Translator's Introduction, Modernity and Plato

Studies in the history of philosophy of mind, 2016

In our everyday dealings with ourselves, other persons and the world, we commonly take our selves, or the entities signifi ed by our employment of the fi rst-personal pronoun 'I' in simple assertoric sentences such as 'I am', 'I think', or 'I am walking', to be the uncontroversial loci of our experiences of being, knowing, and acting. But when we glance at contemporary literature on the philosophy of mind and action, on a steady increase for much of the twentieth and the present century in naturalist , analytic , and phenomenological approaches alike, we fi nd that few of the intuitions we may have about that fi rst-personal pivot actually stand uncontested. In fact, it rather seems that if there is one connecting thread in the variety of discussion, this must the dissatisfaction with the so-called Cartesian paradigm and its claim to epitomize some of those very intuitions. Typically presented as standard for the early modern period, the paradigm stems from Descartes' alleged notion of a substantial soul which is immediately and irrefutably aware of itself and its action, and which, as an immaterial entity independent of the mechanistic processes taking place in the body, is in full control of all operations that are properly called its own. In this caricature form, the Cartesian dualistic approach to the self has been criticized as incapable of dealing with the nuances of our inextricably embodied and socialized consciousness that is thoroughly and complexly conditioned by its surroundings. By the same token, the conception of the acting and involved self as a mere aggregate of self-aware thinking and willing, considered as a primitive and unanalysable brute datum, has been deemed too narrow on both phenomenological and metaphysical grounds. Furthermore, it threatens

University of Patras, International Conference: "Self-Consciousness", 28th-29th June., 2013

One of the main insights of the book is that of putting together the principal thought of German Idealism that self-consciousness, reason and freedom are one;

Telos, 1981

TELOS imbalance. 5 It is thus with respect to practical reason that he wants to "hold on to the intentions of the Enlightenment." Anti-humanism, which is becoming increasingly chic as the world grows progressively more inhuman, maintains that the crisis of modernity cannot be resolved through the fulfillment of the modern project because that project itself is the root of the crisis. The anti-humanists argue that the central categories of European humanist thought, i.e., the subject, historical progress, meaning, etc., are myths that must be abandoned if the contemporary crisis is to be resolved. 6 In his excellent account of this movement, Dallmayr summarizes the anti-humanist position: "Seen from this vantage point, the malaise of modern, contemporary life can be traced, either directly or indirectly, to its anthropocentric and subjectivist thrust, or its focus on the thinking subject; according to some, the malaise has already reached a crisis stage with the result that the 'end' or 'death of man' is imminent (if not an accomplished fact). Spokesmen differ as to the nature of proposed antidotes or substitutes for modern subjectivity and individuality; but a preferred (though not uniformly endorsed) remedy consists in a radical shift of attention, aimed at dislocating or 'decentering' man in favor of overarching structures of systematic relations." 7 Granted the dilemmas of subjectivistic epistemology or morality can only be resolved by unraveling the dialectics of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. But this is not what anti-humanists have in mind. What they advocate, instead, is a one-sided emphasis on the "overarching structures of systematic relations" that tends to exclude the subject. What the anti-humanists offer as an alternative is simply a celebration of one of the central tendencies of modernity, i.e., the absolutization of instrumental reasons. They reflect in theory what the capitalist rationalization is accomplishing in practice: the eclipse of the subject by the "overarching structures" of a reified world. This is not to say that the concept of the subject is without difficulties. Let us consider, for example, the following observation by Hans Loewald concerning the relation of psychoanalysis to the individual: "With reference to the problem of individuation and the status of the individual, psychoanalysis appears to be in an awkward position. On the one hand, it seems to stand and fall with the proposition that the emergence of a relatively autonomous individual is the culmination of human development. How this may come about and what interferes with such an outcome, resulting in psychopathology, is a most important aspect of psychoanalytic research, reconstruction and treatment.... On the other hand, in part owing to 5. Joel Whitebook, "The Problem of Nature in Habermas," Telos, 40 (Summer 1979), pp. 6Sff. 6. The charge that these categories are nothing but the unreflected prejudices of 19th-century Europe is a bit peculiar. They are no more the prejudices of 19th-century Europe than the ideas that truth must be supra-individual and atemporal, which the anti-humanists dogmatically presuppose, are the prejudices of 6th-century B.C. Greece.

2017

A History if Western Thought is a comprehensive introduction to the history of Western philosophy from the pre-Socratics to the twentieth century. Along with in-depth discussion of all the major philosophical movements, Skirhekk and Gilje also look at the historical factors that have influenced Western philosophy, including the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities, as well as political ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and fascism. A History C!i Western Thought is an ideal introduction to philosophy and the sociological and scientific structures that have shaped modern philosophy. Contents AcknowledBements Translator'sforeword collaboration that we have had during this project. I would also like to thank Judith Larsen for her helpful comments on the manuscript. Special thanks go to Vivian, Kai, and Aila, who gave me the time and freedom to work on this project. This is for them.

Care of the self in early Greek philosophy, 2012

The ancient Greek notion of “care of the self” and the self-knowledge it presupposes is premised on the concept of introspection. Introspection obviously involves “consciousness”; more precisely, it implies a “conscious” notion of the “self.” Consciousness itself can be notorious difficult to define and explain. In this paper, I examine some of the historical precedents for “caring for the self” as we find them in Plato’s earlier dialogues, notably the Apology, and the kind of consciousness it presupposes. This was an invited paper for a panel on “Care of the self in early Greek philosophy” organized by Annie Larivée for the 80th Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New Brunswick, May 2011. I’ve added a few references to my more recent work on the topic.

the physical sciences, history of society and ethics, and philosophy which for them would be standard for producing a well rounded and educated citizen.

The execution of Socrates at the hands of the Athenian democracy and the philosophical reactions to it have formed what is known as western thought. Despite the profound beauty of this philosophy, to be able to rebel against its deeply entrenched oppressive mechanisms that dominate contemporary everyday lives one must first learn it. In my introduction to Plato, we explore questions like How can something BE and NOT BE at the same time? What are the psychological dynamics involved in getting a person to focus attention on first principles rather than on the titillating fascinating particulars that absorb us most of our lives? What is Plato's perception of justice, time, love, and virtue - and how do they all relate to Plato's moral absolutism? This course was and is taught at Spandau's community college in Berlin since Autumn 2018. Feel free to join me in this intellectual journey.

One of the most noticeable aspects of Plato’s dramatization of Socrates in the Apology is that many themes of philosophical relevance emerge by way of a series of self-images that Socrates crafts throughout the defence speech he delivers at the trial held against him in 399 B.C. Coming to grips with such images may turn out to be a particularly baffling experience for the Platonic reader, especially when one attempts to draw a coherent picture of Socrates’ personality and conduct at the trial in the light of the various forms of self-representation proposed in the text. In fact, one might entertain the impression that different voices and attitudinal approaches are unleashed from one and the same character, and also that these might not provide an internally consistent portrait of his own professed values, abilities, and epistemological limitations. For instance, some images convey the idea of a shameless and boastful Socrates (cf. Apology 30d and 31a, where he describes himself as a gift of god, or 28b-29d, where he compares his own condition to the one experienced by the Homeric hero Achilles), whereas others express the view that Socrates is a man aware of his own limits and, what is more, one respectful of divine signs and messages (cf. 21b). I will offer a tentative reconstruction of some of such self-images and argue that, despite the fact that these are prima facie open to opposing interpretations, Plato supplies his readers with some conceptual tools for understanding the following idea: the Socrates of his Apology, rather than aiming to present himself as a boastful character, seeks to express the non-negotiable value of truth and philosophical examination, i.e. ideals he endorses and exemplifies in his individual life. In this way, I hope to demonstrate that Socrates’ respect of cultural and religious traditions can be pursued compatibly with the innovations introduced by epistemic devices such as the elenchos and the critical comparisons he stages between the self-perception cultivated by others and Socrates’ own awareness of his wisdom.