crisis. This paper sets out to examine the information-related events of early 2014 with a particular focus on the annexation of Crimea. The aim is twofold. First, it provides an insight into the Russian world of ideas regarding information and its power applying the concept of information superiority and how it connects cyber and information warfare. Second, this paper exemplifies how Russia or pro-Russian entities make use of a wide array of tools and methods – kinetic, cyber, and informational – with the purpose of achieving information superiority. The paper concludes with a discussion regarding the impact of cyber within Russian Information Warfare as experienced in Ukraine.

During the last decade, 'information warfare' has become a much-politicised term in Russian domestic and foreign affairs. This article sheds light on the conceptual roots that have been shaping this idea in the Russian academic, political, and public discourse. Moreover, the article points to the major actors leading the politicisation of this idea by promoting narratives describing the so-called 'Western information war against Russia'. In the context of Russia's contemporary attempts to re-establish itself as a global power and Western fear and distress associated with Russian activities in the information domain, a grounded understanding of the major conceptual narratives influencing Russian thinking about information warfare, as well as perspectives on how these narratives have been politicised, is of paramount importance.

The culture of mass communication in Russia has been challenged by the emergence of new communication systems. This has forced the state to seek ways to adapt to today’s globalized and decentralized information sphere. The Internet penetration in Russia has grown quickly during the past decade, requiring state leaders to look for ways to master social media as a means of quick and potentially two-way communication, enabling it to be a tool for themselves and for promoting national security goals. The intention of this article is to deliver insights into how the current Russian information security policies are related to by the top strategic and operational level. In the first part, this article explores the various related policies and doctrines. The insights are then put into the context of social media narratives of President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and the practices of the Federal Security Service. This approach reveals that Russia’s top leadership recognizes the importance of social media, but struggles with the implementation of the aspects that are regarded as significant for Russia’s information security. It is argued, that Russia is recreating the traditional state-centric forms of control in the modern information space and thereby is trying to establish digital sovereignty.

2015

The challenge of Russian information warfare is not a static situation, but a developing process. The Russian approach evolves, develops, adapts, and just like other Russian operational approaches, identifies success and reinforces it, and conversely abandons failed attempts and moves on. The result is that Russia should not be expected to fight the last war when it next decides to use an information warfare component in a new conflict. In other words, those nations or organisations that think they understand Russian information warfare on the basis of current studies, and are responding by preparing for currently visible threats and capabilities, are out of date and will be surprised once again by what happens next. This paper therefore examines not only some of the conceptual underpinnings of the Russian approach to information warfare, but also new developments which to date have not been widely covered in open sources, and their potential implications for the next wave of information confrontation with Russia. [November 2015]

2019

The Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation (RF) defines the threat to information security as a complex of actions and factors that represent a danger to Russia in the information space. These threats can be informationpsychological (i.e., when the adversary tries to influence a person's mind) or information-technical (i.e., when the object of influence is the information infrastructure). The information infrastructure of the RF is a combination of information systems, websites, and communication networks located in the territory of the RF, or those used as part of international treaties signed by the RF. A cyber threat is an illegal penetration or threat of penetration by an internal or external actor into the information infrastructure of the RF to achieve political, social, or other goals. Cyber threats against Russia are increasing and becoming more diverse. The Russian assessment of the cyber threat contains the same besieged fortress narrative as the country's other threat assessments do. In this narrative, Russia is surrounded by hostile states and non-state actors in cyberspace. The sources of the cyber threat are Western intelligence services, terrorists, extremist movements, and criminals. To protect itself against cyber threats, Russia is increasing its digital sovereignty by preparing to isolate the Russian segment of the Internet, RUNET, from the global Internet. Russia is also improving the protection of its critical information infrastructure. To protect itself against cyber threats but also to monitor the opposition, Russia has increased surveillance of RUNET and banned user anonymity. Russia is also making an effort to replace imported information and communication technology (ICT) with Russian production. This paper discuss Russia's defense against cyber threats. After the introduction, the paper begins with a description of the Russian cyber threat perception. The main section then discusses Russia's response to this threat. This study uses grounded theory, an appropriate method for this subject because little theoretical and structured information has, to date, been published on the Russian response to cyber threats. The study data are drawn from official Russian documents such as strategies, doctrines, laws, and presidential decrees.

Since March 2014, European countries are facing massive disinformation campaigns originating from the Russian Federation. Information warfare itself cannot be considered as a new phenomenon in armed conflicts, however in today’s information era, the Internet and the social media have provide information warfare with a new battleground, where the main target groups are not militaries, but the minds of civilians. Russian behaviour became more and more aggressive and its origins can be traced back to 2007.