A Simple Proof of Grounding Internality

Noûs

I systematically defend a novel account of the grounds for identity and distinctness facts: they are all uniquely zero-grounded. First, the Null Account is shown to avoid a range of problems facing other accounts: a relation satisfying the Null Account would be an excellent candidate for being the identity relation. Second, a plenitudinist view of relations suggests that there is such a relation. To flesh out this plenitudinist view I sketch a novel framework for expressing real definitions, use this framework to give a definition of identity, and show how the central features of the identity relation can be deduced from this definition.

Many philosophers have recently been impressed by an argument to the effect that all grounding facts about “derivative entities”—e.g. the facts expressed by the (let us suppose) true sentences ‘the fact that Beijing is a concrete entity is grounded in the fact that its parts are concrete’ and ‘the fact that there are cities is grounded in the fact that p’, where ‘p’ is a suitable sentence couched in the language of particle physics—must themselves be grounded. This argument relies on a principle, Purity, which states that facts about derivative entities are non-fundamental. Purity is questionable. In this paper, I introduce a new argument—the argument from Settledness—for a similar conclusion but which does not rely on Purity. The conclusion of the new argument is that every “thick” grounding fact is grounded, where a grounding fact [F is grounded in G, H, …] is said to be thick when at least one of F, G, H, … is a fact—a condition that is automatically satisfied if grounding is factive. After introducing the argument, I compare it with the argument from Purity, and I assess its cogency relative to the relevant accounts of the connections between grounding and fundamentality that are available in the literature.

A popular principle about grounding, "Internality", says that if A grounds B, then necessarily, if A and B obtain, then A grounds B. I argue that Internality is false. Its falsity reveals a distinctive, new kind of explanation, which I call "ennobling". Its falsity also entails that every previously proposed theory of what grounds grounding facts is false. I construct a new theory.

2021

A popular stance amongst philosophers is one according to which, in Lewis’ words, “identity is utterly simple and unproblematic”. Building from Lewis’ famous passage on the matter, we reconstruct, and then criticize, an argument to the conclusion that identities cannot be grounded. With the help of relatively uncontroversial assumption concerning identity facts, we show that not all identities are equi-fundamental, and, on the contrary, some appear to be provided potential grounding bases using two-level identity criteria. Further potential grounding bases for identities are presented. Identity might be utterly simple and unproblematic, but this is not sufficient to conclude that identities are ungrounded, or fundamental.

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2017

The Problem of Iterated Ground is to explain what grounds truths about ground: if Γ grounds φ, what grounds that Γ grounds φ? This paper develops a novel solution to this problem. The basic idea is to connect ground to explanatory arguments. By developing a rigorous account of explanatory arguments we can equip operators for factive and non-factive ground with natural introduction and elimination rules. A satisfactory account of iterated ground falls directly out of the resulting logic: nonfactive grounding claims, if true, are zero-grounded in the sense of Fine.  Introduction If Γ 's being the case grounds φ's being the case, what grounds that Γ 's being the case grounds φ's being the case?  This is the Problem of Iterated Ground. (Dasgupta c; Bennett ; and deRosset ) have grappled with this problem from the point of view of metaphysics. But iterated ground is a problem not just for metaphysicians: the existing logics of ground  have had nothing to say about such iterated grounding claims. In this paper I propose a novel account of iterated ground and develop a logic of iterated ground. The account-what I will call the Zero-Grounding Account (zga for short)-is based Material from this paper has been presented at a reading group at Harvard University, the University of Texas at Austin, a conference on grounding at the University of Nottingham, a workshop at CSMN, a workshop on Ground and Groundedness at Munich and at the  meeting of the Eastern division of the APA. I'm grateful to members of the audience at all those places. I am very grateful to Michael Raven, Shamik Dasgupta, Øystein Linnebo, and Jönne Kriener for comments on earlier drafts of this material. Special thanks to Louis deRosset for extended discussions of the logics sketched in this paper and to Kit Fine for several suggestions that led to technical improvements. I am also very grateful for the detailed and very helpful comments I received from several anonymous reviewers.  Here Γ are some (true) propositions and φ is a (true) proposition. For the official formulation of claims of ground, see §  below. In the interest of readability I will not distinguish carefully between use and mention throughout.  Fine b; Correia , ; Schnieder ; Poggiolesi forthcoming.

2013

I discuss three recent counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding due to Jonathan Schaffer. I argue that the counterexamples don’t work and draw some conclusions about the relationship between grounding and explanation.

Synthese, 2018

I develop a reduction of grounding to essence. My approach is to think about the relation between grounding and essence on the model of a certain concept of existential dependence. I extend this concept of existential dependence in a couple of ways and argue that these extensions provide a reduction of grounding to essence if we use sorted variables that range over facts and take it that for a fact to obtain is for it to exist. I then use the account to resolve various issues surrounding the concept of grounding and its connection with essence; apply the account to paradigm cases and to the impure logic of grounding; and respond to objections.

I argue against some standard objections to identity criteria and argue that they should be understood as claims of generic ground.

Analytic Philosophy

Are grounding claims fully general in character? If a is F in virtue of being G, does it follow that anything that's G has to be F for that reason? According to the thesis of Weak Formality, the answer is 'yes'. In this paper, however, I argue that there is philosophical utility in rejecting this thesis. More exactly, I argue that two outstanding problems in contemporary metaphysics can be dealt with if we maintain that there can be cases of 'kind-dependent grounding', and, moreover, that once we allow for the possibility of such cases (in order to solve these problems), we must also hold that Weak Formality is false. The paper turns crucially on two main ideas, viz. (a) that each object instantiates a fundamental kind, which can determine certain of the properties it can have, and (b) that grounding relations can hold conditionally. As we will see, it is only in light of these two ideas that we can make sense of the notion of kind-dependent grounding that is central to this paper.

Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2019

I explore the logic of ground. I first develop a logic of weak ground. This logic strengthens the logic of weak ground presented by Fine in his ‘Guide to Ground.’ This logic, I argue, generates many plausible principles which Fine’s system leaves out. I then derive from this a logic of strict ground. I argue that there is a strong abductive case for adopting this logic. It’s elegant, parsimonious and explanatorily powerful. Yet, so I suggest, adopting it has important consequences. First, it means we should think of ground as a type of identity. Second, it means we should reject much of Fine’s logic of strict ground. I also show how the logic I develop connects to other systems in the literature. It is definitionally equivalent both to Angell’s logic of analytic containment and to Correia’s system G.