Schopenhauer on the charming, the beautiful and the sublime

This article analyzes the constitution of the metaphysics of the beautiful in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer present in the book The world as will and as representation. Therefore, an exposition of the theoretical foundations of the metaphysics of the Will is made, and then the steps that comprise all the pessimism characteristic of the author's thought are examined, and thus understand how these contribute to the composition of aesthetic contemplation. Thus, a bibliographical research on the theme will be carried out, aiming to understand how these conceptions contribute to the aesthetic experience, analyzing the main concepts and particularities of the ideas of the German philosopher.

Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch, 2001

European Journal of Philosophy, 2008

Routledge eBooks, 2016

Schopenhauer's claims about the principle of sufficient reason face several significant problems, not in the least because he is adamant that his theory of knowledge is compatible with a metaphysical view that distinguishes sharply between the phenomenal world (the world as representation) and the world as it is in itself (the world as will). His intriguing analysis of the peculiar type of perception he qualifies as aesthetic further complicates matters, as it is also intricately linked up with his dyadic conception of will and representation. Since Schopenhauer insists that perceiving an object aesthetically requires an exceptional attitude which enables us to pierce the veil of Maya and capture a glimpse of how the will manifests itself most adequately in (or as) Ideas, the question arises not only what are the specific features of such a kind of knowledge beyond the principle of sufficient reason, but also whether qualifying aesthetic cognition in this way may lead to a coherent phenomenology of aesthetic experience which safeguards the life-affirming nature of the aesthetic. Those two questions, which will guide us in what follows, are of the utmost importance in the broader context not only of Schopenhauer's epistemology and philosophy of mind but also of his philosophy as a whole, for (or so I shall argue) answering them in a satisfactory way will enable us to give the lie to those who, like Nietzsche, unjustly repudiate his view of aesthetic experience as misguided and ultimately hostile to life. First, then, I will briefly discuss the tenets of Schopenhauer's theory of sensory perception. I then contrast this with his account of aesthetic perception and cognition (ästhetische Anschauung und Erkenntnis), which arguably transcends the principle of sufficient reason. Further, I aim to show that the consensus view of Schopenhauer's theory of the aesthetic

Schopenhauer is renowned for his account of the pleasures of aesthetic contemplation. A lot and perhaps even most of Schopenhauer's insightful account of the arts can be reduced to a kind of enlightened aesthetic attitude theory that relates all artistic achievements back to the value of the aesthetic experiences afforded. But Schopenhauer's account of tragedy reveals some reticence about the 'aesthetic experience' approach that is usually attributed to him. Although Christopher Janaway (along with many other commentators) is right to emphasise the crucial importance of the pleasure of will-less tranquillity, 1 Schopenhauer's analysis of the significance of tragedy at least suggests that we cannot explain the value of all art in terms of the pleasurable experience afforded. We do not value a work of art merely because it offers us pleasure, nor do we repudiate it because it fails to do so. Janaway rightly insists that 'aesthetics is at the heart of philosophy for Schopenhauer', 2 but also ultimately reduces Schopenhauer's theory of art to an account of aesthetic pleasure. However, unlike Paul Guyer, for example, 3 he argues that 'Schopenhauer's philosophy, at a deeper level, is more Platonic than it is Kantian'. 4 His main arguments are: first, that the theory of Platonic Ideas is no mere ad hoc insertion into a dominantly Kantian framework, but a carefully prepared and fundamental insight; and, second, that his account of aesthetic experience is ultimately preoccupied with timeless and painless contemplation-i.e. the younger Schopenhauer's so-called ideal of the 'better consciousness': the timeless, painless subject-which is 'indissolubly' connected with the knowledge of (Platonic) Ideas. I shall argue that some important (and often neglected) aspects of Schopenhauer's insightful discussion of tragedy show that the thesis that the value of art is reducible to the aesthetic pleasure it affords is inadequate. 5 Pace some of what Schopenhauer himself suggests, the value of the understanding offered by an artwork does not solely consist in the pleasure it may generate. Although Schopenhauer does not sufficiently develop this strand of thought, he nonetheless rightly suggests that a theory that conceives of artistic value as being fully exhausted by aesthetic value cannot but be mistaken.

Heythrop Journal-a Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Theology, 2009

Schopenhauer has been portrayed, since the emergence of the analytic philosophies of Russell and Moore 1 , with respect to two primary philosophical results. On the one hand, he is described as a 'metaphysician' of the Will. On the other hand, he is depicted as an 'ethicist' of the tragic self-denial of the Will. Indeed, there is much evidence for such interpretations in his magnum opus. Yet, the collateral effect of our captivation to this picture of mere philosophical results has been to render Schopenhauer's philosophy into a closed circle or a philosophical dead-end. Indeed, even the rare admissions of his influence upon major philosophers such as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein 2 have been accompanied by a decided suppression of any consideration of the philosophical context of Schopenhauer's original questioning and of the specific meaning of 'metaphysics' amid his post-Kantian horizons. Until the last decade or so, the usual attitude to the philosophy of Schopenhauer has been dominated by the prejudicial legacy of the logical positivists -and other antimetaphysicians -with their respective dismissals of 'metaphysical' philosophies. For these iconoclasts, the philosophy of Schopenhauer is a contradictory, idiosyncraticbut above all metaphysical -teaching which sought, due to its own weakness or obscurity (or, Orientalism), to escape from the facticity of existence. 3 Of course, Nietzsche could be blamed for some aspects of this picture of Schopenhauer. Yet, while we will see below that Nietzsche's criticisms may have their merit, the character of his criticisms is quite distinct from that of the positivists. Indeed, I will explore the depth of the philosophy of Schopenhauer that exceeds the merely anti-2 metaphysical critiques, especially in light of his overt animosity to idealistic interpretations of Kantian philosophy and the Absolute idealism of Hegel, both dominant in the Academy of his day. To simply brand him a 'metaphysician' without any specification of the philosophical context simply obscures that which is critical for an understanding of his philosophy. Schopenhauer does not, as with Kant's description of the 'rationalists', simply play amongst the plethora of mere concepts, nor, does he descend into the passive state of pre-critical 'empiricism'. On the contrary, as a 'good', though dissident, post-Kantian, he remains a transcendental philosopher, but, one honest enough to enact a radical phenomenologyhis own hermeneutics of existence. He not only acknowledges our finite predicament, but also discloses phenomenologies of pain, pleasure, laughter and weeping, etc. (not to mention, for the moment, those of beauty and the sublime). In this light, my emphasis will be upon his methodology of contemplation, from which these philosophical results arose in the first place. We will find in Schopenhauer's contemplations upon the body, nature and art, an aesthetic phenomenology, one far removed from that of either Husserl or Nietzsche. 4

Arthur Schopenhauer’s theory of aesthetic contemplation is the most viable of his paths towards happiness, for as Schopenhauer’s asceticism seeks to negate life by negating the active will, his aestheticism actively affirms it – the former state is impossible, for to negate the will one must continue willing, leaving the latter as the only workable option. This will first be proven by examining the aesthetic experience’s basis in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, then establishing various steps that will cement it as an active force through a series of reconceptualizations: a negation of certain desires in order to train the mind and the body to be open to a broader range of positive experience, and a commitment to not concern oneself with ends or with value judgments. This will then allow the subject to be open to the aesthetic experience at every possible juncture, thereby living aesthetically.

The human mind, with its complexities, generally finds its identity in unity with a complex order and beauty. This accounts for the ease with which the magnificence of nature and art capture our marvel and wonder. Ducasse was quick to assent to this, when he observed that ‘beauty, or even the thought of it, is a thing so mysteriously thrilling to many persons that they regard as both sacrilege and presumption, any attempt to dissect it, feeling that this but kills instead of reveals its pure essence’. Beauty, here, is a property of a given object that offers the capacity of the object to cause pleasure in a subject who contemplates it. Such objects can be classified under broad distinctions, as works of nature or as works of art. Works of art, of which we are more concerned, are but a reflection of the inner creation of the human imagination, the ability to create or imitate, with a striking relevance for the human person and his/her society. A philosophy of art, therefore, will attempt to scrutinize, firstly the fundamental concepts that embody our understanding of art, and then, furthermore, to offer a succinct demarcation of art from non-art, and finally, to propose a theory of art that provides a deep, explanatory account of art and its relevance to society. It is this latter concern of philosophy of art that Schopenhauer sought to tackle. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was a most peculiar philosopher, with an originality of thought that was generally outstanding. He was a staunch pessimist, unlike a good deal of his predecessors and communicated this, as the canvas for his picture of the universe. Despite his strong cynicism, he held a remarkable interest in art and ethics, expressing his being admired as a ‘man of wide culture’. Accordingly, it is the butt of this essay to critically expose the philosophy of art of the great German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer. To carry out this set task, the paper will start off with a consideration of the philosophical background of Schopenhauer’s presentation on art, before delving into his theory of art. Finally, the essay will address Schopenhauer on the epistemological value of art, and round-off with an evaluation and conclusion of the entire work.

Schopenhauer's account of the nature of Aesthetic Contemplation.