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2016
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11 pages
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The partial ceasefire led to some slight optimism that the negotiations in Geneva on 14 April might make some progress. A slight change in a government position enhanced this optimism. President Assad, in an interview on 1 April, said that “in principle” he agreed to the idea of presidential elections where all Syrians, inside and outside the country, would have the right to vote. He also took a more flexible stand than the armed opposition, saying that the government would consider any group to be part of the political process if it agreed to join the truce and “engage in dialogue” with the Syrian state.
2016
Following UN Security Council Resolution 2254, De Mistura announced the next round of Geneva Talks for 25 January. These negotiations were to start as indirect ones, with De Mistura shuttling between the delegations. His first priority was to stop the violence. Clause five of Resolution 2254 called for the International Syria Support Group, primarily the United States and Russia, to help implement an immediate “cessation of violence.” His second priority was to discuss the 18 month transitional period, which was still subject to various interpretations.
2016
Despite some violations, the ceasefire not only reduced the level of violence, it also gave new life to the Geneva negotiation process. De Mistura said he was optimistic and knew that all ceasefires would have some violations. On March 14, negotiations resumed. De Mistura insisted that forming a transitional government would be the central issue.
Aleppo Conflict Timeline , 2017
The clouds of war started gathering after the fall of the Lavrov-Kerry agreement which aimed to cease hostilities in Aleppo. The fall of the ceasefire agreement was followed by intensified bombing on eastern Aleppo and periodic attacks towards western Aleppo. Blame exchanged between Russian and U.S. diplomats for breaking the agreement highlighted the fragmentation and fragility of the agreement and the lack of leverage over their allies on the ground. The resumption of violence caused mass scale damage and deterioration of living conditions in Aleppo, and gave space to armed opposition forces, especially Jabhat al-Nusra, to carry out further attacks. Although rebel groups managed to break the siege in eastern Aleppo earlier in August 2016, which allowed food and ammunitions to enter the eastern part, the humanitarian situation deteriorated, and the level of deprivation inflicted upon inhabitants of eastern Aleppo increased until the fall of the city in December 2016. In continuation of the regime’s strategy “Surrender or We Wipe You Out”1, bids for an urgent intervention to stop the annihilation of eastern Aleppo and its people went in vain. To access the article online, please follow this link: http://www.thealeppoproject.com/the-fall-of-aleppo-city/
2016
Syria is suffering the brutal winter that followed the Arab Spring. This popular outpouring for social, economic and political change in the Middle East and North Africa started in Tunisia and has not ended yet despite the efforts of many governments to crush it. In February 2011, Damascene protestors began to defy the heavy hand of the repressive state, which had been exercising power since 1970. The torture of several children by the security forces prompted more protests in Deraa in March. For the first six months, the protesters were largely non-violent, but even peaceful protests met with intense brutality from the state. By September, armed rebel movements had emerged in response and Syria sank into what would become a catastrophic civil war.
The struggle for the Syrian city of Aleppo is of great strategic importance for all conflict stakeholders. The winner on the front line will significantly determine the course of negotiations regarding a ceasefire as well as the political future of Syria. The Aleppo offensive is, therefore, a matter of life and death for the armed opposition in their fight against the regime and its allies. Peace in Syria can ultimately only be achieved by pressure from outside. If the United States and Russia pull on one rope together, the chances are good that the regime will bend to Russian demands and open up to an inclusive process leading to political stabilization.
2022
The Battle of Aleppo is undoubtedly the most decisive battle in the exhausting war in Syria. Aleppo being the largest city in the country, adding here the heterogeneous ethno-religious structure of the population, became the strategic node where the fate of the war and the survival of the Assad regime, were largely determined. It is estimated that about 30 different anti-government groups operated in the city. In the most complicated position was the Kurdish-inhabited district, protected by the Kurdish Protection Units (YPG). The multidimensionality of the war will force them to change alliances and attitudes towards other warring parties
Middle East Quarterly, 2019
President Bashar al-Assad is winning in Syria. Russia has shifted the balance of power there dramatically. Assad, in short, is dividing his enemies and counting on his ability to pick off one at a time. It is hard to imagine Assad losing or being thrown back to some Alawite ethnic canton. The real question is how much of Syria Assad can retake. Assad believes that the Russians will carry him to the finish line, but that is not at all certain. The Syrian regime already rules over some 75 percent of Syria’s Arab population. Assad seems convinced that he can bully the remaining 25 percent into “accepting” the bitterness of defeat in exchange for the end to deprivation and war. But that will likely take years. Much depends on Turkey and the Gulf states, the primary sponsors of the rebels.
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