Similar Fact Evidence

We are being asked to consider the law relating to: admissibility of similar fact evidence in Maldives, and to make any appropriate recommendations for reform. For the purpose of this assignment similar fact evidence may be defined as 'evidence that the accused has, before or after the facts alleged in the instant charge, acted in similar way to that charged'. In this assignment I will be mainly focus on three parts. Initially, what is similar fact evidence and how it has been developed in English law. Secondly, how far some other jurisdictions have given weigh for similar fact evidence. Finally, my opinion on admissibility of similar fact evidence in Maldives and the reasoning.

International Journal of Engineering Technology Research & Management, 2017

Relevancy and admissibility are two popular concepts of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. For literal and common understanding both appear as same. However, principles of evidence attach different meanings and have different objectives underneath the concepts. The author here tries to elucidate the concepts with cases laws, for the beginners of laws.

The "res gestae" doctrine is the term used, to sum up, relevance and admissibility in the Law of Evidence, and it refers to acts, declarations, and circumstances consisting of or explaining a fact or transaction in question. An illustration can be drawn from the cases of Lwanga Versus. Uganda 1 and Kinyatti Versus. Republic 2. In Lwanga Versus. Uganda the appellant contested his four-year imprisonment by the lower court for simple robbery, after evidence was presented in court that he with other accused persons beat a one Mutambuze Farouk with sticks and robbed him of a chequebook from Housing Finance Bank and nine million Ugandan shillings in cash. The appellant argued that the trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to properly evaluate the evidence on court record; relying on prosecution evidence; and relying on irrelevant evidence to prosecute him. The Appellant argued that the trial magistrate took note of the notoriety of the offence of robbery to sentence the appellant to argue that the trial magistrate prosecuted him on irrelevant evidence. The court found in favour of the lower court saying that the trial magistrate was taking note of the facts which he was entitled to according to the law. More so according to the oath made by the appellant, Mutambuze Farouk did a screening of five people, one of whom was the appellant, and the appellant admitted to receipt of 1,500,000 Ugandan Shillings of the stolen money, an admission he also made to police. Additionally, the appellant was placed at the scene of the crime by the evidence of Mutambuze Farouk and investigating officer Alice Nabirye, and the appellant failed to forward an alibi. In the case of Kinyatti Versus. Republic the appellant was a Senior Lecturer in the History Department at Kenyatta University College and was arrested after the police found a seditious document while conducting a search of his study room and was charged via Section 57(2) of the Penal Code for being in possession of a seditious document. Counsel for the appellant argued that the Trial Magistrate and High Court Justices had erroneously taken the statement of his wife that everything in the study was the

In Subedar & Ors. v. King-Emperor [AIR 1924 All. 207] it was held that a statement made by the accused implicating himself and others cannot be called ‘first information report’. However it was held that though it could not be treated as first information report but could be used as information furnished under section 27 of Evidence Act. It was held thus : “The approver and one of the appellants were arrested practically red-handed. They made statements to the officer who arrested them involving admissions of guilt. They went further and gave a list of the other members of the gang. Thereupon the officer made a report in writing to his superior, containing the information which he had received, including the names of those other persons received from the two men arrested. Somehow or other, the learned Judge has described this police report, which is merely the report of a confession, as “the first information report.” Now the first information report is a well known technical description of a report under section 154, Criminal Procedure Code, giving first information of a cognizable crime. This is usually made by the complainant, or by some one on his behalf. The language is inapplicable to a statement made by the accused. The novelty of a statement by an accused person being called the first information report was to me so strange, that when counsel for the appellants addressed the argument to me attacking the Judge’s use of the first information report, I took no notice of the argument. The learned Judge realized that he was dealing with a confession, but he momentarily failed to appreciate that the document itself was inadmissible, and that the only way in which the information relied upon could be used was by section 27. That is to say, with regard to the other accused, the officer giving evidence might say : “I arrested them in consequence of information received from Narain and Thakuri. When I arrested them they made a statement to me which caused me to arrest these people”. The use which can legitimately be made of such information is merely this, that when direct evidence is given against the accused at the trial and there was evidence against the accused, it is open to the defence to check such evidence by asking whether the name of a particular accused was mentioned or not at the time….” 20. Considering the aforesaid dictums, it is apparent that there was discovery of a fact as per the statement of Mehmood Ali and Mohd. Firoz. Co-accused was nabbed on the basis of identification made by the accused Mehboob and Firoz. He was dealing with fake currency notes came to the knowledge of police through them. Recovery of forged currency notes was also made from Anju Ali. Thus the aforesaid accused had the knowledge about co-accused Anju Ali who was nabbed at their instance and on the basis of their identification. These facts were not to the knowledge of the Police hence the statements of the accused persons leading to discovery of fact are clearly admissible as per the provisions contained in section 27 of the Evidence Act which carves out an exception to the general provisions about inadmissibility of confession made under police custody contained in sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.808 OF 2010 Mehboob Ali & Anr. … Appellants Vs. State of Rajasthan … Respondent [With Crl.A. No. 1088 of 2010] Dated;October 27, 2015

The 94 th report of the Law Commission of India delves into the arena of evidences which have been taken illegally or improperly and how such illegality would affect the admissibility of these evidence. Indeed the report raises the question on whether such illegality in collecting the evidences actually even affects the admissibility of the evidence.

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 2012

Stephen's groundbreaking Indian Evidence Act contained ideas that appear unfamiliar in the context of modern rules of evidence. Singapore is an Indian Evidence Act jurisdiction which has retained those ideas, such as the non-distinction between relevance and admissibility, the framing of exclusionary rules in inclusionary terms, and the prohibition against relying on common law developments inconsistent with the Evidence Act. These peculiarities should have presented obstacles to the applicability of the common law concept of the judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence, but this has not been the case. In this article, I first suggest why Singapore courts might have been attracted to the concept, but I then highlight fundamental uncertainties regarding the concept's scope and normative justification. I proceed to propose an alternative paradigm for Singapore, namely using relevance and reliability as the only touchstones for admissibility of all evidence in criminal proceedings. The various advantages of this paradigm are also highlighted.

2021

The article deals with the problem of evidence and proof in civil proceedings in India. A number of foreign researchers focus on the issue of admissibility and inadmissibility of evidence in legal proceedings. In this regard, special attention is paid to the interpretation of different types of evidence and the legality of their inclusion or recusal in terms of judicial civil proceedings in India. Moreover, the situation is complicated by the global pandemic problem that makes the assessment of the validity of evidence more challenging for the judicial system of India and other countries in modern conditions.

Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 2015

Generally, evidence of bad character of a person especially accused in a case cannot be tendered as it is inadmissible. However, there are few situations where the evidence of bad character may be adduced as relevant in a case if it is provided under the ambit of Evidence Law. Among others, similar fact evidence may be given in a case although it will amount to a bad character of the accused. This article addresses the issue of relevancy of similar fact evidence in Malaysia by referring to the provisions under the Evidence Act 1950 and the decided cases. This article further explains the factors to be considered by the courts before admitting similar fact evidence against the accused in Malaysia. The article found that "striking similarity" which has been used as a main component in admitting similar fact evidence in Malaysia has been relaxed by the Malaysian apex court in the case of Public Prosecutor v Mohamad Roslan bin Desa. The article also found that though the Evidence Act 1950 does not contain any direct provisions relating to similar fact evidence, sections 14 and 15 have been used as similar fact provisions in Malaysia.

Res gestae has no exact English translation. A literal translation means "something deliberately undertaken or done". 1 Few areas of the common law of hearsay are in greater dispute than the doctrine of res gestae. 2 Dean Wigmore comments, "The phrase res gestae is, in the present state of the law, not only entirely useless, but even positively harmful… It ought therefore wholly to be repudiated, as a vicious element in our legal phraseology. It should never be mentioned."