Save the Meat for Cats: Why It's Wrong to Eat Roadkill

This paper discusses Peter Singer's strict ethical vegetarianism. I argue that utilitarianism does not provide sufficient grounds for vegetarianism to be presented as an ethical obligation. I argue that the boycott style of vegetarianism advocated by Singer is not an effective means of reducing the suffering experienced by animals and, finally, demonstrate that the proper application of the principle of utility to our dietary choices requires the consumption of both ethically sourced meats and roadkill.

Between the Species, 2008

In Konstantinos Boudouris (Ed.) Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy. Athens: Greek Philosophical Society, 2018

There is a teeth-biting debate between vegetarianism and non-vegetarianism on human obligations towards animals. Vegetarianism appeals for equal and ethical treatment for animals whereas non-vegetarianism simply denies any such treatments considering that animals do not have a sense of morality. Non-vegetarianism seems to be ignoring some obligatory duties towards animals and undermines ethical arguments for animal rights. It does not provide sound reason for why humans should deliberately kill animals, painlessly or with least harm, for their own sake. It also overlooks the world economic situation of global hunger in which the use of the total food resources and distribution in terms of nutrition would be much more equitable if everyone was a vegetarian. This paper argues against non-vegetarianism and defends vegetarianism by making a claim that we do have moral obligations of certain kinds towards animals same as we have moral obligations towards us in terms of natural right to survival.

Between the Species: An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals, 1995

Food Ethics, 2022

New omnivorism is a term coined by Andy Lamey to refer to arguments that-paradoxically-our duties towards animals require us to eat some animal products. Lamey's claim to have identified a new, distinctive position in food ethics is problematic, however, for some of his interlocutors are not new (e.g., Leslie Stephen in the nineteenth century), not distinctive (e.g., animal welfarists), and not obviously concerned with eating animals (e.g., plant neurobiologists). It is the aim of this paper to bolster Lamey's argument that he has identified a novel, unified, and intriguing position (or set of positions) in animal ethics and the philosophy of food. We distinguish new omnivorism from four other non-vegan positions and then differentiate three versions of new omnivorism based on the kinds of animal products they propose we consume. We conclude by exploring a range of argumentative strategies that could be deployed in response to the new omnivore.

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2013

Winners of the rst prize of the 2012 essay competition for students sponsored by the Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie (GAP) in cooperation with the Grazer Philosophische Studien* Summary e purpose of this article, which takes the form of a dialogue between a vegetarian and a meat eater, is twofold. On the one hand, we argue for a general characterisation of moral value in terms of well-being and su ering. On the other hand, on the basis of this characterisation, we argue that, in most cases, the moral value attached to the choice of eating meat is negative; in particular, we defend this claim against a number of objections concerning the nature of animal su ering, its moral value, and the moral responsibility of meat eaters. "When we lift our forks, we hang our hats somewhere" (Foer, 2009, 132) " e question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they su er?" (Bentham, 1789, chapter XVII) * e question of the 2012 competition was: "Are we allowed to eat animals?" From the 53 submissions that conformed to the rules of the competition, the jury selected three, one each for the rst, second, and third prize. e authors of the prizewinning essays were permitted to slightly revise and expand their submission for publication. uncorrected proof nicht korrigierte Fahne 258 In what follows, Mechoui, a meat eater, and Kardamon, a vegetarian, discuss the question of eating animals from a moral point of view. Mechoui: ese cheeseburgers are really delicious; are you sure you do not want one? Kardamon: I am sure they taste good; but I am also quite sure that eating animals is morally problematic, to say the least. Mechoui: And apparently you even think that it is bad. How would you defend this position? Kardamon: We could start from the generally accepted idea that su ering is bad (i.e. has a negative moral value) and that well-being is good (i.e. has a positive moral value). On that basis, we could characterise a good behaviour as one which improves the state of someone (towards more well-being or less su ering), and a bad behaviour as one that worsens the state of someone (towards less well-being or more su ering). Mechoui: You are talking about individuals su ering, but some of the individuals that are relevant to our moral question are animals (more precisely, non-human animals). It is not obvious that animals su er in the same way as humans, or even that they su er at all (see e.g. Descartes 1637, part V; Nagel 1974; Wittgenstein 1953, 174). Kardamon: Animal su ering is indeed a controversial issue. Let us rst consider the claim that animals do not su er at all. It seems that a necessary and su cient condition for being able to su er is to be a sentient being, and that a necessary and su cient condition for being a sentient being is to be equipped with a sufciently developed nervous system. us, since at least some animals meet this condition, at least some animals can su er. Mechoui: What you are saying suggests not only that at least certain animals can su er, but also that other individuals, like plants, cannot su er. Kardamon: Exactly. And this is why, for instance, it is not incoherent to choose not to eat animals on ethical grounds, while still eating vegetables. Let us now consider the claim that animals can su er, but not in the same way as we do. People who endorse this position seem to suggest that there is

Ethical consequentialist vegetarians believe that farmed animals have lives that are worse than non-existence. In this paper, I sketch out an argument that wild animals have worse lives than farmed animals, and that consistent vegetarians should therefore reduce the number of wild animals as a top priority. I consider objections to the argument, and discuss which courses of action are open to those who accept the argument.

2017

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