Political Philosophy

Nwogu Peter, 2025

Hobbes's political theory begins with his representation of the state of nature, a hypothetical condition in which individuals exist without a formal government or social contract. He argues that in this natural state, individuals are driven by self-preservation and are inherently in conflict with one another. This leads to a “war of all against all,” where life is characterized by constant fear, insecurity, and violence. According to Hobbes, human beings are motivated by basic instincts and desires, including the pursuit of self-interest and the avoidance of harm. To escape the chaos of the state of nature, Hobbes proposes the formation of a social contract, in which individuals collectively agree to surrender certain freedoms and submit to a sovereign authority. This sovereign he called “Leviathan," possesses absolute power to maintain order and enforce laws. The social contract, therefore, is the foundation of political legitimacy and social cohesion. His social contract theory and advocacy for absolute sovereignty remain central to debates in political philosophy and theory.

This article explores the concept and function of power in the philosophy and politics of Thomas Hobbes and the ways in which he has subsequently been read and used. We look at how fear of violent death structures the contract model and how Hobbes mobilizes a spectacle of fear, a 'lesson of fear', to legitimate his system and convince his readers and we discuss his political psychology and the anthropological foundation of his thinking situating man as the eminently dangerous and killable being. Man is basically exposed and vulnerable and this is both the foundation and the selling point of his system. We then move onto his nominalism and the right of interpretation and naming as the premier attribute of sovereignty. It is a monopoly on decision and interpretation rather than violence which preoccupies Hobbes and defines his sovereign. Just like the fragility of flesh is used creatively so is religion both the problem and the solution. Hobbes develops a political theology using a minimalist and politicized definition of religion to block the attempts of religious scholars and proselytes to use religion against the sovereign but he also acknowledges the power of religion to persuade and legitimate so he inscribes the sovereign, the Leviathan, the mortal God, within a religious vocabulary and mysticism. Deep within his mechanistic philosophy a mystic religious core pulses. Hobbes' solution throughout is to turn the problem and source of disorder into the solution and foundation of order. This article explores how he did that.

Most discussions of Hobbes' political thought leave one with the impression that Hobbes' most important contribution to political theory is the contractual nature of his commonwealth from which the modern social contract and many discussions of contemporary political theory emerge. Adopting this perspective on Hobbes' political thought risks losing sight of the philosophy of politics he develops. This philosophy not only draws on a realist attitude toward human political motivation, but it also takes a position on the place of politics in culture, and redefines the horizons of culture to emphasize the role of religion within it, at times drawing on and echoing classical Jewish sources. In Leviathan, politics inherits the classical role of religion as the determining force of this cultural horizon. Political theology legitimizes the sovereign not only politically, but culturally. Liberal political theory has for over two centuries assumed the question of religion and politics to be settled. This article proposes that this question be reconsidered in light of liberalism's foundational philosophy.

2017

In the course of knowledge, the aspect that gives enlightenment about a state, government, politics, liberty, justice and authority by exploring the question that come up in any of these aspects and tries to come up with recommendations to minimize friction and conflict in a state is commonly referred to as Political Philosophy. Overtime, the definition of political philosophy has been modified to suit different eras and epochs but it remains unchanged on the premise that it gives stance to how a state should be set up, what system of government minimizes conflict and ensures inclusiveness within a polity as well as summarize the rights and duties of individuals within the state. Many scholars have been brought to limelight through their ideological stance on what is or what ought to be in a state, before it can said to enjoy governance and authority and the boundary between the right of the governed and the governor and some of these ideals have been criticized on various ethical, moral philosophical and religious grounds but these scholars have made their mark as far as the field of Political philosophy by bringing forth their ideological thoughts, one of such scholar is Thomas Hobbes.

Hobbesian Internationalism, 2019

The fundamental problem of political philosophy—Why should there be a state?—supposes both a definition of the state and an argument for its justification. The central thesis of this book is that Hobbes formulates this problem as a relation between authority and anarchy—or what Hobbes calls a ‘state of nature’—and not between authority and some more basic moral principles. This latter approach to state justification is endorsed by the majority of contemporary political philosophers. This chapter will explicate these two alternative approaches by focussing on the concept of authority. This will prepare the ground for discussing the complex set of arguments on the state of nature that Hobbes presents in his major writings on morality and politics: The Elements, De Cive, and Leviathan.

Open Journal of Philosophy, 2015

The purpose of the state and its apparatus right from the formation of human society to this contemporary period is still being confronted with the question of legitimacy. One of the major reasons why the state is formed is for the attainment of good life of the citizens. The institution of the state would thus remain legitimate only when those who are in political authority perform basic functions of government to meet the expectations of the members of the society. To this end, this paper examines the concept of consent and consensus as a foundation for the justification of the emergence of the state and argue that if there is no mutual agreement within the society, there can be little or no way of ensuring peaceful resolution of policy differences that is associated with the democratic process. Consequent upon this, the paper adopts Thomas Hobbes social contract theory as a theoretical framework to explain the origin of the state and justify the absolute power of the government which is rooted in the consent and the consensus of the people. The philosophical methods of conceptual clarification and critical analysis are employed to examine Hobbes political theory and evaluate its relevance to the contemporary society.

Evidence accumulated from a range of academic disciplines can, and ought to, be used by political theorists to evaluate the seminal works of their field. This essay attempts to demonstrate the merits of this approach by utilizing empirical evidence from anthropology, archaeology, criminology, history, political science coupled with a sociobiological perspective to evaluate three of the central propositions Hobbesian political theory namely that (a) individuals are solitary beings that focus on maximizing personal felicity; (b) life is more violent without centralized government (the Leviathan) than it is with it and; (c) there can be no rational reason for returning to pre-Leviathan times or the ‘state of nature’ given (b). Though (a) stands in contradiction to what we now know about humanity’s universal inclination towards sociability, there is nevertheless considerable empirical evidence which suggests that violence – which occurred not just over somatic resources, as Hobbes originally predicted, but also over reproductive opportunities – in the ‘state of nature’ was both endemic and lethal. Even though (b) is fairly well-established, however, it does not follow that (c) should always be true: a potent criticism that can be made of Hobbes is his insensitivity towards issues such as immediate social deprivation that have often caused people to rebel against the Leviathan and thus return to the state of nature.

Teoria Politica, 2012

Contemporary debates on obedience and consent, such as those between Thomas Senor and A. John Simmons, suggest that either political obligation must exist as a concept or there must be natural duty of justice accessible to us through reason. Without one or the other, de facto political institutions would lack the requisite moral framework to engage in legitimate coercion. This essay suggests that both are unnecessary in order to provide a conceptual framework in which obedience to coercive political institutions can be understood. By providing a novel reading of Hobbes's Leviathan, this article argues that both political obligation and a natural duty to justice are unnecessary to ground the ability of political institutions to engage in legitimate coercion. This essay takes issue with common readings of Hobbes which assume consent is necessary to generate obedience on the part of citizens, and furthermore that political obligation is critical for the success of political institutions. While the failure of the traditional Hobbesian narrative of a consenting individual would seem to suggest the Leviathan is indefensible as a project, this paper argues that the right of war in the state of nature was more central for Hobbes's understanding of political institutions than obligation. Furthermore, Hobbes provides an adequate defense of political institutions even if his arguments about consent, obligation and punishment are only rhetorical. In this way Hobbesian law is best understood as a set of practical requirements to avoid war, and not as moral requirements that individuals are bound to comply with. Thus Hobbesian political institutions are not vulnerable to contemporary philosophical anarchist criticisms about political obligation and political institutions as such. To develop this reading, I focus primarily on the Leviathan, including interpretations by Skinner, Kateb, Flathman, and Oakeshott. Ultimately, this argument provides insight into contemporary political institutions of the state, citizenship, criminality, and the law in a world where political obligation has not been adequately justified.

Hobbes Studies, 2022

This article identifies an argument in Hobbes’s writings often overlooked but relevant to current philosophical debates. Political philosophers tend to categorize his thought as representing consent or rescue theories of political authority. Though these interpretations have textual support and are understandable, they leave out one of his most compelling arguments—what we call the lesser evil argument for political authority, expressed most explicitly in Chapter 20 of Leviathan. Hobbes frankly admits the state’s evils but appeals to the significant disparity between those evils and the greater evils outside the state as a basis for political authority. More than a passing observation, aspects of the lesser evil argument appear in each of his three major political works. In addition to outlining this argument, the article examines its significance both for Hobbes scholarship and recent philosophical debates on political authority.