Theory of motion with historical perspective.

Aristotle defines motion as such: 'The fulfillment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exist potentially, is motion.' (Phy., 1 Γ, 1, 201a10-11) He defines it again in the same chapter: 'It is the fulfillment of what is potential when it is already fully real and operates not as itself but as movable, that is motion. What I mean by 'as' is this: Bronze is potentially a statue. But it is not the fulfillment of bronze as bronze which is motion.' (Phy., Γ, 1) 2) Motion: not a real thing Aristotle believes that 'there is no such thing as motion over and above the things' that is supposed to mean that motion cannot be something else than his categories: 'It is always

International Journal of Mechanical and Production Engineering Research and Development, 2020

Philosophers since times immemorial have endeavoured to comprehend the reality of nature and within it the primacy of "motion". An attempt in this enquiry is being made, to sieve through the corpus of thought, relating to the ontology of motion through primary and secondary data. The article traces the systematic attempt over the ages to cogitate on and formulate the concept of motion, beginning with the ancient mechanistic view, and culminating in Newton's work. In this exposition we scrutinize the shift from positivism, to what Husserl called idealization to account for the scientific theories of motion. In Newton's own words, "Since the ancients esteemed the science of mechanics of greatest importance in the investigation of natural things, and the moderns rejecting substantial forms and occult qualities, have endeavoured to subject the phenomenon of nature to the laws of mathematics, as far as it relates to philosophy" (Newton,1952 ,p.1). In the spirit of a larger inquiry, we have tried to identify whether any of the thought processes emerging out with the onset of the Scientific Revolution could be gleaned in any of the preceding historical moments of intellectual investigation.

European Journal of Physics, 2024

This study delves into the historical development of the core principles of dynamics, namely the interplay between forces and motion. We explore the intricate and nonlinear transition from the Aristotelian framework, which held sway for eighteen centuries, to the Newtonian paradigm. We posit that the complexity of this transition largely stems from what we perceive as an inadequate understanding of force. Our focus lies particularly on the seminal contributions of Galileo and the subsequent remarkable advancements made by Newton. However, we also note that, somewhat surprisingly, the transition does not conclude with Newton himself. What is commonly known as Newtonian dynamics in modern textbooks diverges significantly from the original theory outlined in the Principia, and we endeavour to elucidate these disparities. In the concluding sections, we scrutinise the implications of these concepts for contemporary teaching methodologies. Specifically, we delve into various interpretations of the Principle of Inertia, the Second Law, and their interrelationship, pinpointing what we perceive as weak points in current didactic approaches and proffering some suggestions for effectively imparting these concepts.

The persistence of students' misconceptions about motion illustrates the enormous difficulty that teachers face in their attempts to overcome these with traditional physics instruction. An understanding of students' ideas about motion and ways to incorporate them into successful instructional approaches can be obtained from an analysis of historical evidence about certain aspects of dynamics previously held. Inquiry-based instruction can proceed effectively within a context that provides familiar situations to students, where teachers have an awareness of the origin and role of difficulties that inexorably lead to misconceptions about certain properties of motion. What appears as a bewildering array of views about motion can make sense when seen with a historical perspective on the evolution of human understanding about dynamics.

2013

By examining the theory of relativity, we postulate that every massive particle specifies a space-time body frame in a universal entity, which may be referred to as ether. As a result, the four-dimensional theory of general accelerating motion is developed. It is seen that the relative motion of particles is actually the result of relative four-dimensional rotation of their corresponding space-time body frames. Consequently, the governing geometry of relative motion is non-Euclidean.

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 1995

The main object of this thesis is to expose arguments defending the view according to which Kepler emerged as a modern physicist by refuting the Aristotelian worldview as metaphysics. A key concept in this quest will be that of motion. A comparison of Aristotle’s concept of motion with “Kepler motion” will be an instrument to reveal Kepler’s worldview. To conclude, another key concept will be used: that of falsification as formulated by Karl Raymund Popper. Kepler’s rejection of Aristotle’s worldview is based on Kepler’s refusal of considering the validity of a theory when the theory in question is proven to be pure metaphysics. A metaphysical hypothesis has no alternative, it cannot be refuted or denied by any other hypothesis, least by scientific ones. A metaphysical hypothesis (theory) requires belief while scientific hypotheses (theories) require scientific proof. Therefore, the Aristotelian worldview cannot be, in Kepler’s eyes, falsified by a scientific theory as the two belong to different categories. A theory that is proven unfalsifiable is automatically being refuted.

I show that Aristotelian physics is a correct approximation of Newtonian physics in its appropriate domain, in the same precise sense in which Newton theory is an approximation of Einstein's theory. Aristotelian physics lasted long not because it became dogma, but because it is a very good theory.

Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2008