THE UNITED STATES, POKHRAN-II AND SOUTH ASIA

1998

This report, which will be updated periodically, presents background and analysis of the nuclear tests conducted by India on May 11 and 13, 1998, and by Pakistan on May 28 and 30, 1998. The report explores the regional context of the tests, including the long-standing India-Pakistan rivalry and domestic considerations that may have contributed to the two nations' decisions to test, as well as ongoing U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. The report also examines the technical aspects of the tests and their effect on the global nuclear nonproliferation regime particularly the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The final sections identify applicable U.S. sanctions under the Arms Export Control Act and other U.S. legislation, assess the implications for U.S. interests, and posit three broad policy options for the Administration and Congress, and take note of legislation relating to nuclear sanctions.

2007

2019

The nuclear politics of South Asiain the context of the protracted India-Pakistan conflicthas become one of the most debated topic of contemporary international systems analysis. During the four decades long US-USSR Cold War rivalry, South Asia was an epicentre of great power politics. The standing of New Delhi and Islamabad and their hostile relationship proved centrally important in the wider context of extra-regional power between the United States and Soviet Union. The importance of both India and Pakistan in the Cold War resulted in the US active involvement in the region and placed eventually both India and Pakistan with the United States. The proliferation of overt nuclear weapons in South Asia further intensified the role of United States in the politics of nuclearized subcontinent. The opening of complex bilateral relations by President Bill Clinton and initiation of a global war on terror by President George W. Bush marked a new chapter in the history of subcontinent for both of the principal contestants of South Asia. Subsequently, the administrations of Obama and Trump continued the policy of bilateralism and generated a plan of de-hyphenation for New Delhi and Islamabad by establishing separate relations with India and Pakistan. The strategic consequences of the US bilateral policy intensified the American role in South Asia, moving India closer to the US, while critically reexamining and re-evluating the standing of Pakistan in the region simultaneously. Hence, the trilateral strategic relations between the United States, India, and Pakistan structured an American South Asian policy that proved ultimately to be perplexing. Indo-US and Pak-US complex relations have proven to be complex and, in past, reflect a dichotomy in American South Asian relations. Now, it is difficult to separate the American role from strategic competition of India and Pakistan. This dissertation is an effort to provide a scholarly dimension to the American South Asian engagement, which encompasses a complex and an extensive record of cooperative and estranged diplomatic interaction. Moreover, this study is an attempt to comprehend the triangular relationship of ii power between these. The theoretical conception of neorealism is applied to understand the South Asian nuclear arms race and its persistent growth in the presence of extra-regional powers. The interconnectedness of South Asian regional subsystem to greater international system carried the debate in this research which attempted to emphasize particularly the US engagement with India and Pakistan. In the end, the research endeavoured to craft a proposed the future scenarios of US South Asian engagement.

Asian Review of Social Sciences, 2019

India and the United States have long historical, diplomatic, strategic and cultural linkages. Since the genesis of the Indo-US engagement in the international politics, the issues relating to nuclear aspects have been a great source of divergence and convergence between the two countries. This relation is mostly revolve around the three major shifts; Pokhran-I (1974), Pokhran-II (1998) and Civilian Nuclear deal (2005).However, before the signing of civil nuclear deal, both the countries had many clashes for not signing India in NPT and CTBT. However, this paper focuses on the evolution of India-US nuclear relations since past and also discuss how US response to nuclear tests that India had conducted. It also concludes the agreements that led to the cordial relations between the two countries at present.

The Nonproliferation Review, 2020

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been one of the most successful international security institutions. However, its success was not inevitable and in fact it faced a serious threat only a few years after it came into force in 1970. India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) in May 1974 rocked the nuclear nonproliferation regime and cast doubt on the NPT. And yet in the two years after the PNE, several significant countries ratified the treaty. Why did states that had been notable holdouts from the NPT, like Italy, Japan, and South Korea, ratify the treaty soon after the Indian nuclear test? This paper finds that the PNE galvanized pro-NPT forces in the US and Canada, leading to changes in nonproliferation policy. In particular, it led them to threaten to withhold access to nuclear technology and materials unless the holdouts ratified the NPT. It also motivated Henry Kissinger to change his secret advice to Japan that the US did not want Japan to ratify the NPT in order to keep the People's Republic of China unsure about Japan's nuclear intentions.

Strategic Analysis, 2018

The history of the US–Soviet and US–Russian dialogues on the nuclear weapons programme of India can be divided into two major periods: First, from Pokhran I up to the end of the 1990s, when Moscow and Washington shared concerns regarding India’s nuclear programme, and even their bilateral disagreements in international affairs did not stop them from reaching a consensus on how to react to the 1974 nuclear test. Second, from late 1990s to 2000s, when the growing mistrust between Russia and the US made joint actions in response to Pokhran II almost impossible, despite shared non-proliferation goals.

Center for International Strategic Studies, 2018

India demonstrated its nuclear prowess, for the first time, in May 1974, though it chose to call that nuclear explosive test a 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosion' (PNE). This characterization served to alleviate international pressure and sanctions, and provided a convenient smoke screen for the global powers to react mildly to this development. The other reason for India to not declare itself as a nuclear weapons power in 1974, was the fact that it did not possess requisite nuclear delivery systems, except a few WW-II vintage Canberra bombers. It also did not have the wherewithal to establish an effective and operationally viable nuclear command and control structure. It, therefore, feared that if it prematurely declared its nuclear status, it might be subjected to a pre-emptive Chinese strike. India's focus, then, shifted to greater investments in its space and missile programs. It initiated, in 1983, an Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) aimed at producing an anti-tank missile Nag, a short range surface to air missile Trishul, a medium range surface to air missile Aakash and, most importantly, a short range nuclear capable ballistic missile Prithvi as well as a medium range nuclear capable ballistic missile Agni. India later added a Cruise missile BrahMos (a joint Russian-Indian venture) and longer range versions of Agni series of missiles with Agni five approaching the ICBM range. It has also tested Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and has been experimenting with a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program, for over a decade now. Once space and missile capabilities started to mature, India felt confident enough to bring its nuclear weapons capability out of the closet. During Narasimha Rao's premiership, India had planned to conduct another nuclear test which, was scheduled in December 1995. "Pakistan had proposed a Comprehensive Restraint Regime, based on nuclear restraint, along with conventional balance and resolution of disputes, from as far back as October 1998, and had renewed its offer when the Comprehensive Dialogue resumed in 2004 and in later rounds of talks as well." However, the preparations, for the test, were picked up by American satellites and the Rao government had to abandon the test under US pressure. Then in the spring of 1996, during his short stint in Prime Minister's office, lasting 15 days, Vajpayee had instructed Abdul Kalam and Chidambram to go ahead with the nuclear tests but that plan had to be abandoned due to his failure to win the vote of confidence for his government in the parliament. Even I.K.Gujral, commonly perceived as a pacifist, had also toyed with the idea of a nuclear test to boost his political fortunes.

The bilateral relationship has a history of being influenced by US policies towards India's neighbours and India's policy of non-alignment and its relations with the erstwhile Soviet Union. Nations are seen firm for rapid progress and economic competition which can no longer pay for the price of war, leaving alone a nuclear war. The relations between the United States and India can be viewed through the identical lenses of the nuclear non-proliferation and civil nuclear deal. Nuclear weapons are an essential part of India’s national security and will remain so, until non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament. The bilateral relation between India and US is reaching new epoch but on the other hand, NPT regime got a terrific setback after the recent commencement of the Indo-US nuclear deal as India being the non-signatory to the NPT.

In 1974 India conducted its first nuclear blast at Pokhran in the Thar Desert, a so-called “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion,” sometimes referred to as Pokhran I. This event motivated the United States and the international community to promulgate several regimes to retard India’s weapons development program and to limit further horizontal proliferation. India again startled the world in May 1998 when it renewed testing at Pokhran. New Delhi’s dismantling of an established nuclear status quo discomfited nonproliferation proponents as they anxiously awaited Islamabad’s response. Oddly, the 1998 blasts were nearly universally characterized as “unexpected.” Yet what is so surprising about New Delhi’s 1998 blasts is that they were indeed so surprising.