India's nuclear doctrine: Stasis or dynamism
ali ahmed2019, OUP Karachi
Sign up for access to the world's latest research
Abstract
India’s official nuclear doctrine, adopted by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on January 4, 2003, has an expansive intent of inflicting unacceptable retaliatory damage of levels characterized in the doctrine as ‘massive’ to any form of nuclear first use against India or its forces anywhere (Prime Minister’s Office 2003). The doctrinal tenet in full is: ‘Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage (ibid).’ The primary argument for this formulation is that India believes nuclear weapons are a ‘political instrument of deterrence’ (Sethi 2009, 126). Admittedly, the intent to go ‘massive’ in retaliation should ordinarily deter. As against this, the critique has it that the threat of retaliation at massive levels lacks credibility (Sethi 2009, xxii, 125), particularly if the provocation for retaliation is of a lower order using tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). To buttress the critique, the usual illustration is intruding Indian forces being met by a Pakistani TNW attack. In light of Pakistan’s higher number of nuclear weapons, it could retaliate in kind. Critics have it that India would be hard put to follow through with its retaliatory intent as declared, as to do so would be disproportionate and escalatory (Ahmed 2014, 158). In light of continuing India-Pakistan hostility, this is no longer an unlikely scenario. The critique therefore requires a plausible doctrinal answer. However, there has been no change in the official nuclear doctrine of India over the past decade and half. This is puzzling, reflecting as it does either a deficit in nuclear learning or that even as India’s declaratory nuclear doctrine remains stagnant overtly and nuclear doctrinal change has been kept outside the open domain. Nuclear ambiguity has overtaken India’s nuclear doctrinal glasnost of the turn of the century. In this chapter, nuclear opacity (Prakash 2014, 6-7) notwithstanding, the finding is that India’s official nuclear doctrine of 2003 stands superseded in light of doctrinal innovation. There is apparently a move towards a warfighting nuclear doctrine and posture, albeit one to cover the deterrence deficit identified. Since secrecy attends India’s operational doctrine (Kampani 2014), a definitive answer is precluded. This is reason enough to interrogate India’s nuclear doctrine.
