Russian and US policies on the INF Treaty endanger arms control
Petr Topychkanov2018
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Abstract
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This paper discusses the implications of Russian and US policies regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, highlighting the threats posed to arms control by developments in missile defense systems and the geopolitical dynamics between the two powers. It examines Russia's reactions to US missile defense strategies, particularly in Europe, and the potential strategic adjustments that Russia may implement as a result. The analysis sheds light on the broader context of nuclear deterrence and highlights the challenges facing future arms control agreements.
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